Detection rules › Sublime MQL
Twitter infrastructure abuse via link shortener
Email contains Twitter shortened link (t.co) but does not originate from a Twitter domain. This is a known malicious and spam tactic.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware, Spam |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Impersonation: Brand, Social engineering |
Event coverage
| Message attribute |
|---|
| body |
| body.links (collection) |
| headers.auth_summary |
| sender.email |
| type |
Rule body MQL
type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == "t.co")
and sender.email.domain.domain not in~ (
'twitter.com',
'x.com',
'twitter.discoursemail.com'
)
and (
not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Email contains Twitter shortened link (t.co) but does not originate from a Twitter domain. This is a known malicious and spam tactic.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 't.co'
- sender.email.domain.domain not in ('twitter.com', 'x.com', 'twitter.discoursemail.com')
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender_email().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender, profile.by_sender_email. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | t.co |
sender.email.domain.domain | member | twitter.com |
sender.email.domain.domain | member | x.com |
sender.email.domain.domain | member | twitter.discoursemail.com |