Brand impersonation: State Farm

Severity: medium
Type: rule
Source: github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules

Detects messages impersonating State Farm insurance company through display name spoofing or similar variations, excluding legitimate communications from verified State Farm domains with proper DMARC authentication.

Threat classification

Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).

Category	Values
Attack types	Credential Phishing
Tactics and techniques	Impersonation: Brand, Social engineering, Spoofing

Event coverage

Message attribute
headers.auth_summary
sender
sender.email
type

Rule body MQL

type.inbound
and (
  regex.icontains(sender.display_name, 'state\s?farm')
  and not (
    strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "state farm")
    and (
      strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "center")
      or strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "arena")
      or strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "stadium")
      or strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "hall")
      or strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "classic")
      or strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "showdown")
      or strings.icontains(sender.display_name, "perks at work")
    )
  )
)

// and the sender is not in org_domains or from State Farm domains
and not (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain in (
      "statefarm.com",
      "statefarminsurance.com",
      "statefarm.ca",
      "statefarmbank.com",
      "sfauthentication.com",
      "statefarmarena.com",
      "statefarmservice.com",
      "statefarmisthere.com",
      "digitalpayouts.com", // State Farm use this domain for claim payouts
      "aravo.com", // risk management company State Farm uses
      "statefarmclaims.com",
      "statefarmfeedback.com", // legit survey
      "statefarmsurveys.com", // legit survey
      "nationalesurvey.com"
    )
  )
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and not (
  sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
  and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)

Detection logic

Scope: inbound message.

inbound message
all of:
- sender.display_name matches 'state\\s?farm'
- not:
  - all of:
    
    sender.display_name contains 'state farm'
    sender.display_name contains any of 7 patterns
    
    center
    arena
    stadium
    hall
    classic
    showdown
    perks at work
none of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('statefarm.com', 'statefarminsurance.com', 'statefarm.ca', 'statefarmbank.com', 'sfauthentication.com', 'statefarmarena.com', 'statefarmservice.com', 'statefarmisthere.com', 'digitalpayouts.com', 'aravo.com', 'statefarmclaims.com', 'statefarmfeedback.com', 'statefarmsurveys.com', 'nationalesurvey.com')
not:
- all of:
  - sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
  - coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass)

Inspects: headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.display_name, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains, $org_domains.

Indicators matched (23)

Field	Match	Value
`regex.icontains`	regex	`state\s?farm`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`state farm`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`center`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`arena`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`stadium`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`hall`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`classic`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`showdown`
`strings.icontains`	substring	`perks at work`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarm.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarminsurance.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarm.ca`

11 more

`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmbank.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`sfauthentication.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmarena.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmservice.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmisthere.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`digitalpayouts.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`aravo.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmclaims.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmfeedback.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`statefarmsurveys.com`
`sender.email.domain.root_domain`	member	`nationalesurvey.com`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)