[Deprecated] - Zinc Actor IOCs domains hashes IPs and useragent - October 2022

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 6h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Use Microsoft's up-to-date Threat Intelligence solution from the Content Hub to replace the deprecated query with outdated IoCs. Install it from: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1546` Event Triggered Execution

Rule body kusto

id: 95543d6d-f00d-4193-a63f-4edeefb7ec36
name: "[Deprecated] - Zinc Actor IOCs domains hashes IPs and useragent - October 2022"
description: | 
  'Use Microsoft's up-to-date Threat Intelligence solution from the Content Hub to replace the deprecated query with outdated IoCs. Install it from: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy'
severity: High 
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors: 
  - connectorId: DNS
    dataTypes:
      - DnsEvents
  - connectorId: AzureMonitor(VMInsights)
    dataTypes:
      - VMConnection
  - connectorId: F5
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CiscoASA
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CiscoAsaAma
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: PaloAltoNetworks
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: Fortinet
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CheckPoint
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CEF
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog  
  - connectorId: CefAma
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog             
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceNetworkEvents
      - DeviceFileEvents
      - DeviceEvents
      - DeviceProcessEvents
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: Office365
    dataTypes:
      - OfficeActivity
  - connectorId: AzureFirewall
    dataTypes: 
      - AzureDiagnostics
  - connectorId: WindowsFirewall
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsFirewall
  - connectorId: WindowsFirewallAma
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsFirewall
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - SecurityEvents 
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - WindowsEvent             
queryFrequency: 6h 
queryPeriod: 6h 
triggerOperator: gt 
triggerThreshold: 0 
tactics: 
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1546
tags:
  - Zinc
query:  |
  let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ZincOctober2022IOCs.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
  let domains = (iocs | where Type =~ "domainname"| project IoC);
  let IPList = (iocs | where Type =~ "ip"| project IoC);
  let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);
  let useragents = (iocs | where Type =~ "useragent" | project IoC);
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (CommonSecurityLog
  | where DestinationHostName has_any (domains) or RequestURL has_any (domains) or Message has_any (domains) or  SourceIP has_any (IPList) or DestinationIP  has_any (IPList)
  | parse Message with * '(' DNSName ')' *
  | project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, Type, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DNSName
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = SourceUserID, UrlEntity = RequestURL , IPEntity = DestinationIP, DNSCustomEntity = DNSName
  ),
  (DnsEvents
  | where Name in~ (domains) or IPAddresses has_any (IPList)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type
  | extend DNSName = Name, Host = Computer
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Host, DNSCustomEntity = DNSName, IPEntity = IPAddresses
  ),
  (VMConnection
  | where  RemoteDnsCanonicalNames has_any (domains)  or  SourceIp has_any (IPList) or DestinationIp has_any (IPList)
  | parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '["' DNSName '"]' *
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, RemoteDnsCanonicalNames, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = DestinationIp, HostEntity = Computer, ProcessEntity = ProcessName, DNSCustomEntity = DNSName
  ),
  (Event
  | where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 3
  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
  | extend SourceIP = tostring(EventDetail.[9].["#text"]), DestinationIP = tostring(EventDetail.[14].["#text"]), Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"]
  | where  SourceIP has_any (IPList) or DestinationIP has_any (IPList)
  | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Image, UserName, Computer, EventDetail, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), HostEntity = Computer , IPEntity = DestinationIP
  ),  
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where RemoteUrl has_any (domains) or RemoteIP has_any (IPList) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) 
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = RemoteIP, HostEntity = DeviceName, UrlEntity =RemoteUrl
  ),
  (AzureDiagnostics
  | where ResourceType =~ "AZUREFIREWALLS"
  | where Category =~ "AzureFirewallDnsProxy"
  | project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type
  | parse msg_s with "DNS Request: " ClientIP ":" ClientPort " - " QueryID " " Request_Type " " Request_Class " " Request_Name ". " Request_Protocol " " Request_Size " " EDNSO_DO " " EDNS0_Buffersize " " Responce_Code " " Responce_Flags " " Responce_Size " " Response_Duration
  | where Request_Name has_any (domains) or ClientIP has_any (IPList)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Request_Name, IPEntity = ClientIP
  ),
  (AzureDiagnostics
  | where ResourceType =~ "AZUREFIREWALLS"
  | where Category =~ "AzureFirewallApplicationRule"
  | project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s
  | parse msg_s with Protocol 'request from ' SourceHost ':' SourcePort 'to ' DestinationHost ':' DestinationPort '. Action:' Action
  | where DestinationHost has_any (domains) or SourceHost has_any (IPList)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = DestinationHost, IPEntity = SourceHost
  ),
  (Event
  | where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 1
  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
  | parse EventDetail with * 'SHA256=' SHA256 '",' *
  | extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"]
  | where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, SHA256, CommandLine, Image
  | extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = SHA256
  ),  
  (DeviceProcessEvents
  | where  InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256
  ),
  (DeviceFileEvents
  | where  InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RequestAccountName, RequestSourceIP, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = RequestAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256
  ),
  (DeviceEvents
  | where  InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
  | extend CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256
  ),
  (OfficeActivity
  | where ClientIP has_any (IPList) or UserAgent has_any (useragents)
  | project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, Operation, RecordType, UserId, ClientIP, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = ClientIP, AccountEntity = UserId
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(HostEntity, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
  | extend Name = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 1)[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPEntity 
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: ProcessEntity
  - entityType: FileHash
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Algorithm
        columnName: AlgorithmEntity
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: FileHashEntity        
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `iocs`

