Detection rules › Sublime MQL
Sublime MQL rules: open
Open redirect: adnxs.com
#Message contains use of the adnxs.com redirect with getuid parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
(
.href_url.domain.domain == "ib.adnxs.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/getuid')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to adnxs.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'getuid\?(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// second form of an open redirect
or (
.href_url.domain.domain == "secure.adnxs.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redir=')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to adnxs.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redir=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "adnxs.com"
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "appnexus.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the adnxs.com redirect with getuid parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere any holds:all of:
- .href_url.domain.domain is 'ib.adnxs.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/getuid'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'getuid\\?(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
all of:
- .href_url.domain.domain is 'secure.adnxs.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redir='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redir=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'adnxs.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'appnexus.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | ib.adnxs.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /getuid |
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | secure.adnxs.com |
strings.icontains | substring | redir= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
or
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "getuid\\?(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "ib.adnxs.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/getuid"
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redir=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "secure.adnxs.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redir="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "adnxs.com"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "appnexus.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | adnxs.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"adnxs.com" |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | appnexus.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"appnexus.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: agena-smile.com
#Message contains use of the agena-smile.com redirect with wptouch_switch parameter. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "agena-smile.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'wptouch_switch=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirect=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*agena-smile\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "agena-smile.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the agena-smile.com redirect with wptouch_switch parameter. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'agena-smile.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'wptouch_switch='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*agena-smile\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'agena-smile.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | agena-smile.com |
strings.icontains | substring | wptouch_switch= |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*agena-smile\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "agena-smile.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "wptouch_switch="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "agena-smile.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | agena-smile.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"agena-smile.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: amaterasu-for-website-5.com
#Detects messages containing amaterasu-for-website-5.com redirect links that use the url parameter to redirect users to malicious sites. This has been observed in phishing campaigns.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
// Look for website-5 URLs
.href_url.domain.domain == "api.amaterasu-for-website-5.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// Make sure it's not redirecting back to website-5.com domains
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*website-5\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// Exclude legitimate website-5 domains as senders
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "website-5.com"
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "amaterasu-for-website-5.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects messages containing amaterasu-for-website-5.com redirect links that use the url parameter to redirect users to malicious sites. This has been observed in phishing campaigns.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'api.amaterasu-for-website-5.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*website-5\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'website-5.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'amaterasu-for-website-5.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | api.amaterasu-for-website-5.com |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*website-5\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "api.amaterasu-for-website-5.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "amaterasu-for-website-5.com"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "website-5.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | amaterasu-for-website-5.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"amaterasu-for-website-5.com" |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | website-5.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"website-5.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: api.spently.com
#Message contains use of the api.spently.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
// there are less than 10 unique links for api.spently.com within the body.links
and length(distinct(filter(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "api.spently.com"
),
.href_url.url
)
) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "api.spently.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/api/spently/click')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'type=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*spently\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "spently.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the api.spently.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
- length(distinct(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.domain == 'api.spently.com'), .href_url.url)) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'api.spently.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/api/spently/click'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'type='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*spently\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'spently.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | api.spently.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /api/spently/click |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
strings.icontains | substring | type= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*spently\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "api.spently.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/api/spently/click"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "type="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "spently.com"
distinct(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.domain == 'api.spently.com'), .href_url.url) length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | spently.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"spently.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Artisteer
#Message contains use of the Artisteer open redirect, but the sender is not Artisteer. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'artisteer.com'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirect_url=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'p=affr')
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'artisteer.com'
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Artisteer open redirect, but the sender is not Artisteer. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'artisteer.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect_url='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'p=affr'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'artisteer.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | artisteer.com |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect_url= |
strings.icontains | substring | p=affr |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "artisteer.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "p=affr"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect_url="
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "artisteer.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"artisteer.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: artkaderne
#Message contains use of an open redirect on artkaderne.dk. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "artkaderne.dk"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "refurl=")
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "artkaderne.dk"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of an open redirect on artkaderne.dk. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'artkaderne.dk'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'refurl='
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'artkaderne.dk'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | artkaderne.dk |
strings.icontains | substring | refurl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "artkaderne.dk"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "refurl="
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "artkaderne.dk"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | artkaderne.dk | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"artkaderne.dk" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open Redirect: asemailmgmteu.com
#Message contains use of the asemailmgmteu.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and 0 < length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "asemailmgmteu.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirect=')
and .display_text != "unsubscribe"
// negate use of the redirect by asemailmgmteu.com
and not any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["redirect"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain == sender.email.domain.root_domain
or strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain == "asemailmgmteu.com"
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the asemailmgmteu.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
all of:
- length(body.links) > 0
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'asemailmgmteu.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect='
- .display_text is not 'unsubscribe'
not:
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['redirect']where any holds:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain is sender.email.domain.root_domain
- strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain is 'asemailmgmteu.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].display_text, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['redirect'], headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.parse_url. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | asemailmgmteu.com |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
any(body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['redirect'])
or
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['redirect'][]).domain.root_domain == asemailmgmteu.com"
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['redirect'][]).domain.root_domain == sender.email.domain.root_domain"
body.links.display_text ne "unsubscribe"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "asemailmgmteu.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
body.links length_compare "0"
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: astroarts.co.jp
#Message contains use of the astroarts.co.jp redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "astroarts.co.jp"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/oauth/')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirect_uri=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirect_uri=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*astroarts\.co\.jp(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "astroarts.co.jp"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the astroarts.co.jp redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'astroarts.co.jp'
- .href_url.path starts with '/oauth/'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect_uri='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirect_uri=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*astroarts\\.co\\.jp(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'astroarts.co.jp'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | astroarts.co.jp |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /oauth/ |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect_uri= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirect_uri=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*astroarts\\.co\\.jp(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "astroarts.co.jp"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/oauth/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect_uri="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "astroarts.co.jp"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | astroarts.co.jp | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"astroarts.co.jp" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Atdmt
#Message contains use of the Atdmt (Facebook) open redirect.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'ad.atdmt.com'
and strings.ilike(.href_url.path, '*/c*')
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Atdmt (Facebook) open redirect.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'ad.atdmt.com'
- .href_url.path matches '*/c*'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.ilike.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | ad.atdmt.com |
strings.ilike | substring | */c* |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "ad.atdmt.com"
body.links.href_url.path match "/c"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Avast
#Detects emails containing links to avast.com leveraging an open redirect
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "avast.com"
and strings.contains(.href_url.query_params,
"DisplayRedirectCustomPage"
)
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != "avast.com"
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects emails containing links to avast.com leveraging an open redirect
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'avast.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'DisplayRedirectCustomPage'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'avast.com'
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender, strings.contains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | avast.com |
strings.contains | substring | DisplayRedirectCustomPage |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().solicited"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "avast.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "DisplayRedirectCustomPage"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "avast.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"avast.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: bananaguide.com
#Message contains use of the bananaguide.com redirect with url parameter. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "bananaguide.com"
and .href_url.path == "/thru.php"
and length(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"]) > 0
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to bananaguide.com
and not any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain == "bananaguide.com"
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "bananaguide.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the bananaguide.com redirect with url parameter. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'bananaguide.com'
- .href_url.path is '/thru.php'
- length(.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']) > 0
not:
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']where:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain is 'bananaguide.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'bananaguide.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'], headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.parse_url. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | bananaguide.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /thru.php |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
any(body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'])
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain.root_domain == bananaguide.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "bananaguide.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/thru.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'] length_compare "0"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "bananaguide.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | bananaguide.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"bananaguide.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: bangkoksync.com
#Message contains use of the bangkoksync.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "bangkoksync.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/goto.php')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f))'
)
and any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain != "bangkoksync.com"
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "bangkoksync.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the bangkoksync.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'bangkoksync.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/goto.php'
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))'
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']where:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain is not 'bangkoksync.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'bangkoksync.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'], headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.parse_url. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | bangkoksync.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /goto.php |
regex.icontains | regex | url=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
any(body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'])
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain.root_domain != bangkoksync.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "bangkoksync.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/goto.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "bangkoksync.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | bangkoksync.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"bangkoksync.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: bestdeals.today
#Message contains use of the bestdeals.today open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "bestdeals.today"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/redirect')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '(?:^|&)url=')
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'bestdeals.today'
and headers.return_path.domain.root_domain != "bestdeals.today"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the bestdeals.today open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'bestdeals.today'
- .href_url.path contains '/redirect'
- .href_url.query_params matches '(?:^|&)url='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'bestdeals.today'
- headers.return_path.domain.root_domain is not 'bestdeals.today'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.return_path.domain.root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | bestdeals.today |
strings.icontains | substring | /redirect |
regex.icontains | regex | (?:^|&)url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "bestdeals.today"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/redirect"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "(?:^|&)url="
headers.return_path.domain.root_domain ne "bestdeals.today"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "bestdeals.today"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
Open redirect: Bitrix24 URL Path
#Message contains use of the Bitrix24 redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/bitrix/')
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, '.php')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'goto=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Bitrix24 redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.path starts with '/bitrix/'
- .href_url.path ends with '.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'goto='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.iends_with, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /bitrix/ |
strings.iends_with | suffix | .php |
strings.icontains | substring | goto= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.path ends_with ".php"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/bitrix/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "goto="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: BMW USA
#Message contains use of BMW USA's open redirect but the sender is not BMW.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in~ ('bmw.com', 'bmwusa.com')
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 't.msg.bmwusa.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/r/'
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of BMW USA's open redirect but the sender is not BMW.
