Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage (Normalized Process Events)

Severity: high
Time window: 1h
Author: Yuval Naor
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies the host and account that executed AdFind by hash and filename in addition to common and unique flags that are used by many threat actors in discovery. To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the ASIM normalization parsers

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Discovery	`T1018` Remote System Discovery

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Sysmon	Event ID 5	Process terminated
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4689	A process has exited.

Rule body kusto

id: 45076281-35ae-45e0-b443-c32aa0baf965
name: Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage (Normalized Process Events)
description: |
  'Identifies the host and account that executed AdFind by hash and filename in addition to common and unique flags that are used by many threat actors in discovery.
  To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Discovery
relevantTechniques:
  - T1018
tags:
  - Id: c63ae777-d5e0-4113-8c9a-c2c9d3d09fcd
    version: 1.0.0
  - Schema: ASIMProcessEvent
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.0

query: |
  let args = dynamic(["objectcategory","domainlist","dcmodes","adinfo","trustdmp","computers_pwdnotreqd","Domain Admins", "objectcategory=person", "objectcategory=computer", "objectcategory=*","dclist"]);
  let parentProcesses = dynamic(["pwsh.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe"]);
  imProcessCreate
  //looks for execution from a shell
  | where ActingProcessName has_any (parentProcesses)
  | extend ActingProcessFileName = tostring(split(ActingProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | where ActingProcessFileName in~ (parentProcesses)
  // main filter
  | where Process hassuffix "AdFind.exe" or TargetProcessSHA256 == "c92c158d7c37fea795114fa6491fe5f145ad2f8c08776b18ae79db811e8e36a3"
  // AdFind common Flags to check for from various threat actor TTPs
  or CommandLine has_any (args)
  | extend AlgorithmType = "SHA256"
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @'\')[0])
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Dvc, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Dvc, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Dvc, DomainIndex + 1), Dvc)
  | project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: User
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Dvc
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: ActingProcessName
      - identifier: CommandLine
        columnName: CommandLine
  - entityType: FileHash
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Algorithm
        columnName: AlgorithmType
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: TargetProcessSHA256
version: 1.1.6
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Yuval Naor
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Threat Intelligence" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let parentProcesses = dynamic(["pwsh.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe"]);

Let binding: `args`

let args = dynamic(["objectcategory","domainlist","dcmodes","adinfo","trustdmp","computers_pwdnotreqd","Domain Admins", "objectcategory=person", "objectcategory=computer", "objectcategory=*","dclist"]);

Stage 1: `source`

imProcessCreate

Stage 2: `where`

| where ActingProcessName has_any (parentProcesses)

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend ActingProcessFileName = tostring(split(ActingProcessName, '\\')[-1])

Stage 4: `where`

| where ActingProcessFileName in~ (parentProcesses)

Stage 5: `where`

| where Process hassuffix "AdFind.exe" or TargetProcessSHA256 == "c92c158d7c37fea795114fa6491fe5f145ad2f8c08776b18ae79db811e8e36a3"
or CommandLine has_any (args)

References args (defined above).

Stage 6: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend AlgorithmType = "SHA256"
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @'\')[0])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Dvc, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Dvc, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Dvc, DomainIndex + 1), Dvc)

Stage 7: `project-away`

| project-away DomainIndex

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActingProcessFileName`	in	`cmd.exe` `powershell.exe` `pwsh.exe`
`ActingProcessName`	match	`cmd.exe` `powershell.exe` `pwsh.exe`
`CommandLine`	match	`Domain Admins` corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1) `adinfo` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `computers_pwdnotreqd` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `dclist` `dcmodes` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `domainlist` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `objectcategory` `objectcategory=*` `objectcategory=computer` `objectcategory=person` `trustdmp` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`Process`	ends_with	`AdFind.exe`
`TargetProcessSHA256`	eq	`c92c158d7c37fea795114fa6491fe5f145ad2f8c08776b18ae79db811e8e36a3` transforms: `cased` corpus 2 (kusto 2)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ActingProcessFileName`	`extend`
`AlgorithmType`	`extend`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage (Normalized Process Events)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `args`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `project-away`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage (Normalized Process Events)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: args

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: project-away

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `args`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `project-away`