Detect Windows Allow Firewall Rule Addition/Modification

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This analytic rule detects any registry value creation or modification of Windows firewall registry keys to allow network traffic. This could be an indication of defense evasion by an adversary to allow network traffic to/from a compromised host.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1562` Impair Defenses

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 12	RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Sysmon	Event ID 14	RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4657	A registry value was modified.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4660	An object was deleted.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4663	An attempt was made to access an object.
Defender-DeviceRegistryEvents	RegistryKeyDeleted	Registry key deleted
Defender-DeviceRegistryEvents	RegistryValueSet	Registry value set
Defender-DeviceRegistryEvents	RegistryValueDeleted	Registry value deleted
Defender-DeviceRegistryEvents	RegistryKeyRenamed	Registry key renamed

Rule body kusto

id: 056593d4-ca3b-47a7-be9d-d1d0884a1d36
name: Detect Windows Allow Firewall Rule Addition/Modification
description: |
  This analytic rule detects any registry value creation or modification of Windows firewall registry keys to allow network traffic. This could be an indication of defense evasion by an adversary to allow network traffic to/from a compromised host.
severity: Medium
status: Available 
tags:
  - Schema: _ASim_RegistryEvent
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.2
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CrowdStrikeFalconEndpointProtection
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: SentinelOne
    dataTypes:
      - SentinelOne_CL
  - connectorId: VMwareCarbonBlack
    dataTypes:
      - CarbonBlackEvents_CL
  - connectorId: CiscoSecureEndpoint
    dataTypes:
      - CiscoSecureEndpoint_CL
  - connectorId: TrendMicroApexOne
    dataTypes:
      - TMApexOneEvent
  - connectorId: TrendMicroApexOneAma
    dataTypes:
      - TMApexOneEvent
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1562
query: |
  // List of Windows Firewall registry keys to monitor
  let firewallRegistryList = dynamic([
        'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\RestrictedServices\\Static\\System',
        'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\RestrictedServices\\Configurable\\System',
        'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Defaults\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules',
        'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall'
    ]);
  _ASim_RegistryEvent
  | where EventType in ('RegistryValueSet', 'RegistryKeyCreated') 
  | where RegistryKey has_any (firewallRegistryList) and RegistryValueData has_all ('Action=Allow', 'Active=TRUE')
  | project
      TimeGenerated,
      DvcHostname,
      ActorUsername,
      ActorUsernameType,
      ActingProcessId,
      ActingProcessName,
      ActingProcessCommandLine,
      RegistryKey,
      RegistryValue,
      RegistryValueType,
      RegistryValueData
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, '.')[0])
  | extend DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DvcHostname, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
  | extend Username = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '\\')[1]), ActorUsername)
  | extend NTDomain = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '\\')[0]), ActorUsername)
  | extend Username = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '@')[0]), Username)
  | extend UPNSuffix = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '@')[1]), '')
  | extend RegHive = tostring(split(RegistryKey, '\\')[0]), RegKey = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(RegistryKey, '\\'), 1, -1), '\\')) 
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: NTDomain
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Username
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: NTDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: ActingProcessId
      - identifier: CommandLine
        columnName: ActingProcessCommandLine
  - entityType: RegistryKey
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Hive
        columnName: RegHive
      - identifier: Key
        columnName: RegKey
  - entityType: RegistryValue
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: RegistryValue
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: RegistryValueData
      - identifier: ValueType
        columnName: RegistryValueType
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: singleAlert
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "Allow Firewall Rule {{RegistryValueData}} added at registry key {{RegKey}} on {{HostName}}"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "An allow Firewall Rule {{RegistryValueData}} added at registry key {{RegKey}} by {{Username}}."
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `firewallRegistryList`

let firewallRegistryList = dynamic([
      'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\RestrictedServices\\Static\\System',
      'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\RestrictedServices\\Configurable\\System',
      'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Defaults\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules',
      'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall'
  ]);

Stage 1: `source`

_ASim_RegistryEvent

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventType in ('RegistryValueSet', 'RegistryKeyCreated')

Stage 3: `where`

| where RegistryKey has_any (firewallRegistryList) and RegistryValueData has_all ('Action=Allow', 'Active=TRUE')

References firewallRegistryList (defined above).

Stage 4: `project`

| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DvcHostname,
    ActorUsername,
    ActorUsernameType,
    ActingProcessId,
    ActingProcessName,
    ActingProcessCommandLine,
    RegistryKey,
    RegistryValue,
    RegistryValueType,
    RegistryValueData

Stage 5: `extend` (7 consecutive steps)

| extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, '.')[0])
| extend DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DvcHostname, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
| extend Username = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '\\')[1]), ActorUsername)
| extend NTDomain = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '\\')[0]), ActorUsername)
| extend Username = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '@')[0]), Username)
| extend UPNSuffix = iff(tostring(ActorUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(ActorUsername, '@')[1]), '')
| extend RegHive = tostring(split(RegistryKey, '\\')[0]), RegKey = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(RegistryKey, '\\'), 1, -1), '\\'))

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventType`	in	`RegistryKeyCreated` transforms: `cased` `RegistryValueSet` transforms: `cased` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`RegistryKey`	match	`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall` `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Defaults\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules` `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\RestrictedServices\\Configurable\\System` `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\RestrictedServices\\Static\\System`
`RegistryValueData`	match	`Action=Allow` `Active=TRUE`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ActingProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`ActingProcessId`	`project`
`ActingProcessName`	`project`
`ActorUsername`	`project`
`ActorUsernameType`	`project`
`DvcHostname`	`project`
`RegistryKey`	`project`
`RegistryValue`	`project`
`RegistryValueData`	`project`
`RegistryValueType`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`HostName`	`extend`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`
`Username`	`extend`
`NTDomain`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`
`RegHive`	`extend`
`RegKey`	`extend`

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Detect Windows Allow Firewall Rule Addition/Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `firewallRegistryList`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `project`

Stage 5: `extend` (7 consecutive steps)

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Detect Windows Allow Firewall Rule Addition/Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: firewallRegistryList

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: project

Stage 5: extend (7 consecutive steps)

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `firewallRegistryList`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `project`

Stage 5: `extend` (7 consecutive steps)