- inbound message
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('bmw.com', 'bmwusa.com')
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 't.msg.bmwusa.com'
- .href_url.path is '/r/'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | t.msg.bmwusa.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /r/ |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "t.msg.bmwusa.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/r/"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["bmw.com", "bmwusa.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | bmw.com, bmwusa.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"bmw.com" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"bmwusa.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: bubblelife.com
#Message contains use of the bubblelife.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "bubblelife.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/click/')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*bubblelife\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// remove uses that originate from bubblelife.com
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "bubblelife.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the bubblelife.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'bubblelife.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/click/'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*bubblelife\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'bubblelife.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | bubblelife.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /click/ |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*bubblelife\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "bubblelife.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/click/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "bubblelife.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: buildingengines.com
#Detects messages containing buildingengines.com redirect links that use the _redirectTo parameter to redirect users to malicious sites. This has been observed in phishing campaigns.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
// Look for buildingengines URLs
.href_url.domain.domain == "app.buildingengines.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '_redirectTo=')
// Make sure it's not redirecting back to buildingengines.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'_redirectTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*buildingengines\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// Exclude legitimate Building Engines domains as senders
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "buildingengines.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects messages containing buildingengines.com redirect links that use the _redirectTo parameter to redirect users to malicious sites. This has been observed in phishing campaigns.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'app.buildingengines.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains '_redirectTo='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches '_redirectTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*buildingengines\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'buildingengines.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | app.buildingengines.com |
strings.icontains | substring | _redirectTo= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "_redirectTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*buildingengines\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "app.buildingengines.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "_redirectTo="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "buildingengines.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | buildingengines.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"buildingengines.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: business.google.com website_shared URL Param
#Detects messages containing an open redirect in business.google.com's website_shared/launch_bw.html endpoint with the 'f' parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "business.google.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/website_shared/launch_bw.html')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'f=')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to google.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'f=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*google\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// Exclude legitimate Google domains as senders
and not regex.icontains(sender.email.domain.root_domain, '^google')
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects messages containing an open redirect in business.google.com's website_shared/launch_bw.html endpoint with the 'f' parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'business.google.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/website_shared/launch_bw.html'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'f='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'f=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*google\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain matches '^google'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | business.google.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /website_shared/launch_bw.html |
strings.icontains | substring | f= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "f=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*google\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "business.google.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/website_shared/launch_bw.html"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "f="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain regex_match "^google"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | regex_match | ^google | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"^google" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Cartoon Network
#This rule detects the use of Cartoon Network's Denmark domain as an open redirect.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Spam |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Evasion |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.sld == 'cartoonnetwork'
// it has to be www. - not hitting the www doesn't work
and .href_url.domain.subdomain == 'www'
// the path startswith a double //
and strings.starts_with(.href_url.path, '//')
// the path has to end in a trailing /
and strings.ends_with(.href_url.path, '/')
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
This rule detects the use of Cartoon Network's Denmark domain as an open redirect.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.sld is 'cartoonnetwork'
- .href_url.domain.subdomain is 'www'
- .href_url.path starts with '//'
- .href_url.path ends with '/'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.sld, body.links[].href_url.domain.subdomain, body.links[].href_url.path, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.ends_with, strings.starts_with.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.sld | equals | cartoonnetwork |
body.links[].href_url.domain.subdomain | equals | www |
strings.starts_with | prefix | // |
strings.ends_with | suffix | / |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.sld eq "cartoonnetwork"
body.links.href_url.domain.subdomain eq "www"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "/"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "//"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: chkc.com.hk
#Message contains use of the chkc.com.hk open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'chkc.com.hk'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'ViewSwitcher/SwitchView')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'returnUrl=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the chkc.com.hk open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'chkc.com.hk'
- .href_url.path contains 'ViewSwitcher/SwitchView'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'returnUrl='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | chkc.com.hk |
strings.icontains | substring | ViewSwitcher/SwitchView |
strings.icontains | substring | returnUrl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "chkc.com.hk"
body.links.href_url.path contains "ViewSwitcher/SwitchView"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "returnUrl="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: City of Calgary
#Message contains use of calgary.ca's open redirect but the sender is not the City of Calgary.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Exploit, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'calgary.ca'
and .href_url.path =~ '/_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "redirect")
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'calgary.ca'
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of calgary.ca's open redirect but the sender is not the City of Calgary.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'calgary.ca'
- .href_url.path is '/_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'calgary.ca'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | calgary.ca |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "calgary.ca"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "calgary.ca"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"calgary.ca" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Club-OS
#Message contains use of the Club-OS open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "club-os.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'click')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'target=')
// negate hash lookup targets (not actor controlled)
and not (
regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'target=[a-f0-9]{40}(?:$|&)')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '&hashLookup=true')
)
// negate urls that go back to club-os
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'target=[^\&]*club-os.com/'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Club-OS open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'club-os.com'
- .href_url.path contains 'click'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'target='
not:
all of:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'target=[a-f0-9]{40}(?:$|&)'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&hashLookup=true'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'target=[^\\&]*club-os.com/'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | club-os.com |
strings.icontains | substring | click |
strings.icontains | substring | target= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
and
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&hashLookup=true"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "target=[a-f0-9]{40}(?:$|&)"
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "target=[^\\&]*club-os.com/"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "club-os.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "click"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "target="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: convertcart.com
#Message contains use of the convertcart.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
// convertcart is used in benign messages, however, they commonly have many links
// ensure messages contain less than 10 links convertcart.com to ensure higher fidelity matching of malicious messages
and length(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == "convertcart.com")
) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "convertcart.com"
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, '/click')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*convertcart\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
and not strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
sender.email.domain.root_domain
)
)
// remove uses that originate from convertcart.com
and not any(headers.domains,
.root_domain in ("convertcart.com", "convertc.com")
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the convertcart.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
- length(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'convertcart.com')) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'convertcart.com'
- .href_url.path ends with '/click'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*convertcart\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params)
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain in ('convertcart.com', 'convertc.com')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.iends_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | convertcart.com |
strings.iends_with | suffix | /click |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*convertcart\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
not
strings.icontains func_call "strings.icontains(body.links[].href_url.query_params)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "convertcart.com"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "/click"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain in ["convertc.com", "convertcart.com"]
filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'convertcart.com') length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Dell
#Message contains use of the Dell open redirect, but the sender is not Dell.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 't.em.home.dell.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/r/'
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('dell.com', 'dell.ca')
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Dell open redirect, but the sender is not Dell.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 't.em.home.dell.com'
- .href_url.path is '/r/'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('dell.com', 'dell.ca')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | t.em.home.dell.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /r/ |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "t.em.home.dell.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/r/"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["dell.ca", "dell.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | dell.ca, dell.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"dell.ca" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"dell.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: designsori.com
#Message contains use of the designsori.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "designsori.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'redirect.php')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}'
)
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*designsori\.com(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "designsori.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the designsori.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'designsori.com'
- .href_url.path contains 'redirect.php'
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*designsori\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'designsori.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | designsori.com |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect.php |
regex.icontains | regex | url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2} |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*designsori\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "designsori.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "redirect.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "designsori.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | designsori.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"designsori.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Diesel.az
#Detects inbound messages containing links that abuse Diesel.az's open redirect functionality at '/az/redirect', where the 'url' query parameter points to an external domain. The rule flags messages where the sender is not from diesel.az and the redirect destination leads outside of the diesel.az domain.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Impersonation: Brand |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "diesel.az"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/az/redirect')
and length(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"]) > 0
// redirect is not going back to diesel.az
and not any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain == "diesel.az"
)
)
and not (
sender.email.domain.root_domain == "diesel.az"
and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects inbound messages containing links that abuse Diesel.az's open redirect functionality at '/az/redirect', where the 'url' query parameter points to an external domain. The rule flags messages where the sender is not from diesel.az and the redirect destination leads outside of the diesel.az domain.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'diesel.az'
- .href_url.path starts with '/az/redirect'
- length(.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']) > 0
not:
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']where:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain is 'diesel.az'
not:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'diesel.az'
- coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass)
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'], headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.istarts_with, strings.parse_url.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | diesel.az |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /az/redirect |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
any(body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'])
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain.root_domain == diesel.az"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "diesel.az"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/az/redirect"
body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'] length_compare "0"
not
and
coalesce func_call "coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass)"
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "diesel.az"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | diesel.az | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"diesel.az" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: documentmailbox.com
#Message contains use of the documentmailbox.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "documentmailbox.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'RedirectTarget.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'TargetUrl=')
)
and length(filter(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "documentmailbox.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'RedirectTarget.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'TargetUrl=')
)
) == 1
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the documentmailbox.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'documentmailbox.com'
- .href_url.path contains 'RedirectTarget.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'TargetUrl='
- length(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'documentmailbox.com' and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'RedirectTarget.aspx') and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'TargetUrl='))) is 1
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | documentmailbox.com |
strings.icontains | substring | RedirectTarget.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | TargetUrl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "documentmailbox.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "RedirectTarget.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "TargetUrl="
filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'documentmailbox.com' and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'RedirectTarget.aspx') and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'TargetUrl=')) length_compare "1"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Doubleclick.net
#Doubleclick.net link leveraging an open redirect from a new or outlier sender.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "doubleclick.net"
and (
strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/aclk")
or strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/pcs/click")
or strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/searchads/link/click")
)
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:[a-z]+(?:\:|%3a))?(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)'
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Doubleclick.net link leveraging an open redirect from a new or outlier sender.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'doubleclick.net'
any of:
- .href_url.path contains '/aclk'
- .href_url.path contains '/pcs/click'
- .href_url.path contains '/searchads/link/click'
- .href_url.query_params matches '&(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:[a-z]+(?:\\:|%3a))?(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f)'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (5)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | doubleclick.net |
strings.icontains | substring | /aclk |
strings.icontains | substring | /pcs/click |
strings.icontains | substring | /searchads/link/click |
regex.icontains | regex | &(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:[a-z]+(?:\:|%3a))?(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
or
body.links.href_url.path contains "/aclk"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/pcs/click"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/searchads/link/click"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "doubleclick.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:[a-z]+(?:\\:|%3a))?(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f)"
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: eaoko.org
#Message contains use of the eaoko.org redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "eaoko.org"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'goto=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*eaoko\.org(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "eaoko.org"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the eaoko.org redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'eaoko.org'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'goto='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*eaoko\\.org(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'eaoko.org'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | eaoko.org |
strings.icontains | substring | goto= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*eaoko\\.org(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "eaoko.org"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "goto="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "eaoko.org"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | eaoko.org | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"eaoko.org" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: easycamp.com
#Message contains use of the easycamp.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "easycamp.com"
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirect=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f))'
)
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirect=[^\&]*easycamp\.com'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "easycamp.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the easycamp.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'easycamp.com'
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirect=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirect=[^\\&]*easycamp\\.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'easycamp.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | easycamp.com |
regex.icontains | regex | redirect=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirect=[^\\&]*easycamp\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "easycamp.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirect=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "easycamp.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | easycamp.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"easycamp.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: embluemail.com
#Message contains use of the embluemail.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "nts.embluemail.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/p/cl')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '!')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'\!(?:((?:%68|h)(?:%74|t){2}(?:%70|p)(?:%73|s)?)?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.domain == "nts.embluemail.com"
and not strings.iends_with(headers.message_id, '@embluemail.com>')
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the embluemail.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'nts.embluemail.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/p/cl'
- .href_url.query_params contains '!'