let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ZincOctober2022IOCs.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);

Let binding: `domains`

let domains = (iocs | where Type =~ "domainname"| project IoC);

Derived from iocs.

Let binding: `IPList`

let IPList = (iocs | where Type =~ "ip"| project IoC);

Derived from iocs.

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);

Derived from iocs.

Let binding: `useragents`

let useragents = (iocs | where Type =~ "useragent" | project IoC);

Derived from iocs.

union `isfuzzy=true` (12 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: CommonSecurityLog, DnsEvents, VMConnection, Event, DeviceNetworkEvents, AzureDiagnostics, AzureDiagnostics, Event, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceEvents, OfficeActivity

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationHostName has_any (domains) or RequestURL has_any (domains) or Message has_any (domains) or  SourceIP has_any (IPList) or DestinationIP  has_any (IPList)
| parse Message with * '(' DNSName ')' *
| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, Type, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DNSName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = SourceUserID, UrlEntity = RequestURL , IPEntity = DestinationIP, DNSCustomEntity = DNSName

Leg 2: `DnsEvents`

DnsEvents
| where Name in~ (domains) or IPAddresses has_any (IPList)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type
| extend DNSName = Name, Host = Computer
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Host, DNSCustomEntity = DNSName, IPEntity = IPAddresses

Leg 3: `VMConnection`

VMConnection
| where  RemoteDnsCanonicalNames has_any (domains)  or  SourceIp has_any (IPList) or DestinationIp has_any (IPList)
| parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '["' DNSName '"]' *
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, RemoteDnsCanonicalNames, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = DestinationIp, HostEntity = Computer, ProcessEntity = ProcessName, DNSCustomEntity = DNSName

Leg 4: `Event`

Event
| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 3
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend SourceIP = tostring(EventDetail.[9].["#text"]), DestinationIP = tostring(EventDetail.[14].["#text"]), Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"]
| where  SourceIP has_any (IPList) or DestinationIP has_any (IPList)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Image, UserName, Computer, EventDetail, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), HostEntity = Computer , IPEntity = DestinationIP

Leg 5: `DeviceNetworkEvents`

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has_any (domains) or RemoteIP has_any (IPList) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) 
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = RemoteIP, HostEntity = DeviceName, UrlEntity =RemoteUrl

Leg 6: `AzureDiagnostics`

AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType =~ "AZUREFIREWALLS"
| where Category =~ "AzureFirewallDnsProxy"
| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type
| parse msg_s with "DNS Request: " ClientIP ":" ClientPort " - " QueryID " " Request_Type " " Request_Class " " Request_Name ". " Request_Protocol " " Request_Size " " EDNSO_DO " " EDNS0_Buffersize " " Responce_Code " " Responce_Flags " " Responce_Size " " Response_Duration
| where Request_Name has_any (domains) or ClientIP has_any (IPList)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Request_Name, IPEntity = ClientIP

