TI Map URL Entity to SecurityAlert Data

Severity: medium
Time window: 14d
Group by: AlertName, IndicatorId
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This query identifies any URL indicators of compromise (IOCs) from threat intelligence (TI) by searching for matches in SecurityAlert data.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Command & Control	`T1071` Application Layer Protocol

Rule body kusto

id: f30a47c1-65fb-42b1-a7f4-00941c12550b
name: TI Map URL Entity to SecurityAlert Data
description: |
  'This query identifies any URL indicators of compromise (IOCs) from threat intelligence (TI) by searching for matches in SecurityAlert data.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftCloudAppSecurity
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: AzureSecurityCenter
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: ThreatIntelligence
    dataTypes:
      - ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
  - connectorId: ThreatIntelligenceTaxii
    dataTypes:
      - ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
  - connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderThreatIntelligence
    dataTypes:
      - ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1071
query: |
  let dt_lookBack = 1h;
  let ioc_lookBack = 14d;
  let URLRegex = "((https?|ftp|ldap|wss?|file):\\/\\/(([\\:\\%\\w\\_\\-]+(\\.|@))*((xn--)?[a-zA-Z0-9\\-]+\\.)+(xn--[a-z0-9]+|[A-Za-z]+)|\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{0,3})[.,:\\w@?^=%&\\/~+#-]*[\\w@?^=%&\\/~+#-])";
  let SecurityEvents = materialize(SecurityAlert
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(dt_lookBack)
    | extend MSTI = case(AlertName has "TI map" and VendorName == "Microsoft" and ProductName == 'Azure Sentinel', true, false)
    | where MSTI == false
    // Extract URL from JSON data
    | mv-expand parse_json(Entities)
    | where isnotempty(Entities.Url) or isnotempty(Entities.Urls)
    | extend Url = coalesce(Entities.Url, Entities.Urls)
    | mv-expand Url
    | extend Url = tolower(Url)
    // Extract hostname from JSON data for entity mapping
    | extend Compromised_Host = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).["Compromised Host"])
    | extend Alert_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated);
  let EventUrls = materialize(SecurityEvents | distinct Url | summarize make_list(Url));
  ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
  | where isnotempty(Url)
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(ioc_lookBack)
  | extend Url = tolower(Url)
  | where tolower(Url) in (EventUrls)
  | summarize LatestIndicatorTime = arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by IndicatorId
  | where Active == true and ExpirationDateTime > now()
  | where Description !contains_cs "State: inactive;" and Description !contains_cs "State: falsepos;" 
  // using innerunique to keep perf fast and result set low, we only need one match to indicate potential malicious activity that needs to be investigated
  | join kind=innerunique (SecurityEvents) on Url
  | where Alert_TimeGenerated < ExpirationDateTime
  | summarize Alert_TimeGenerated = arg_max(Alert_TimeGenerated, *) by IndicatorId, AlertName
  | project timestamp = Alert_TimeGenerated, ActivityGroupNames, IndicatorId, ThreatType, ExpirationDateTime, ConfidenceScore, AlertName, AlertSeverity, Description, Url, Compromised_Host
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: Compromised_Host
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: Url
version: 1.2.8
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let dt_lookBack = 1h;
let ioc_lookBack = 14d;

Let binding: `URLRegex`

let URLRegex = "((https?|ftp|ldap|wss?|file):\\/\\/(([\\:\\%\\w\\_\\-]+(\\.|@))*((xn--)?[a-zA-Z0-9\\-]+\\.)+(xn--[a-z0-9]+|[A-Za-z]+)|\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{0,3})[.,:\\w@?^=%&\\/~+#-]*[\\w@?^=%&\\/~+#-])";

Let binding: `SecurityEvents`

let SecurityEvents = materialize(SecurityAlert
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(dt_lookBack)
  | extend MSTI = case(AlertName has "TI map" and VendorName == "Microsoft" and ProductName == 'Azure Sentinel', true, false)
  | where MSTI == false
  | mv-expand parse_json(Entities)
  | where isnotempty(Entities.Url) or isnotempty(Entities.Urls)
  | extend Url = coalesce(Entities.Url, Entities.Urls)
  | mv-expand Url
  | extend Url = tolower(Url)
  | extend Compromised_Host = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).["Compromised Host"])
  | extend Alert_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated);

Derived from dt_lookBack.

Let binding: `EventUrls`

let EventUrls = materialize(SecurityEvents | distinct Url | summarize make_list(Url));

Derived from SecurityEvents.

Stage 1: `source`

ThreatIntelligenceIndicator

Stage 2: `where`

| where isnotempty(Url)

Stage 3: `where`

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(ioc_lookBack)

Stage 4: `extend`

| extend Url = tolower(Url)

Stage 5: `where`

| where tolower(Url) in (EventUrls)

References EventUrls (defined above).

Stage 6: `summarize`

| summarize LatestIndicatorTime = arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by IndicatorId

Stage 7: `where`

| where Active == true and ExpirationDateTime > now()

Stage 8: `where`

| where Description !contains_cs "State: inactive;" and Description !contains_cs "State: falsepos;"

Stage 9: `join`

| join kind=innerunique (SecurityEvents) on Url

Stage 10: `where`

| where Alert_TimeGenerated < ExpirationDateTime

Stage 11: `summarize`

| summarize Alert_TimeGenerated = arg_max(Alert_TimeGenerated, *) by IndicatorId, AlertName

Stage 12: `project`

| project timestamp = Alert_TimeGenerated, ActivityGroupNames, IndicatorId, ThreatType, ExpirationDateTime, ConfidenceScore, AlertName, AlertSeverity, Description, Url, Compromised_Host

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Description`	contains	`State: falsepos;`
`Description`	contains	`State: inactive;`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Active`	eq	`true` transforms: `cased`
`Alert_TimeGenerated`	lt	`ExpirationDateTime` transforms: `cased`
`MSTI`	eq	`false` transforms: `cased`
`Url`	in	`EventUrls` transforms: `tolower`, `cased`
`Url`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`Urls`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ActivityGroupNames`	`project`
`AlertName`	`project`
`AlertSeverity`	`project`
`Compromised_Host`	`project`
`ConfidenceScore`	`project`
`Description`	`project`
`ExpirationDateTime`	`project`
`IndicatorId`	`project`
`ThreatType`	`project`
`Url`	`project`
`timestamp`	`project`

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

TI Map URL Entity to SecurityAlert Data

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `URLRegex`

Let binding: `SecurityEvents`

Let binding: `EventUrls`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `where`

Stage 11: `summarize`

Stage 12: `project`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

TI Map URL Entity to SecurityAlert Data

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: URLRegex

Let binding: SecurityEvents

Let binding: EventUrls

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: summarize

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: join

Stage 10: where

Stage 11: summarize

Stage 12: project

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `URLRegex`

Let binding: `SecurityEvents`

Let binding: `EventUrls`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `where`

Stage 11: `summarize`

Stage 12: `project`