- .href_url.query_params matches '\\!(?:((?:%68|h)(?:%74|t){2}(?:%70|p)(?:%73|s)?)?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}'
not:
- sender.email.domain.domain is 'nts.embluemail.com'
not:
- headers.message_id ends with '@embluemail.com>'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.message_id, sender.email.domain.domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.iends_with, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | nts.embluemail.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /p/cl |
strings.icontains | substring | ! |
regex.icontains | regex | \!(?:((?:%68|h)(?:%74|t){2}(?:%70|p)(?:%73|s)?)?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2} |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "nts.embluemail.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/p/cl"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "!"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "\\!(?:((?:%68|h)(?:%74|t){2}(?:%70|p)(?:%73|s)?)?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}"
not
headers.message_id ends_with "@embluemail.com>"
not
sender.email.domain.domain eq "nts.embluemail.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.message_id | ends_with | @embluemail.com> | excludes:headers.message_id field:"headers.message_id" value:"@embluemail.com>" |
sender.email.domain.domain | eq | nts.embluemail.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.domain field:"sender.email.domain.domain" value:"nts.embluemail.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: emlakarsa
#Message contains use of the emlakarsa open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "emlakarsa.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "_setLang")
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "redirect=")
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'emlakarsa.net'
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the emlakarsa open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'emlakarsa.net'
- .href_url.query_params contains '_setLang'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'emlakarsa.net'
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | emlakarsa.net |
strings.icontains | substring | _setLang |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
or
and
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().solicited"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "emlakarsa.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "_setLang"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect="
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "emlakarsa.net"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"emlakarsa.net" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: emp.eduyield.com
#Message contains use of the eduyield redirect which chains google amp. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "emp.eduyield.com"
// the redirect field
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "&dest=")
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&dest=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?google\.com[^\&]*\/+amp\/+(s\/+)?'
)
)
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the eduyield redirect which chains google amp. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'emp.eduyield.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&dest='
- .href_url.query_params matches '&dest=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?google\\.com[^\\&]*\\/+amp\\/+(s\\/+)?'
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender, regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | emp.eduyield.com |
strings.icontains | substring | &dest= |
regex.icontains | regex | &dest=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?google\.com[^\&]*\/+amp\/+(s\/+)? |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
or
and
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().solicited"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "emp.eduyield.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&dest="
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&dest=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?google\\.com[^\\&]*\\/+amp\\/+(s\\/+)?"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: eodcnetworkdirect.com
#Message contains use of the eodcnetworkdirect.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "in.eodcnetworkdirect.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '&url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.domain.domain,
'&url=[^\&]*eodcnetwork(?:direct\.com|\.org)(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain in (
"eodcnetworkdirect.com",
"eodcnetwork.org"
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the eodcnetworkdirect.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'in.eodcnetworkdirect.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&url='
not:
- .href_url.domain.domain matches '&url=[^\\&]*eodcnetwork(?:direct\\.com|\\.org)(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('eodcnetworkdirect.com', 'eodcnetwork.org')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | in.eodcnetworkdirect.com |
strings.icontains | substring | &url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.domain.domain regex_match "&url=[^\\&]*eodcnetwork(?:direct\\.com|\\.org)(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "in.eodcnetworkdirect.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["eodcnetwork.org", "eodcnetworkdirect.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | eodcnetwork.org, eodcnetworkdirect.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"eodcnetwork.org" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"eodcnetworkdirect.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: events.csiro.au
#Message contains use of the events.csiro.au redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "events.csiro.au"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '&ec_url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&ec_url=[^\&]*csiro\.au(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("csiro.au")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the events.csiro.au redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'events.csiro.au'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&ec_url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches '&ec_url=[^\\&]*csiro\\.au(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('csiro.au')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | events.csiro.au |
strings.icontains | substring | &ec_url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&ec_url=[^\\&]*csiro\\.au(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "events.csiro.au"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&ec_url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "csiro.au"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | csiro.au | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"csiro.au" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: ExacTag
#Message contains use of the ExacTag open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "exactag.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'ai.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the ExacTag open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'exactag.com'
- .href_url.path contains 'ai.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | exactag.com |
strings.icontains | substring | ai.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "exactag.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "ai.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: fenc.com
#Message contains use of the fenc.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "fenc.com"
and .href_url.path =~ "/redirector.aspx"
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'y=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f))'
)
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'y=[^\&]*fenc\.com')
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "fenc.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the fenc.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'fenc.com'
- .href_url.path is '/redirector.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params matches 'y=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'y=[^\\&]*fenc\\.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'fenc.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | fenc.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /redirector.aspx |
regex.icontains | regex | y=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "y=[^\\&]*fenc\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "fenc.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/redirector.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "y=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "fenc.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | fenc.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"fenc.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: g7.fr
#Message contains use of the g7.fr open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "g7.fr"
and strings.starts_with(.href_url.path, '//')
and strings.ends_with(.href_url.path, '/')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the g7.fr open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'g7.fr'
- .href_url.path starts with '//'
- .href_url.path ends with '/'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.ends_with, strings.starts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | g7.fr |
strings.starts_with | prefix | // |
strings.ends_with | suffix | / |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "g7.fr"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "/"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "//"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: giving.lluh.org
#Message contains use of the giving.lluh.org redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "giving.lluh.org"
and .href_url.path =~ "/site/UserLogin"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'nexturl=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the giving.lluh.org redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'giving.lluh.org'
- .href_url.path is '/site/UserLogin'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'nexturl='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | giving.lluh.org |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /site/UserLogin |
strings.icontains | substring | nexturl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "giving.lluh.org"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/site/UserLogin"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "nexturl="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Google Ad Services
#Message contains use of the Google Ad Services open redirect, but the sender is not Google. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'googleadservices.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/pagead/aclk'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "adurl=")
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'google.com'
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Google Ad Services open redirect, but the sender is not Google. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'googleadservices.com'
- .href_url.path is '/pagead/aclk'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'adurl='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'google.com'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | googleadservices.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /pagead/aclk |
strings.icontains | substring | adurl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "googleadservices.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/pagead/aclk"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "adurl="
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "google.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"google.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Hakumonkai.org
#Detects inbound messages containing links or attachments with URLs that utilize the hakumonkai.org domain's redirect functionality (/fukkou/ref.php) to redirect users to external domains through the 'url' parameter.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and (
any(body.links,
(
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "hakumonkai.org"
and .href_url.path == "/fukkou/ref.php"
and any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.valid
)
)
)
or any(filter(attachments, .file_type == "pdf"),
any(file.explode(.),
any(.scan.url.urls,
(
.domain.root_domain == "hakumonkai.org"
and .path == "/fukkou/ref.php"
and any(.query_params_decoded["url"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.valid
)
)
)
)
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects inbound messages containing links or attachments with URLs that utilize the hakumonkai.org domain's redirect functionality (/fukkou/ref.php) to redirect users to external domains through the 'url' parameter.
- inbound message
any of:
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'hakumonkai.org'
- .href_url.path is '/fukkou/ref.php'
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']where:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.valid
any of
filter(attachments)where:any of
file.explode(.)where:any of
.scan.url.urlswhere all hold:- .domain.root_domain is 'hakumonkai.org'
- .path is '/fukkou/ref.php'
any of
.query_params_decoded['url']where:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.valid
Inspects: attachments[].file_type, body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'], type.inbound. Sensors: file.explode, strings.parse_url.
