Brand impersonation: Microsoft with embedded logo and credential theft language

type.inbound
and (
  (
    length(attachments) > 0
    and all(attachments,
            .file_type in $file_types_images or .file_type == "pdf"
    )
  )
  or length(attachments) == 0
)
and any(ml.logo_detect(file.message_screenshot()).brands,
        strings.starts_with(.name, "Microsoft")
)
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
      .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
  )
  or (
    length(body.current_thread.text) == 0
    //
    // This rule makes use of a beta feature and is subject to change without notice
    // using the beta feature in custom rules is not suggested until it has been formally released
    //
    and any(ml.nlu_classifier(beta.ocr(file.message_screenshot()).text).intents,
            .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
    )
  )
)
and (
  not (
    headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain in (
      "azureadnotifications.us",
      "microsoft.com",
      "sharepointonline.com",
      "cloudappsecurity.com",
      "microsoftsupport.com",
      "microsoft.onmicrosoft.com",
      "yammer.com"
    )
  )
  or headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
  or headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain is null
)
and not (
  sender.email.domain.domain == "planner.office365.com"
  and headers.return_path.email == "noreply@planner.office365.com"
  and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.root_domain == "office365.com"
)
// Microsoft has some legit onmicrosoft domains...
and not (
  sender.email.domain.domain == "microsoft.onmicrosoft.com"
  and headers.auth_summary.spf.pass
  and all(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == "microsoft.com")
)
// message is not from sharepoint actual (additional check in case DMARC check above fails to bail out)
and not (
  (
    strings.ilike(headers.message_id,
                  '<Share-*',
                  '<MassDelete-*',
                  '<FileDeleteAfterExpiration-*',
                  '<NotifyOwnerSharedWithExternalUsers*',
                  '<OneTimePasscode*'
    )
    and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
  )
  or (
    any(headers.hops,
        any(.fields,
            .name == "X-Google-Original-Message-ID"
            and strings.ilike(.value,
                              '<Share-*',
                              '<MassDelete-*',
                              '<FileDeleteAfterExpiration-*',
                              '<NotifyOwnerSharedWithExternalUsers*',
                              '<OneTimePasscode*'
            )
            and strings.ends_with(.value, '@odspnotify>')
        )
    )
  )
)
and (
  not profile.by_sender().solicited
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
  )
)

// negate org domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
    and (
      not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
      // MS quarantine digest emails from an org domain are router "internally" to MS, therefore, there is no authentication information
      or not (
        headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
        and all(headers.domains,
                .root_domain in ("outlook.com", "office365.com")
        )
        // typical emails from freemail Outlook accounts are from prod.outlook.com
        and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, "protection.outlook.com>")
      )
    )
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
)

// negate sharepoint file shares with mimecast rewrites
and not (
  // rewritten message ID
  strings.iends_with(headers.message_id, 'mimecast.lan>')
  and all(filter(body.links,
                 strings.icontains(subject.subject, .display_text)
                 or .display_text == "Open"
          ),
          .href_url.domain.root_domain in (
            "mimecastprotect.com",
            "mimecast.com"
          )
          and any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["domain"],
                  strings.parse_domain(.).tld == "ms"
                  or strings.parse_domain(.).root_domain == "sharepoint.com"
          )
  )
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign