Unauthorized user access across AWS and Azure

Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: AWSNetworkEntity, AuthenticationRequirement, ClientAppUsed, ConditionalAccessStatus, IPAddress, OperationName, RiskDetail, UserAgent, UserPrincipalName
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This detection compiles and correlates unauthorized user access alerts originating from AWS GuardDuty with Azure portal sign-in activities. It focuses on AWS GuardDuty alerts related to unauthorized user access, specifically targeting network IP associations tied to activities such as logins from malicious IP addresses or instance credential exfiltration attempts. The ditection leverages these common network IP advisories to detect and pinpoint unauthorized users attempting to access both AWS and Azure resources.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1110.003` Brute Force: Password Spraying, `T1110.004` Brute Force: Credential Stuffing, `T1212` Exploitation for Credential Access, `T1557` Adversary-in-the-Middle
Discovery	`T1087` Account Discovery, `T1580` Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Exfiltration	`T1048` Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Rule body kusto

id: 60f31001-018a-42bf-8045-a92e1f361b7b
name: Unauthorized user access across AWS and Azure
description: |
  'This detection compiles and correlates unauthorized user access alerts originating from AWS GuardDuty with Azure portal sign-in activities. It focuses on AWS GuardDuty alerts related to unauthorized user access, specifically targeting network IP associations tied to activities such as logins from malicious IP addresses or instance credential exfiltration attempts. The ditection leverages these common network IP advisories to detect and pinpoint unauthorized users attempting to access both AWS and Azure resources.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - SigninLogs
  - connectorId: AWSS3
    dataTypes:
      - AWSGuardDuty
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - Exfiltration
  - Discovery
relevantTechniques:
  - T1557
  - T1110
  - T1110.003
  - T1110.004
  - T1212
  - T1048
  - T1087
  - T1580
query: |
    // Define a variable 'AwsAlert' to collect Unauthorized user access alerts from AWS GuardDuty table
    let AwsAlert = materialize (
        AWSGuardDuty
        | where ActivityType has_any ("UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller", "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom", 
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS", "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B","UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller")
        | extend
            AWSAlertId = Id, 
            AWSAlertTitle = Title,
            AWSAlertDescription = Description,
            AWSresourceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).resourceType),
            AWSNetworkEntity = tostring(parse_json(ServiceDetails).action.awsApiCallAction.remoteIpDetails.ipAddressV4),
            AWSAlertUserNameEntity = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).accessKeyDetails.userName),
            InstanceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).instanceDetails.instanceType),
            AWSTargetingService = parse_json(ServiceDetails).additionalInfo.apiCalls,
            AWSAlertTime = TimeCreated,
            AWSAlertLink= tostring(strcat('https://us-east-1.console.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/home?region=us-east-1#/findings?macros=current&fId=',Id)),
            Severity = 
      case (
        Severity >= 7.0, "High",
        Severity between (4.0 .. 6.9), "Medium",
        Severity between (1.0 .. 3.9), "Low",
        "Unknown")
        | mv-apply AIPCall = AWSTargetingService on 
            ( 
            where AIPCall has "name"    
            | extend APICallName = tostring(AIPCall.name), APICallCount = tostring(AIPCall["count"])
            ) 
        | distinct
            AWSAlertTime,
            ActivityType,
            Severity,
            AWSAlertId,
            AWSAlertTitle,
            AWSAlertDescription,
            AWSAlertLink,
            Arn,
            AWSresourceType,
            AWSNetworkEntity,
            AWSAlertUserNameEntity,
            InstanceType,
            APICallName,
            APICallCount      
        );
        // Define a variable 'Azure_sigin' to collect Azure portal Signing activity from SigninLogs Table
        let Azure_sigin = materialize (SigninLogs
            | where AppDisplayName == "Azure Portal"
            | where isnotempty(OriginalRequestId)
            | summarize 
                totalAzureLoginEventId = dcount(OriginalRequestId), 
                AzureFailedEventsCount = dcountif(OriginalRequestId, ResultType != 0), 
                AzureSuccessfulEventsCount = dcountif(OriginalRequestId, ResultType == 0),
                AzureSetOfFailedEvents = makeset(iff(ResultType != 0, OriginalRequestId, ""), 5), 
                AzureSetOfSuccessfulEvents = makeset(iff(ResultType == 0, OriginalRequestId, ""), 5) 
            by 
                IPAddress, 
                UserPrincipalName, 
                bin(TimeGenerated, 1min), 
                UserAgent,
                ConditionalAccessStatus,
                OperationName,
                RiskDetail,
                AuthenticationRequirement,
                ClientAppUsed 
            // Extracting the name and UPN suffix from UserPrincipalName
            | extend
                Name = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]),
                UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
        );
        // Join 'AwsAlert' and 'Azure_sigin' on the AWS Network Entity and Azure IP Address
        AwsAlert
        | join kind=inner Azure_sigin on $left.AWSNetworkEntity == $right.IPAddress
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPAddress
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
customDetails:
  AWSAlertUserName: AWSAlertUserNameEntity
  AWSArn: Arn
  AWSresourceType: AWSresourceType
  AWSInstanceType: InstanceType
  AWSAPICallName: APICallName
  AWSAPICallCount: APICallCount
  AzureUserAgent: UserAgent
  AzureUser: UserPrincipalName
  AzureClientAppUsed: ClientAppUsed
  AzConditionalAccess: ConditionalAccessStatus
  AzureOperationName: OperationName
  AzureRiskDetail: RiskDetail
  AzAuthRequirement: AuthenticationRequirement
  alertSeverity: Severity
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "{{AWSNetworkEntity}} from {{AWSAlertTitle}} observed in Azure Singins with {{UserPrincipalName}}"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "  This detection compiles and correlates unauthorized user access alerts originating from AWS GuardDuty With Alert Description '{{AWSAlertDescription}}' with Azure portal sign-in activities. It focuses on AWS GuardDuty alerts related to unauthorized user access, specifically targeting network IP associations tied to activities such as logins from malicious IP addresses or instance credential exfiltration attempts. The detection leverages these common network IP advisories to detect and pinpoint unauthorized users attempting to access both AWS and Azure resources.  \n\n AWS ALert Link : '{{AWSAlertLink}}' \n\n Find More Details :https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-active.html"
  alertSeverityColumnName: Severity
  alertDynamicProperties:
    - alertProperty: AlertLink
      value: AWSAlertLink
    - alertProperty: ProviderName
      value: "AWS"
    - alertProperty: ProductName
      value: "AWSGuardDuty"
    - alertProperty: ProductComponentName
      value: "AWSGuardDuty"
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.4

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `Azure_sigin`

let Azure_sigin = materialize (SigninLogs
        | where AppDisplayName == "Azure Portal"
        | where isnotempty(OriginalRequestId)
        | summarize 
            totalAzureLoginEventId = dcount(OriginalRequestId), 
            AzureFailedEventsCount = dcountif(OriginalRequestId, ResultType != 0), 
            AzureSuccessfulEventsCount = dcountif(OriginalRequestId, ResultType == 0),
            AzureSetOfFailedEvents = makeset(iff(ResultType != 0, OriginalRequestId, ""), 5), 
            AzureSetOfSuccessfulEvents = makeset(iff(ResultType == 0, OriginalRequestId, ""), 5) 
        by 
            IPAddress, 
            UserPrincipalName, 
            bin(TimeGenerated, 1min), 
            UserAgent,
            ConditionalAccessStatus,
            OperationName,
            RiskDetail,
            AuthenticationRequirement,
            ClientAppUsed 
        | extend
            Name = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]),
            UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    );

The stages below define let AwsAlert (the rule's main pipeline source).

Stage 1: `source`

AWSGuardDuty

Stage 2: `where`

| where ActivityType has_any ("UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller", "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom", 
    "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS", "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS",
    "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B","UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller")

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend
        AWSAlertId = Id, 
        AWSAlertTitle = Title,
        AWSAlertDescription = Description,
        AWSresourceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).resourceType),
        AWSNetworkEntity = tostring(parse_json(ServiceDetails).action.awsApiCallAction.remoteIpDetails.ipAddressV4),
        AWSAlertUserNameEntity = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).accessKeyDetails.userName),
        InstanceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).instanceDetails.instanceType),
        AWSTargetingService = parse_json(ServiceDetails).additionalInfo.apiCalls,
        AWSAlertTime = TimeCreated,
        AWSAlertLink= tostring(strcat('https://us-east-1.console.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/home?region=us-east-1#/findings?macros=current&fId=',Id)),
        Severity = 
  case (
    Severity >= 7.0, "High",
    Severity between (4.0 .. 6.9), "Medium",
    Severity between (1.0 .. 3.9), "Low",
    "Unknown")

Severity =

ifSeverity >= 7.0"High"

elifSeverity >= 4.0 and Severity <= 6.9"Medium"

elifSeverity >= 1.0 and Severity <= 3.9"Low"

else"Unknown"

Stage 4: `kusto:mv-apply`

| mv-apply AIPCall = AWSTargetingService on 
        ( 
        where AIPCall has "name"    
        | extend APICallName = tostring(AIPCall.name), APICallCount = tostring(AIPCall["count"])
        )

Stage 5: `distinct`

| distinct
        AWSAlertTime,
        ActivityType,
        Severity,
        AWSAlertId,
        AWSAlertTitle,
        AWSAlertDescription,
        AWSAlertLink,
        Arn,
        AWSresourceType,
        AWSNetworkEntity,
        AWSAlertUserNameEntity,
        InstanceType,
        APICallName,
        APICallCount

The stages below run on AwsAlert (the outer pipeline).

Stage 6: `join`

AwsAlert
| join kind=inner Azure_sigin on $left.AWSNetworkEntity == $right.IPAddress

Stage 7: `summarize`

summarize by IPAddress, UserPrincipalName, UserAgent, ConditionalAccessStatus, OperationName, RiskDetail, AuthenticationRequirement, ClientAppUsed

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AIPCall`	match	`name` transforms: `term`
`ActivityType`	match	`UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B` `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS` `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS` `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller` `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom` `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller`
`AppDisplayName`	eq	`Azure Portal` transforms: `cased`
`OriginalRequestId`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AuthenticationRequirement`	`summarize`
`ClientAppUsed`	`summarize`
`ConditionalAccessStatus`	`summarize`
`IPAddress`	`summarize`
`OperationName`	`summarize`
`RiskDetail`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`UserPrincipalName`	`summarize`

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`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Unauthorized user access across AWS and Azure

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `Azure_sigin`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 5: `distinct`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `summarize`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Unauthorized user access across AWS and Azure

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: Azure_sigin

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: kusto:mv-apply

Stage 5: distinct

Stage 6: join

Stage 7: summarize

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `Azure_sigin`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 5: `distinct`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `summarize`