Indicators matched (5)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | hakumonkai.org |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /fukkou/ref.php |
attachments[].file_type | equals | pdf |
file.explode(filter(attachments)[])[].scan.url.urls[].domain.root_domain | equals | hakumonkai.org |
file.explode(filter(attachments)[])[].scan.url.urls[].path | equals | /fukkou/ref.php |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
any(filter(attachments))
any(file.explode(filter(attachments)))
any(file.explode(filter(attachments)).scan.url.urls)
and
any(file.explode(filter(attachments)).scan.url.urls.query_params_decoded['url'])
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(file.explode(filter(attachments)[])[].scan.url.urls[].query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain.valid"
file.explode(filter(attachments)[])[].scan.url.urls[].domain.root_domain eq "hakumonkai.org"
file.explode(filter(attachments)[])[].scan.url.urls[].path eq "/fukkou/ref.php"
any(body.links)
and
any(body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'])
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain.valid"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "hakumonkai.org"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/fukkou/ref.php"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: HHS
#Looks for use of the HHS open redirect.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'dcis.hhs.gov'
and strings.ilike(.href_url.query_params, '*service*')
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Looks for use of the HHS open redirect.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'dcis.hhs.gov'
- .href_url.query_params matches '*service*'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.ilike.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | dcis.hhs.gov |
strings.ilike | substring | *service* |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "dcis.hhs.gov"
body.links.href_url.query_params match "service"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: ijf.org
#Message contains use of the ijf.org redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "ijf.org"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/cookies_agree')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'backTo=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'backTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*ijf\.org(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "ijf.org"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the ijf.org redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'ijf.org'
- .href_url.path starts with '/cookies_agree'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'backTo='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'backTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*ijf\\.org(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'ijf.org'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | ijf.org |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /cookies_agree |
strings.icontains | substring | backTo= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "backTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*ijf\\.org(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "ijf.org"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/cookies_agree"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "backTo="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "ijf.org"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | ijf.org | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"ijf.org" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Indeed
#Detects emails containing links using Indeed '/r?target=xxxxxx' open redirect where the email has not come from indeed.com
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain != "indeed.com"
and any(body.links, "indeed_open_redirect" in .href_url.rewrite.encoders)
)
or any(attachments,
.file_type == "pdf"
and any(file.explode(.),
any(.scan.url.urls,
"indeed_open_redirect" in .rewrite.encoders
)
)
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects emails containing links using Indeed '/r?target=xxxxxx' open redirect where the email has not come from indeed.com
- inbound message
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'indeed.com'
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.rewrite.encoders contains 'indeed_open_redirect'
any of
attachmentswhere all hold:- .file_type is 'pdf'
any of
file.explode(.)where:any of
.scan.url.urlswhere:- .rewrite.encoders contains 'indeed_open_redirect'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: attachments[].file_type, body.links, body.links[].href_url.rewrite.encoders, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: file.explode. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.rewrite.encoders | contains | indeed_open_redirect |
attachments[].file_type | equals | pdf |
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].rewrite.encoders | contains | indeed_open_redirect |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
any(attachments)
and
any(file.explode(attachments))
any(file.explode(attachments).scan.url.urls)
file.explode(attachments).scan.url.urls.rewrite.encoders contains "indeed_open_redirect"
attachments.file_type eq "pdf"
and
any(body.links)
body.links.href_url.rewrite.encoders contains "indeed_open_redirect"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "indeed.com"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"indeed.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: IndiaTimes
#Message contains use of the IndiaTimes open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "indiatimes.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/etl.php')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// don't match on redirects to indiatimes.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^\&]+\.indiatimes\.com\b'
)
)
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the IndiaTimes open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'indiatimes.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/etl.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=[^\\&]+\\.indiatimes\\.com\\b'
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender().solicited
all of:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
not:
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: profile.by_sender, regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | indiatimes.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /etl.php |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=[^\\&]+\\.indiatimes\\.com\\b"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "indiatimes.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/etl.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
or
and
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().solicited"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: isadatalab.com
#Message contains use of the isadatalab.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "isadatalab.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/redirect')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '(?:^|&)url=')
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'bestdeals.today'
and headers.return_path.domain.root_domain != "bestdeals.today"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the isadatalab.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'isadatalab.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/redirect'
- .href_url.query_params matches '(?:^|&)url='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'bestdeals.today'
- headers.return_path.domain.root_domain is not 'bestdeals.today'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.return_path.domain.root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | isadatalab.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /redirect |
regex.icontains | regex | (?:^|&)url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "isadatalab.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/redirect"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "(?:^|&)url="
headers.return_path.domain.root_domain ne "bestdeals.today"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "bestdeals.today"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
Open redirect: JustPaste.it
#Detects inbound messages containing JustPaste.it redirect links that forward to external destinations outside of JustPaste.it. This technique abuses JustPaste.it's redirect functionality to obscure the true destination URL, bypassing link reputation checks. The rule excludes legitimate senders from JustPaste.it itself.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Free file host, Evasion |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "justpaste.it"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/redirect/')
// wrapped destination is not back to justpaste.it
and not strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'justpaste.it')
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "justpaste.it"
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects inbound messages containing JustPaste.it redirect links that forward to external destinations outside of JustPaste.it. This technique abuses JustPaste.it's redirect functionality to obscure the true destination URL, bypassing link reputation checks. The rule excludes legitimate senders from JustPaste.it itself.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'justpaste.it'
- .href_url.path starts with '/redirect/'
not:
- .href_url.path contains 'justpaste.it'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'justpaste.it'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | justpaste.it |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /redirect/ |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.path contains "justpaste.it"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "justpaste.it"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/redirect/"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "justpaste.it"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | justpaste.it | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"justpaste.it" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: k-mil.net
#Message contains use of the k-mil.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "k-mil.net"
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, 'official_url')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'u=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*k-mil\.net(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "k-mil.net"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the k-mil.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'k-mil.net'
- .href_url.path ends with 'official_url'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'u='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*k-mil\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'k-mil.net'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.iends_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | k-mil.net |
strings.iends_with | suffix | official_url |
strings.icontains | substring | u= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*k-mil\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "k-mil.net"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "official_url"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "u="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "k-mil.net"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | k-mil.net | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"k-mil.net" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Klaviyo
#Message contains use of the Klaviyo (kmail-lists.com) open redirect, but the link display text does not match known permutations. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Spam |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Impersonation: Brand, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'manage.kmail-lists.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/subscriptions/subscribe/update'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'r=')
and not strings.ilike(.display_text, "*subscribe*", "*manage*")
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Klaviyo (kmail-lists.com) open redirect, but the link display text does not match known permutations. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'manage.kmail-lists.com'
- .href_url.path is '/subscriptions/subscribe/update'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'r='
not:
.display_text matches any of 2 patterns
*subscribe**manage*
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].display_text, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.ilike.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | manage.kmail-lists.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /subscriptions/subscribe/update |
strings.icontains | substring | r= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
or
body.links.display_text match "manage"
body.links.display_text match "subscribe"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "manage.kmail-lists.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/subscriptions/subscribe/update"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "r="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: labcluster.com
#Message contains use of the cm.labcluster.com/go.aspx redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "cm.labcluster.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/go.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*labcluster\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "labcluster.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the cm.labcluster.com/go.aspx redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'cm.labcluster.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/go.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*labcluster\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'labcluster.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | cm.labcluster.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /go.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*labcluster\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "cm.labcluster.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/go.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "labcluster.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | labcluster.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"labcluster.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: LearningApps
#Message contains use of the LearningApps open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'learningapps.org'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'setLanguage.php')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'return=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the LearningApps open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'learningapps.org'
- .href_url.path contains 'setLanguage.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'return='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | learningapps.org |
strings.icontains | substring | setLanguage.php |
strings.icontains | substring | return= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "learningapps.org"
body.links.href_url.path contains "setLanguage.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "return="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Linkedin
#Detects emails containing links using Linkedin '/slink?code=xxxxx' open redirect where the email has not come from Linkedin.com
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain != "linkedin.com"
and (
(
any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'linkedin.com'
and .href_url.path == '/slink'
)
and any(body.links, strings.ilike(.href_url.query_params, 'code=*'))
)
or any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'linkedin.com'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirect_uri')
)
)
)
or any(attachments,
.file_type == "pdf"
and any(file.explode(.),
(
any(.scan.url.urls,
.domain.root_domain == 'linkedin.com'
and .path == '/slink'
)
and any(.scan.url.urls,
strings.ilike(.query_params, 'code=*')
)
)
or any(.scan.url.urls,
.domain.root_domain == 'linkedin.com'
and strings.icontains(.query_params, 'redirect_uri')
)
)
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects emails containing links using Linkedin '/slink?code=xxxxx' open redirect where the email has not come from Linkedin.com
- inbound message
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'linkedin.com'
any of:
all of:
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'linkedin.com'
- .href_url.path is '/slink'
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.query_params matches 'code=*'
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'linkedin.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect_uri'
any of
attachmentswhere all hold:- .file_type is 'pdf'
any of
file.explode(.)where any holds:all of:
any of
.scan.url.urlswhere all hold:- .domain.root_domain is 'linkedin.com'
- .path is '/slink'
any of
.scan.url.urlswhere:- .query_params matches 'code=*'
any of
.scan.url.urlswhere all hold:- .domain.root_domain is 'linkedin.com'
- .query_params contains 'redirect_uri'
Inspects: attachments[].file_type, body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: file.explode, strings.icontains, strings.ilike.