Leg 7: `AzureDiagnostics`

AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType =~ "AZUREFIREWALLS"
| where Category =~ "AzureFirewallApplicationRule"
| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s
| parse msg_s with Protocol 'request from ' SourceHost ':' SourcePort 'to ' DestinationHost ':' DestinationPort '. Action:' Action
| where DestinationHost has_any (domains) or SourceHost has_any (IPList)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = DestinationHost, IPEntity = SourceHost

Leg 8: `Event`

Event
| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| parse EventDetail with * 'SHA256=' SHA256 '",' *
| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"]
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, SHA256, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = SHA256

Leg 9: `DeviceProcessEvents`

DeviceProcessEvents
| where  InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256

Leg 10: `DeviceFileEvents`

DeviceFileEvents
| where  InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RequestAccountName, RequestSourceIP, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = RequestAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256

Leg 11: `DeviceEvents`

DeviceEvents
| where  InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
| extend CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256

Leg 12: `OfficeActivity`

OfficeActivity
| where ClientIP has_any (IPList) or UserAgent has_any (useragents)
| project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, Operation, RecordType, UserId, ClientIP, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = ClientIP, AccountEntity = UserId

Applied to the combined result

| extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(HostEntity, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 1)[0])

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Category`	eq	`AzureFirewallApplicationRule` `AzureFirewallDnsProxy`
`ClientIP`	match	`IPList`
`DestinationHost`	match	`domains`
`DestinationHostName`	match	`domains`
`DestinationIP`	match	`IPList`
`DestinationIp`	match	`IPList`
`EventID`	eq	`1` transforms: `cased` `3` transforms: `cased`
`IPAddresses`	match	`IPList`
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	in	`sha256Hashes` transforms: `cased`
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	match	`sha256Hashes`
`Message`	match	`domains`
`Name`	in	`domains`
`RemoteDnsCanonicalNames`	match	`domains`
`RemoteIP`	match	`IPList`
`RemoteUrl`	match	`domains`
`RequestURL`	match	`domains`
`Request_Name`	match	`domains`
`ResourceType`	eq	`AZUREFIREWALLS`
`SHA256`	match	`sha256Hashes`
`SourceHost`	match	`IPList`
`SourceIP`	match	`IPList`
`SourceIp`	match	`IPList`
`UserAgent`	match	`useragents`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ClientIP`	`project`
`Operation`	`project`
`RecordType`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`Type`	`project`
`UserAgent`	`project`
`UserId`	`project`
`AccountEntity`	`extend`
`IPEntity`	`extend`
`timestamp`	`extend`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`Name`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

[Deprecated] - Zinc Actor IOCs domains hashes IPs and useragent - October 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `iocs`

Let binding: `domains`

Let binding: `IPList`

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

Let binding: `useragents`

union `isfuzzy=true` (12 sources)

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

Leg 2: `DnsEvents`

Leg 3: `VMConnection`

Leg 4: `Event`

Leg 5: `DeviceNetworkEvents`

Leg 6: `AzureDiagnostics`

Leg 7: `AzureDiagnostics`

Leg 8: `Event`

Leg 9: `DeviceProcessEvents`

Leg 10: `DeviceFileEvents`

Leg 11: `DeviceEvents`

Leg 12: `OfficeActivity`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

[Deprecated] - Zinc Actor IOCs domains hashes IPs and useragent - October 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: iocs

Let binding: domains

Let binding: IPList

Let binding: sha256Hashes

Let binding: useragents

union isfuzzy=true (12 sources)

Leg 1: CommonSecurityLog

Leg 2: DnsEvents

Leg 3: VMConnection

Leg 4: Event

Leg 5: DeviceNetworkEvents

Leg 6: AzureDiagnostics

Leg 7: AzureDiagnostics

Leg 8: Event

Leg 9: DeviceProcessEvents

Leg 10: DeviceFileEvents

Leg 11: DeviceEvents

Leg 12: OfficeActivity

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `iocs`

Let binding: `domains`

Let binding: `IPList`

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

Let binding: `useragents`

union `isfuzzy=true` (12 sources)

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

Leg 2: `DnsEvents`

Leg 3: `VMConnection`

Leg 4: `Event`

Leg 5: `DeviceNetworkEvents`

Leg 6: `AzureDiagnostics`

Leg 7: `AzureDiagnostics`

Leg 8: `Event`

Leg 9: `DeviceProcessEvents`

Leg 10: `DeviceFileEvents`

Leg 11: `DeviceEvents`

Leg 12: `OfficeActivity`