Detection rules › Sublime MQL
Sublime MQL rules: infrastructure
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| Truth Social infrastructure abuse via link redirect | medium |
| Twitter infrastructure abuse via link shortener | medium |
Truth Social infrastructure abuse via link redirect
#Email contains a Truth Social link (links.truthsocial.com) but does not originate from a Truth Social domain. This is a known malicious tactic.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware, Spam |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Impersonation: Brand, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
bodybody.linksheadersheaders.auth_summarysender.emailtype
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links, .href_url.domain.domain == "links.truthsocial.com")
and sender.email.domain.domain not in~ ('truthsocial.com')
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Email contains a Truth Social link (links.truthsocial.com) but does not originate from a Truth Social domain. This is a known malicious tactic.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'links.truthsocial.com'
- sender.email.domain.domain not in ('truthsocial.com')
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (1)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | links.truthsocial.com |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
or
and
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().solicited"
any(body.links)
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "links.truthsocial.com"
not
sender.email.domain.domain eq "truthsocial.com"
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.domain | eq | truthsocial.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.domain field:"sender.email.domain.domain" value:"truthsocial.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Twitter infrastructure abuse via link shortener
#Email contains Twitter shortened link (t.co) but does not originate from a Twitter domain. This is a known malicious and spam tactic.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware, Spam |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Impersonation: Brand, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
bodybody.linksheadersheaders.auth_summarysender.emailtype
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == "t.co")
and sender.email.domain.domain not in~ (
'twitter.com',
'x.com',
'twitter.discoursemail.com'
)
and (
not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Email contains Twitter shortened link (t.co) but does not originate from a Twitter domain. This is a known malicious and spam tactic.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 't.co'
- sender.email.domain.domain not in ('twitter.com', 'x.com', 'twitter.discoursemail.com')
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender_email().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender, profile.by_sender_email. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (1)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | t.co |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
or
and
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
not
profile.by_sender_email func_call "profile.by_sender_email().solicited"
any(body.links)
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "t.co"
not
sender.email.domain.domain in ["twitter.com", "twitter.discoursemail.com", "x.com"]
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.domain | in | twitter.com, twitter.discoursemail.com, x.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.domain field:"sender.email.domain.domain" value:"twitter.com" field:"sender.email.domain.domain" value:"twitter.discoursemail.com" field:"sender.email.domain.domain" value:"x.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |