Process Creation with Suspicious CommandLine Arguments

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This analytic rule detects process creation events with base64 encoded command line arguments. This could be an indication of a malicious process being executed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1059` Command and Scripting Interpreter
Stealth	`T1027` Obfuscated Files or Information

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Sysmon	Event ID 5	Process terminated
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4689	A process has exited.

Rule body kusto

id: fdbcc0eb-44fb-467e-a51d-a91df0780a81
name: Process Creation with Suspicious CommandLine Arguments 
description: |
  This analytic rule detects process creation events with base64 encoded command line arguments. This could be an indication of a malicious process being executed.
severity: Medium
status: Available 
tags:
  - Schema: _ASim_ProcessEvent
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.4
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CrowdStrikeFalconEndpointProtection
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: SentinelOne
    dataTypes:
      - SentinelOne_CL
  - connectorId: VMwareCarbonBlack
    dataTypes:
      - CarbonBlackEvents_CL
  - connectorId: CiscoSecureEndpoint
    dataTypes:
      - CiscoSecureEndpoint_CL
  - connectorId: TrendMicroApexOne
    dataTypes:
      - TMApexOneEvent
  - connectorId: TrendMicroApexOneAma
    dataTypes:
      - TMApexOneEvent
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Execution
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1059
  - T1027
query: |
  _ASim_ProcessEvent
  | where EventType == 'ProcessCreated'
  | extend CommandLineArgs = strcat_array(array_slice(split(CommandLine, " "), 1, -1), " ")
  | where strlen(CommandLineArgs) > 0
  | where CommandLineArgs contains "base64"
  | project
  TimeGenerated,
  DvcHostname,
  DvcIpAddr,
  DvcDomain,
  TargetUsername,
  TargetUsernameType,
  TargetProcessName,
  TargetProcessId,
  CommandLine
  | extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[1]), TargetUsername)
  | extend NTDomain = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[0]), TargetUsername)
  | extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[0]), Username)
  | extend UPNSuffix = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[1]), '')
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: DvcHostname
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DvcDomain
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: NTDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: DvcIpAddr
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Username
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: NTDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: TargetProcessId
      - identifier: CommandLine
        columnName: CommandLine
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "Process with suspicious command line arguments was created on {{DvcHostname}} ({{DvcIpAddr}}) by ({{TargetUsername}})"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "Process '{{TargetProcessName}}' ProcessId: '{{TargetProcessId}}' with commandline {{CommandLine}} was created."
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

_ASim_ProcessEvent

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventType == 'ProcessCreated'

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend CommandLineArgs = strcat_array(array_slice(split(CommandLine, " "), 1, -1), " ")

Stage 4: `where`

| where strlen(CommandLineArgs) > 0

Stage 5: `where`

| where CommandLineArgs contains "base64"

Stage 6: `project`

| project
TimeGenerated,
DvcHostname,
DvcIpAddr,
DvcDomain,
TargetUsername,
TargetUsernameType,
TargetProcessName,
TargetProcessId,
CommandLine

Stage 7: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[1]), TargetUsername)
| extend NTDomain = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[0]), TargetUsername)
| extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[0]), Username)
| extend UPNSuffix = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[1]), '')

Username =

ifTargetUsernameType == "Windows"tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[1])

elseTargetUsername

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLineArgs`	contains	`base64`
`CommandLineArgs`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`EventType`	eq	`ProcessCreated` transforms: `cased` corpus 10 (kusto 10)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`CommandLine`	`project`
`DvcDomain`	`project`
`DvcHostname`	`project`
`DvcIpAddr`	`project`
`TargetProcessId`	`project`
`TargetProcessName`	`project`
`TargetUsername`	`project`
`TargetUsernameType`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`Username`	`extend`
`NTDomain`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Process Creation with Suspicious CommandLine Arguments

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `project`

Stage 7: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Process Creation with Suspicious CommandLine Arguments

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: project

Stage 7: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `project`

Stage 7: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)