Indicators matched (7)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | linkedin.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /slink |
strings.ilike | substring | code=* |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect_uri |
attachments[].file_type | equals | pdf |
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].domain.root_domain | equals | linkedin.com |
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].path | equals | /slink |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
any(attachments)
and
any(file.explode(attachments))
or
and
any(file.explode(attachments).scan.url.urls)
and
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].domain.root_domain eq "linkedin.com"
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].path eq "/slink"
any(file.explode(attachments).scan.url.urls)
file.explode(attachments).scan.url.urls.query_params starts_with "code="
any(file.explode(attachments).scan.url.urls)
and
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].domain.root_domain eq "linkedin.com"
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.url.urls[].query_params contains "redirect_uri"
attachments.file_type eq "pdf"
and
or
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "linkedin.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/slink"
any(body.links)
body.links.href_url.query_params starts_with "code="
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "linkedin.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect_uri"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "linkedin.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"linkedin.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: LinkedIn Redirect
#Message contains use of a LinkedIn Redirect. The redirect contains a 3 second delay before redirecting the browser. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "linkedin.com"
and .href_url.path =~ "/redir/redirect"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not any(.href_url.query_params_decoded["url"],
strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain in (
"lnkd.in",
'linkedin.com'
)
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a LinkedIn Redirect. The redirect contains a 3 second delay before redirecting the browser. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'linkedin.com'
- .href_url.path is '/redir/redirect'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']where:- strings.parse_url(.).domain.root_domain in ('lnkd.in', 'linkedin.com')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'], headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.parse_url. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | linkedin.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /redir/redirect |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
any(body.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'])
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain.root_domain in (lnkd.in, linkedin.com)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "linkedin.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/redir/redirect"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: listing.ca
#Message contains use of the listing.ca redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "listing.ca"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'goto=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*listing\.ca(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "listing.ca"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the listing.ca redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'listing.ca'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'goto='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*listing\\.ca(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'listing.ca'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | listing.ca |
strings.icontains | substring | goto= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*listing\\.ca(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "listing.ca"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "goto="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "listing.ca"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | listing.ca | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"listing.ca" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: magic4media.com
#Message contains use of the magic4media.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "magic4media.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'r=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'r=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*magic4media\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// remove uses that originate from magic4media.com
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "magic4media.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the magic4media.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'magic4media.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'r='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'r=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*magic4media\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'magic4media.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | magic4media.com |
strings.icontains | substring | r= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "r=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*magic4media\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "magic4media.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "r="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "magic4media.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: magiccity.ne.jp
#Message contains use of the magiccity.ne.jp redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "magiccity.ne.jp"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/rl_out.cgi')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*magiccity\.ne\.jp(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "magiccity.ne.jp"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the magiccity.ne.jp redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'magiccity.ne.jp'
- .href_url.path contains '/rl_out.cgi'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*magiccity\\.ne\\.jp(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'magiccity.ne.jp'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | magiccity.ne.jp |
strings.icontains | substring | /rl_out.cgi |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*magiccity\\.ne\\.jp(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "magiccity.ne.jp"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/rl_out.cgi"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "magiccity.ne.jp"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | magiccity.ne.jp | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"magiccity.ne.jp" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: magneticmarketing.com
#Message contains use of the magneticmarketing.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "magneticmarketing.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path,
"/_tracking/email_click/broadcast/"
)
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// negate use of the redirect by magneticmarketing
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^&]*magneticmarketing\.com'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "magneticmarketing.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the magneticmarketing.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'magneticmarketing.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/_tracking/email_click/broadcast/'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=[^&]*magneticmarketing\\.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'magneticmarketing.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | magneticmarketing.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /_tracking/email_click/broadcast/ |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=[^&]*magneticmarketing\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "magneticmarketing.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/_tracking/email_click/broadcast/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "magneticmarketing.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | magneticmarketing.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"magneticmarketing.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: mail.spiceworks.com
#Message contains use of the mail.spiceworks.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "mail.spiceworks.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'_externalContentRedirect'
)
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'_externalContentRedirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*spiceworks\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "spiceworks.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the mail.spiceworks.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'mail.spiceworks.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains '_externalContentRedirect'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches '_externalContentRedirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*spiceworks\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'spiceworks.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | mail.spiceworks.com |
strings.icontains | substring | _externalContentRedirect |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "_externalContentRedirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*spiceworks\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "mail.spiceworks.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "_externalContentRedirect"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "spiceworks.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | spiceworks.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"spiceworks.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Mailtrack Korea
#Detects messages containing links to mailtrack.ksd.or.kr tracking service that redirect to external domains, potentially bypassing security controls through the legitimate Korean mail tracking infrastructure.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, BEC/Fraud |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Evasion |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "mailtrack.ksd.or.kr"
and .href_url.path == "/TMS/tracking"
and "url" in~ keys(.href_url.query_params_decoded)
and not any(regex.iextract(.href_url.query_params,
'url=([^&]+)(?:\&|\/|$)'
),
strings.parse_url(.groups[0]).domain.root_domain == ..href_url.domain.root_domain
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects messages containing links to mailtrack.ksd.or.kr tracking service that redirect to external domains, potentially bypassing security controls through the legitimate Korean mail tracking infrastructure.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'mailtrack.ksd.or.kr'
- .href_url.path is '/TMS/tracking'
- keys(.href_url.query_params_decoded) contains 'url'
not:
any of
regex.iextract(.href_url.query_params)where:- strings.parse_url(.groups[0]).domain.root_domain is .href_url.domain.root_domain
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.iextract, strings.parse_url.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | mailtrack.ksd.or.kr |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /TMS/tracking |
keys(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded) | contains | url |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
any(regex.iextract(body.links.href_url.query_params))
strings.parse_url func_call "strings.parse_url(regex.iextract(body.links[].href_url.query_params)[].groups[0]).domain.root_domain == body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "mailtrack.ksd.or.kr"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/TMS/tracking"
keys(body.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded) contains "url"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: marketing.edinburghairport.com
#Message contains use of a marketing.edinburghairport.com redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "marketing.edinburghairport.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'externalContentRedirect='
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
or sender.email.domain.root_domain == "edinburghairport.com"
)
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a marketing.edinburghairport.com redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'marketing.edinburghairport.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'externalContentRedirect='
any of:
all of:
any of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'edinburghairport.com'
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | marketing.edinburghairport.com |
strings.icontains | substring | externalContentRedirect= |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | equals | edinburghairport.com |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
or
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "edinburghairport.com"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "marketing.edinburghairport.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "externalContentRedirect="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:eq value:"edinburghairport.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: McGill University
#Message contains use of McGill University's open redirect but the sender is not McGill University.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'myalumni.mcgill.ca'
and .href_url.path =~ '/redirect.aspx'
)
and any(body.links, strings.ilike(.href_url.query_params, '*tokenUrl=*'))
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'mcgill.ca'
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of McGill University's open redirect but the sender is not McGill University.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'myalumni.mcgill.ca'
- .href_url.path is '/redirect.aspx'
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.query_params matches '*tokenUrl=*'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'mcgill.ca'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.ilike.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | myalumni.mcgill.ca |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /redirect.aspx |
strings.ilike | substring | *tokenUrl=* |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "myalumni.mcgill.ca"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/redirect.aspx"
any(body.links)
body.links.href_url.query_params match "tokenUrl="
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "mcgill.ca"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"mcgill.ca" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Medium
#Message contains use of the Medium open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "medium.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/global-identity-2")
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "redirectUrl=")
// negate redirects to medium.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirectUrl=(?:(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2})?(?:[a-z0-9]+\.)*medium\.com'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Medium open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'medium.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/global-identity-2'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirectUrl='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirectUrl=(?:(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2})?(?:[a-z0-9]+\\.)*medium\\.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | medium.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /global-identity-2 |
strings.icontains | substring | redirectUrl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirectUrl=(?:(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2})?(?:[a-z0-9]+\\.)*medium\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "medium.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/global-identity-2"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirectUrl="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Meta --> YouTube Redirection Chain
#Message contains use of a redirect chain which involves Meta and YouTube. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "l.work.meta.com"
// the redirect field
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "u=")
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'u=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?youtube\.com[^\&]*\/+logout.*continue='
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a redirect chain which involves Meta and YouTube. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'l.work.meta.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'u='
- .href_url.query_params matches 'u=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?youtube\\.com[^\\&]*\\/+logout.*continue='
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | l.work.meta.com |
strings.icontains | substring | u= |
regex.icontains | regex | u=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?youtube\.com[^\&]*\/+logout.*continue= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "l.work.meta.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "u="
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "u=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?youtube\\.com[^\\&]*\\/+logout.*continue="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: mindmixer.com
#Message contains use of the mindmixer.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "auth.mindmixer.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/GetAuthCookie')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'returnUrl=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'returnUrl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*mindmixer\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "mindmixer.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the mindmixer.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'auth.mindmixer.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/GetAuthCookie'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'returnUrl='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'returnUrl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*mindmixer\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'mindmixer.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | auth.mindmixer.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /GetAuthCookie |
strings.icontains | substring | returnUrl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "returnUrl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*mindmixer\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "auth.mindmixer.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/GetAuthCookie"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "returnUrl="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "mindmixer.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | mindmixer.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"mindmixer.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: MSN
#Message uses an MSN open redirect. Sample (benign) redirect to sublimesecurity[.]com: https[:]//www[.]msn[.]com/en-gb/lifestyle/rf-best-products-uk/redirect?url=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3VibGltZXNlY3VyaXR5LmNvbQ==
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "msn.com"
and .href_url.path =~ "/en-gb/lifestyle/rf-best-products-uk/redirect"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "url")
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message uses an MSN open redirect. Sample (benign) redirect to sublimesecurity[.]com: https[:]//www[.]msn[.]com/en-gb/lifestyle/rf-best-products-uk/redirect?url=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3VibGltZXNlY3VyaXR5LmNvbQ==
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'msn.com'
- .href_url.path is '/en-gb/lifestyle/rf-best-products-uk/redirect'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | msn.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /en-gb/lifestyle/rf-best-products-uk/redirect |
strings.icontains | substring | url |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "msn.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/en-gb/lifestyle/rf-best-products-uk/redirect"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: museepicassoparis.fr
#Message contains use of the museepicassoparis.fr open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "museepicassoparis.fr"
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, 'registerVisit')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'tracker=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'organization=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'seasonId=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirectTo=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirectTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*museepicassoparis\.fr(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "museepicassoparis.fr"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the museepicassoparis.fr open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'museepicassoparis.fr'
- .href_url.path ends with 'registerVisit'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'tracker='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'organization='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'seasonId='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirectTo='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirectTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*museepicassoparis\\.fr(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'museepicassoparis.fr'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.iends_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (6)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | museepicassoparis.fr |
strings.iends_with | suffix | registerVisit |
strings.icontains | substring | tracker= |
strings.icontains | substring | organization= |
strings.icontains | substring | seasonId= |
strings.icontains | substring | redirectTo= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirectTo=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*museepicassoparis\\.fr(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "museepicassoparis.fr"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "registerVisit"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "organization="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirectTo="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "seasonId="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "tracker="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "museepicassoparis.fr"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | museepicassoparis.fr | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"museepicassoparis.fr" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Nested Doubleclick.net
#Doubleclick.net link leveraging a nested doubleclick.net open redirect from a new or outlier sender. The unusual behavior of nesting a doubleclick URL inside another doubleclick link warrants increasing the severity of this rule.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "doubleclick.net"
and (
strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/aclk")
or strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/pcs/click")
or strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/searchads/link/click")
)
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:https?(\:|%3a))?(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)adclick.g.doubleclick.net'
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Doubleclick.net link leveraging a nested doubleclick.net open redirect from a new or outlier sender. The unusual behavior of nesting a doubleclick URL inside another doubleclick link warrants increasing the severity of this rule.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'doubleclick.net'
any of:
- .href_url.path contains '/aclk'
- .href_url.path contains '/pcs/click'
- .href_url.path contains '/searchads/link/click'
- .href_url.query_params matches '&(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:https?(\\:|%3a))?(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f)adclick.g.doubleclick.net'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (5)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | doubleclick.net |
strings.icontains | substring | /aclk |
strings.icontains | substring | /pcs/click |
strings.icontains | substring | /searchads/link/click |
regex.icontains | regex | &(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:https?(\:|%3a))?(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)adclick.g.doubleclick.net |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
or
body.links.href_url.path contains "/aclk"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/pcs/click"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/searchads/link/click"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "doubleclick.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&(?:adurl|ds_dest_url)=(?:https?(\\:|%3a))?(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f)adclick.g.doubleclick.net"
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Newegg
#Message contains use of the Newegg open redirect, but the sender is not Newegg. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'newegg.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/rts/go2.aspx'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "x=")
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'newegg.com'
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Newegg open redirect, but the sender is not Newegg. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'newegg.com'
- .href_url.path is '/rts/go2.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'x='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'newegg.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | newegg.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /rts/go2.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | x= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "newegg.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/rts/go2.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "x="
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "newegg.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"newegg.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: next2.io
#Message contains use of a next.io redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "c.next2.io"
and .href_url.path =~ "/api/ads"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'fallback_url=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a next.io redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'c.next2.io'
- .href_url.path is '/api/ads'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'fallback_url='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | c.next2.io |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /api/ads |
strings.icontains | substring | fallback_url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "c.next2.io"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/api/ads"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "fallback_url="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: nowlifestyle.com
#Message contains use of the nowlifestyle.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "nowlifestyle.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/redir.php")
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f))'
)
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^\&]*nowlifestyle\.com'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "nowlifestyle.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the nowlifestyle.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'nowlifestyle.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/redir.php'
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))'
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=[^\\&]*nowlifestyle\\.com'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'nowlifestyle.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | nowlifestyle.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /redir.php |
regex.icontains | regex | url=(?:https?|(?:\/|%2f)(?:\/|%2f)) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=[^\\&]*nowlifestyle\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "nowlifestyle.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/redir.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?|(?:\\/|%2f)(?:\\/|%2f))"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "nowlifestyle.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | nowlifestyle.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"nowlifestyle.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: obunsha.co.jp
#Detects messages containing Obunsha's passnavi redirect service that can be exploited to redirect users to malicious sites. This has been used in phishing campaigns.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
// Look for Obunsha passnavi URLs
.href_url.domain.domain == "passnavi.obunsha.co.jp"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/ct.html')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'uri=')
// Make sure it's not redirecting back to obunsha domains
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'uri=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*obunsha\.co\.jp(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// Exclude legitimate Obunsha domains as senders
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "obunsha.co.jp"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects messages containing Obunsha's passnavi redirect service that can be exploited to redirect users to malicious sites. This has been used in phishing campaigns.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'passnavi.obunsha.co.jp'
- .href_url.path contains '/ct.html'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'uri='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'uri=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*obunsha\\.co\\.jp(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'obunsha.co.jp'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | passnavi.obunsha.co.jp |
strings.icontains | substring | /ct.html |
strings.icontains | substring | uri= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "uri=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*obunsha\\.co\\.jp(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "passnavi.obunsha.co.jp"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/ct.html"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "uri="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "obunsha.co.jp"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | obunsha.co.jp | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"obunsha.co.jp" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Panera Bread
#Looks for use of the Panera Bread open redirect coming from someone other than Panera.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and 0 < length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 't.e1.panerabread.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/r/'
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'panerabread.com'
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Looks for use of the Panera Bread open redirect coming from someone other than Panera.
- inbound message
all of:
- length(body.links) > 0
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 't.e1.panerabread.com'
- .href_url.path is '/r/'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'panerabread.com'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | t.e1.panerabread.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /r/ |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "t.e1.panerabread.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/r/"
body.links length_compare "0"
body.links length_compare "10"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "panerabread.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"panerabread.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: people.anuneo.com
#Message contains use of a people.anuneo.com redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "people.anuneo.com"
and .href_url.path =~ "/redir.php"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a people.anuneo.com redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'people.anuneo.com'
- .href_url.path is '/redir.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | people.anuneo.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /redir.php |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "people.anuneo.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/redir.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: phoenixartstudio.net
#Message contains use of the Phoenix Art Studio redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "phoenixartstudio.net"
// the redirect field
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'keyvalue=\d+(?:&|$)')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '&page=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&page=[^\&]*phoenixartstudio\.net(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("phoenixartstudio.net")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Phoenix Art Studio redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'phoenixartstudio.net'
- .href_url.query_params matches 'keyvalue=\\d+(?:&|$)'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&page='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches '&page=[^\\&]*phoenixartstudio\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('phoenixartstudio.net')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | phoenixartstudio.net |
regex.icontains | regex | keyvalue=\d+(?:&|$) |
strings.icontains | substring | &page= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&page=[^\\&]*phoenixartstudio\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "phoenixartstudio.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&page="
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "keyvalue=\\d+(?:&|$)"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "phoenixartstudio.net"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | phoenixartstudio.net | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"phoenixartstudio.net" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: PIRL San Diego
#Message contains use of the PIRL San Diego open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "pirlsandiego.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/LinkClick.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.url, 'link=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the PIRL San Diego open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'pirlsandiego.net'
- .href_url.path contains '/LinkClick.aspx'
- .href_url.url contains 'link='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.url, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | pirlsandiego.net |
strings.icontains | substring | /LinkClick.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | link= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "pirlsandiego.net"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/LinkClick.aspx"
