Detection rules › Kusto
Identify Mango Sandstorm powershell commands
The query below identifies powershell commands used by the threat actor Mango Sandstorm. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
id: ce74dc9a-cb3c-4081-8c2f-7d39f6b7bae1
name: Identify Mango Sandstorm powershell commands
description: |
'The query below identifies powershell commands used by the threat actor Mango Sandstorm.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
- T1570
tags:
- Mango Sandstorm
- Schema: ASIMFileEvent
SchemaVersion: 0.1.0
query: |
(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where CommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend DvcHostname = Computer, ProcessId = tostring(ProcessId), ActorUsername = Account
),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend DvcHostname = DeviceName, ProcessId = tostring(InitiatingProcessId), ActorUsername = strcat(AccountDomain, @"\", AccountName)
),
(imProcessCreate
| where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where CommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend ProcessId = tostring(TargetProcessId)
)
)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: ActorUsername
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountNTDomain
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DvcHostname
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
- entityType: Process
fieldMappings:
- identifier: ProcessId
columnName: ProcessId
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains: [ "Security - Threat Intelligence" ]
Stages and Predicates
union isfuzzy=true (3 sources)
Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: SecurityEvent, DeviceProcessEvents, imProcessCreate
Leg 1: SecurityEvent
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where CommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend DvcHostname = Computer, ProcessId = tostring(ProcessId), ActorUsername = Account
Leg 2: DeviceProcessEvents
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend DvcHostname = DeviceName, ProcessId = tostring(InitiatingProcessId), ActorUsername = strcat(AccountDomain, @"\", AccountName)
Leg 3: imProcessCreate
imProcessCreate
| where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where CommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend ProcessId = tostring(TargetProcessId)
Applied to the combined result
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | contains |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:contains value:"UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA" |
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"-exec bypass -w 1 -enc" |
EventID | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
FileName | eq |
| field:"file_name" kind:eq value:"powershell.exe" |
Process | match |
| field:"Process" kind:match |
ProcessCommandLine | contains |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:contains value:"UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA" |
ProcessCommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"-exec bypass -w 1 -enc" |
Output fields
These fields are emitted when the rule matches.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
ActorUsername | extend |
DvcHostname | extend |
ProcessId | extend |
AccountNTDomain | extend |
AccountName | extend |
DomainIndex | extend |
HostName | extend |
HostNameDomain | extend |