Detection rules › Kusto
Detecting UAC bypass - ChangePK and SLUI registry tampering
This query identifies setting a registry key under HKCU, launching slui.exe and then ChangePK.exe.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Impact |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | DeviceProcessEvents action any: Process activity |
Rule body
id: 829a69ba-93e1-491f-8a1f-b19506e9d88a
name: Detecting UAC bypass - ChangePK and SLUI registry tampering
description: |
This query identifies setting a registry key under HKCU, launching slui.exe and then ChangePK.exe.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Impact
relevantTechniques:
- T1490
query: |
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "slui.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "changepk.exe"
| where ProcessIntegrityLevel == "High"
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DeviceName
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Sid
columnName: AccountSid
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountDomain
- entityType: Process
fieldMappings:
- identifier: CommandLine
columnName: ProcessCommandLine
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
DeviceProcessEvents
Stage 2: where
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "slui.exe"
Stage 3: where
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "changepk.exe"
Stage 4: where
| where ProcessIntegrityLevel == "High"
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.