body.links.href_url.url contains "link="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: plasticsurgery.or.kr
#Message contains use of the plasticsurgery.or.kr open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "plasticsurgery.or.kr"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/bbs/link.php')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'code=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*plasticsurgery\.or\.kr(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "plasticsurgery.or.kr"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the plasticsurgery.or.kr open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'plasticsurgery.or.kr'
- .href_url.path contains '/bbs/link.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'code='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*plasticsurgery\\.or\\.kr(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'plasticsurgery.or.kr'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | plasticsurgery.or.kr |
strings.icontains | substring | /bbs/link.php |
strings.icontains | substring | code= |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*plasticsurgery\\.or\\.kr(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "plasticsurgery.or.kr"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/bbs/link.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "code="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "plasticsurgery.or.kr"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | plasticsurgery.or.kr | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"plasticsurgery.or.kr" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: pmifunds.com
#Message contains use of the pmifunds.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "trk.pmifunds.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'l=')
// not links where they redirect to pmifunds.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'l=[^&]*pmifunds\.com')
)
// remove uses that originate from pmifunds.com
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "pmifunds.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the pmifunds.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'trk.pmifunds.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'l='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'l=[^&]*pmifunds\\.com'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'pmifunds.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | trk.pmifunds.com |
strings.icontains | substring | l= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "l=[^&]*pmifunds\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "trk.pmifunds.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "l="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "pmifunds.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: predictiveresponse.net
#Message contains use of the predictiveresponse.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "predictiveresponse.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirect=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*predictiveresponse\.net(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "predictiveresponse.net"
// negate use of predictiveresponse infra
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "predictiveresponse.net")
and not any(headers.hops,
any(.fields,
.name == "List-Unsubscribe"
and strings.iends_with(.value, '@predictiveresponse.net>')
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the predictiveresponse.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'predictiveresponse.net'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirect='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*predictiveresponse\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'predictiveresponse.net'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'predictiveresponse.net'
not:
any of
headers.hopswhere:any of
.fieldswhere all hold:- .name is 'List-Unsubscribe'
- .value ends with '@predictiveresponse.net>'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, headers.hops, headers.hops[].fields, headers.hops[].fields[].name, headers.hops[].fields[].value, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.iends_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | predictiveresponse.net |
strings.icontains | substring | redirect= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
not
any(headers.hops)
any(headers.hops.fields)
and
headers.hops.fields[].name eq "List-Unsubscribe"
headers.hops.fields[].value ends_with "@predictiveresponse.net>"
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirect=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*predictiveresponse\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "predictiveresponse.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirect="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "predictiveresponse.net"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "predictiveresponse.net"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.hops | array_any | excludes:headers.hops | |
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains | |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | predictiveresponse.net | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"predictiveresponse.net" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: PremierBet
#Message contains use of the PremierBet open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "premierbet.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'returnUrl=')
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "premierbet.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the PremierBet open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'premierbet.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'returnUrl='
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'premierbet.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | premierbet.com |
strings.icontains | substring | returnUrl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "premierbet.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "returnUrl="
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "premierbet.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | premierbet.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"premierbet.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: qrxtech.com
#Message contains use of the qrxtech.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "qrxtech.com"
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, 'XMLServer.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'HREF=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'FUNC=')
and not strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'HREF=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*qrxtech\.com(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
// remove uses that originate from qrxtech.com
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "qrxtech.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the qrxtech.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'qrxtech.com'
- .href_url.path ends with 'XMLServer.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'HREF='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'FUNC='
not:
- .href_url.query_params contains 'HREF=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*qrxtech\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'qrxtech.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.iends_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | qrxtech.com |
strings.iends_with | suffix | XMLServer.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | HREF= |
strings.icontains | substring | FUNC= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "HREF=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*qrxtech\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "qrxtech.com"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "XMLServer.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "FUNC="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "HREF="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "qrxtech.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: queue.swytchbike.com
#Message contains use of the queue.swytchbike.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Impersonation: Brand, Social engineering, Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "queue.swytchbike.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/order')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '(?:^|&)target=')
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'swytchbike.com'
and headers.return_path.domain.root_domain != "swytchbike.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the queue.swytchbike.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'queue.swytchbike.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/order'
- .href_url.query_params matches '(?:^|&)target='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'swytchbike.com'
- headers.return_path.domain.root_domain is not 'swytchbike.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.return_path.domain.root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | queue.swytchbike.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /order |
regex.icontains | regex | (?:^|&)target= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "queue.swytchbike.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/order"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "(?:^|&)target="
headers.return_path.domain.root_domain ne "swytchbike.com"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "swytchbike.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
Open redirect: radiopublic.com
#Message contains use of the radiopublic.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "radiopublic.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/images/thumbnail')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*radiopublic\.com(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "radiopublic.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the radiopublic.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'radiopublic.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/images/thumbnail'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*radiopublic\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'radiopublic.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | radiopublic.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /images/thumbnail |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*radiopublic\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "radiopublic.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/images/thumbnail"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "radiopublic.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | radiopublic.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"radiopublic.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Recipient address embedded in redirect URL pointing to newly registered domain
#Detects inbound messages sent to a single recipient where the body contains a link that embeds the recipient's email address in a URL query parameter, and the resolved destination domain was registered less than 100 days ago. This pattern is consistent with personalized redirect links designed to evade detection while directing targets to newly established infrastructure.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(recipients.to) == 1
and any(body.current_thread.links,
strings.contains(.href_url.url, recipients.to[0].email.email)
and length(.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']) > 0
and any(.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'],
strings.contains(strings.parse_url(.).url,
recipients.to[0].email.email
)
and network.whois(strings.parse_url(.).domain).days_old < 100
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects inbound messages sent to a single recipient where the body contains a link that embeds the recipient's email address in a URL query parameter, and the resolved destination domain was registered less than 100 days ago. This pattern is consistent with personalized redirect links designed to evade detection while directing targets to newly established infrastructure.
- inbound message
- length(recipients.to) is 1
any of
body.current_thread.linkswhere all hold:- strings.contains(.href_url.url)
- length(.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']) > 0
any of
.href_url.query_params_decoded['url']where all hold:- strings.contains(strings.parse_url(.).url)
- network.whois(strings.parse_url(.).domain).days_old < 100
Inspects: body.current_thread.links, body.current_thread.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'], body.current_thread.links[].href_url.url, recipients.to, recipients.to[0].email.email, type.inbound. Sensors: network.whois, strings.contains, strings.parse_url.
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.current_thread.links)
and
any(body.current_thread.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'])
and
network.whois func_call "network.whois(strings.parse_url(body.current_thread.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).domain).days_old < 100"
strings.contains func_call "strings.contains(strings.parse_url(body.current_thread.links[].href_url.query_params_decoded['url'][]).url)"
body.current_thread.links.href_url.query_params_decoded['url'] length_compare "0"
strings.contains func_call "strings.contains(body.current_thread.links[].href_url.url)"
recipients.to length_compare "1"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: retailrocket.net
#Message contains use of the retailrocket.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(filter(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "retailrocket.net"
)
) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "clickproxy.retailrocket.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*retailrocket\.net(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "retailrocket.net"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the retailrocket.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
- length(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'retailrocket.net')) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'clickproxy.retailrocket.net'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*retailrocket\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'retailrocket.net'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | retailrocket.net |
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | clickproxy.retailrocket.net |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*retailrocket\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "clickproxy.retailrocket.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "retailrocket.net"
filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'retailrocket.net') length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | retailrocket.net | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"retailrocket.net" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: ringaraja.net
#Message contains use of the ringaraja.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "ringaraja.net"
and .href_url.path =~ "/portleti/katalogponudnikov/result.asp"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// negate use of the redirect by ringaraja
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^&]*ringaraja\.net'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the ringaraja.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'ringaraja.net'
- .href_url.path is '/portleti/katalogponudnikov/result.asp'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=[^&]*ringaraja\\.net'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | ringaraja.net |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /portleti/katalogponudnikov/result.asp |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=[^&]*ringaraja\\.net"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "ringaraja.net"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/portleti/katalogponudnikov/result.asp"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Samsung
#Message contains use of the Samsung open redirect, but the sender is not Samsung.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
(
.href_url.domain.domain == 't.info.samsungusa.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/r/'
)
or (
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "samsung.com"
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.domain.subdomain, '.email')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/r/')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'id=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'p1=')
// with redirects to google/doubleclick
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'p1=[^\&]*(?:google\.|doubleclick\.net)'
)
)
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('samsungusa.com', 'samsung.com')
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Samsung open redirect, but the sender is not Samsung.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere any holds:all of:
- .href_url.domain.domain is 't.info.samsungusa.com'
- .href_url.path is '/r/'
all of:
- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'samsung.com'
- .href_url.domain.subdomain ends with '.email'
- .href_url.path contains '/r/'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'id='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'p1='
- .href_url.query_params matches 'p1=[^\\&]*(?:google\\.|doubleclick\\.net)'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('samsungusa.com', 'samsung.com')
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.domain.subdomain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.iends_with.
Indicators matched (8)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | t.info.samsungusa.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /r/ |
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | samsung.com |
strings.iends_with | suffix | .email |
strings.icontains | substring | /r/ |
strings.icontains | substring | id= |
strings.icontains | substring | p1= |
regex.icontains | regex | p1=[^\&]*(?:google\.|doubleclick\.net) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
or
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "t.info.samsungusa.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/r/"
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "samsung.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.subdomain ends_with ".email"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/r/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "id="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "p1="
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "p1=[^\\&]*(?:google\\.|doubleclick\\.net)"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["samsung.com", "samsungusa.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | samsung.com, samsungusa.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"samsung.com" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"samsungusa.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: sciencebuddies.org
#Message contains use of the sciencebuddies.org open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "sciencebuddies.org"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/Handlers/QrCode.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'u=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*sciencebuddies\.org(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "sciencebuddies.org"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the sciencebuddies.org open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'sciencebuddies.org'
- .href_url.path contains '/Handlers/QrCode.aspx'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'u='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*sciencebuddies\\.org(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'sciencebuddies.org'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | sciencebuddies.org |
strings.icontains | substring | /Handlers/QrCode.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | u= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*sciencebuddies\\.org(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "sciencebuddies.org"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/Handlers/QrCode.aspx"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "u="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "sciencebuddies.org"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | sciencebuddies.org | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"sciencebuddies.org" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: secondstreetapp.com
#Message contains use of the secondstreetapp.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "secondstreetapp.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '&redirect=')
// not redirects to themselves
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&redirect=[^&]*secondstreetapp\.com'
)
)
// remove uses that originate from secondstreet
and not any(headers.domains,
.root_domain in ("secondstreetmail.com", "secondstreetmessages.com")
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the secondstreetapp.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'secondstreetapp.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&redirect='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches '&redirect=[^&]*secondstreetapp\\.com'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain in ('secondstreetmail.com', 'secondstreetmessages.com')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | secondstreetapp.com |
strings.icontains | substring | &redirect= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&redirect=[^&]*secondstreetapp\\.com"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "secondstreetapp.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&redirect="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain in ["secondstreetmail.com", "secondstreetmessages.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Shibboleth SSO Logout Return Parameter
#Detects links that contain a Shibboleth SSO logout endpoint with a return parameter, which could be used for open redirect attacks. The rule checks for both direct path inclusion and URL-encoded versions in query parameters. Only triggers on senders with non-common prevalence.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Evasion |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
// uses shibboleth.sso directly within the path
(
strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/Shibboleth.sso/Logout')
and (
strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'return=')
or strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'return=')
)
)
// or url encoded within the query_params
or (
strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'Shibboleth.sso%2fLogout')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "return%3d")
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects links that contain a Shibboleth SSO logout endpoint with a return parameter, which could be used for open redirect attacks. The rule checks for both direct path inclusion and URL-encoded versions in query parameters. Only triggers on senders with non-common prevalence.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere any holds:all of:
- .href_url.path contains '/Shibboleth.sso/Logout'
any of:
- .href_url.path contains 'return='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'return='
all of:
- .href_url.query_params contains 'Shibboleth.sso%2fLogout'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'return%3d'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
strings.icontains | substring | /Shibboleth.sso/Logout |
strings.icontains | substring | return= |
strings.icontains | substring | Shibboleth.sso%2fLogout |
strings.icontains | substring | return%3d |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
or
and
or
body.links.href_url.path contains "return="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "return="
body.links.href_url.path contains "/Shibboleth.sso/Logout"
and
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "Shibboleth.sso%2fLogout"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "return%3d"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: shoppermeet.net
#Message contains use of the shoppermeet.net redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "link.shoppermeet.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/deep-link')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'propertyid=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'publisherkey=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*shoppermeet\.net(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "shoppermeet.net"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the shoppermeet.net redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'link.shoppermeet.net'
- .href_url.path contains '/deep-link'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'propertyid='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'publisherkey='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*shoppermeet\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'shoppermeet.net'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (5)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | link.shoppermeet.net |
strings.icontains | substring | /deep-link |
strings.icontains | substring | propertyid= |
strings.icontains | substring | publisherkey= |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*shoppermeet\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "link.shoppermeet.net"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/deep-link"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "propertyid="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "publisherkey="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "shoppermeet.net"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | shoppermeet.net | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"shoppermeet.net" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com
#Message contains use of the shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com"
and strings.starts_with(.href_url.path, '/Analytics/Marketing')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'rdu=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'rdu=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*didatravel\.com(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "didatravel.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/Analytics/Marketing'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'rdu='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'rdu=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*didatravel\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'didatravel.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.starts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com |
strings.starts_with | prefix | /Analytics/Marketing |
strings.icontains | substring | rdu= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "rdu=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*didatravel\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "shoppingwebapi.didatravel.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/Analytics/Marketing"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "rdu="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "didatravel.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | didatravel.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"didatravel.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Signature Travel Network
#Message contains use of the Signature Travel Network open redirect, but the sender is not Signature Travel Network. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'sigtn.com'
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, "emt.cfm")
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "link=")
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in (
'signaturetravelnetwork.com',
'sigtn.com'
)
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "signaturetravelnetwork.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Signature Travel Network open redirect, but the sender is not Signature Travel Network. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'sigtn.com'
- .href_url.path ends with 'emt.cfm'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'link='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('signaturetravelnetwork.com', 'sigtn.com')
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'signaturetravelnetwork.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains, strings.iends_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | sigtn.com |
strings.iends_with | suffix | emt.cfm |
strings.icontains | substring | link= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "sigtn.com"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "emt.cfm"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "link="
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "signaturetravelnetwork.com"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["signaturetravelnetwork.com", "sigtn.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains | |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | signaturetravelnetwork.com, sigtn.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"signaturetravelnetwork.com" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"sigtn.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Slack
#Message contains use of Slack's open redirect but the sender is not Slack.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and 0 < length(body.links) < 10
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in~ (
'atlassian.net',
'slack.com',
'soundtrap.com'
)
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'slack-redir.net'
and strings.ilike(.href_url.query_params, '*url=*')
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of Slack's open redirect but the sender is not Slack.
- inbound message
all of:
- length(body.links) > 0
- length(body.links) < 10
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('atlassian.net', 'slack.com', 'soundtrap.com')
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'slack-redir.net'
- .href_url.query_params matches '*url=*'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.ilike.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | slack-redir.net |
strings.ilike | substring | *url=* |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "slack-redir.net"
body.links.href_url.query_params match "url="
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["atlassian.net", "slack.com", "soundtrap.com"]
body.links length_compare "0"
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | atlassian.net, slack.com, soundtrap.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"atlassian.net" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"slack.com" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"soundtrap.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: slubnaglowie.pl
#Message contains use of a slubnaglowie.pl redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "slubnaglowie.pl"
and .href_url.path == "/przejdz" // "to go" or "to move/proceed" in Polish
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
or sender.email.domain.root_domain == "slubnaglowie.pl"
)
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a slubnaglowie.pl redirect. This redirection has been abused by threat actors in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'slubnaglowie.pl'
- .href_url.path is '/przejdz'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
any of:
all of:
any of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'slubnaglowie.pl'
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | slubnaglowie.pl |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /przejdz |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | equals | slubnaglowie.pl |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
or
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "slubnaglowie.pl"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "slubnaglowie.pl"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/przejdz"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:eq value:"slubnaglowie.pl" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: smartadserver.com
#Message contains use of the smartadserver.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
// smartadserver is used in benign messages, however, they commonly have many links
// ensure messages contain less than 15 links to ensure higher fidelity matching of malicious messages
and length(body.links) < 15
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "smartadserver.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'go=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'go=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*smartadserver\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// remove uses that originate from smartadserver.com
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "smartadserver.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the smartadserver.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 15
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'smartadserver.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'go='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'go=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*smartadserver\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'smartadserver.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | smartadserver.com |
strings.icontains | substring | go= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "go=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*smartadserver\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "smartadserver.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "go="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "smartadserver.com"
body.links length_compare "15"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: smore.com
#Message contains use of the smore.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "smore.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/app/reporting/button/')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'u=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*smore\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "smore.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the smore.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'smore.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/app/reporting/button/'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'u='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*smore\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'smore.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | smore.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /app/reporting/button/ |
strings.icontains | substring | u= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*smore\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "smore.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/app/reporting/button/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "u="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "smore.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | smore.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"smore.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Snapchat
#Message contains use of the click.snapchat.com open redirect.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links, .href_url.domain.domain == "click.snapchat.com")
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != "snapchat.com"
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the click.snapchat.com open redirect.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'click.snapchat.com'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'snapchat.com'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound.
Indicators matched (1)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | click.snapchat.com |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "click.snapchat.com"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "snapchat.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"snapchat.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: social.bigpress.net
#Message contains use of the social.bigpress.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "social.bigpress.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/emailtrack/click')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'goto=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*bigpress\.net(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "bigpress.net"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the social.bigpress.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'social.bigpress.net'
- .href_url.path contains '/emailtrack/click'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'goto='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*bigpress\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'bigpress.net'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | social.bigpress.net |
strings.icontains | substring | /emailtrack/click |
strings.icontains | substring | goto= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*bigpress\\.net(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "social.bigpress.net"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/emailtrack/click"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "goto="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "bigpress.net"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | bigpress.net | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"bigpress.net" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: ssg-financial.com
#Message contains use of the ssg-financial.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "ssg-financial.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/api/v1/track/click/')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redirecturl=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'redirecturl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*ssg-financial\.com(?:\&|\/|$)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "ssg-financial.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the ssg-financial.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'ssg-financial.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/api/v1/track/click/'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'redirecturl='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'redirecturl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*ssg-financial\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'ssg-financial.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | ssg-financial.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /api/v1/track/click/ |
strings.icontains | substring | redirecturl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "redirecturl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*ssg-financial\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "ssg-financial.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/api/v1/track/click/"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "redirecturl="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "ssg-financial.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | ssg-financial.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"ssg-financial.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: stats.lib.pdx.edu
#Message contains use of the stats.lib.pdx.edu open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "stats.lib.pdx.edu"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/proxy.php")
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// negate use of the redirect by stats.lib.pdx.edu
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^&]*stats\.lib\.pdx\.edu'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the stats.lib.pdx.edu open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'stats.lib.pdx.edu'
- .href_url.path contains '/proxy.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=[^&]*stats\\.lib\\.pdx\\.edu'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | stats.lib.pdx.edu |
strings.icontains | substring | /proxy.php |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=[^&]*stats\\.lib\\.pdx\\.edu"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "stats.lib.pdx.edu"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/proxy.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: storematch.jp
#Message contains use of the storematch.jp open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "storematch.jp"
and .href_url.path =~ "/bc"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'rd=')
// negate use of the redirect by
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'rd=[^&]*storematch\.jp'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the storematch.jp open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'storematch.jp'
- .href_url.path is '/bc'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'rd='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'rd=[^&]*storematch\\.jp'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | storematch.jp |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /bc |
strings.icontains | substring | rd= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "rd=[^&]*storematch\\.jp"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "storematch.jp"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/bc"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "rd="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Ticketmaster
#Message contains use of the Ticketmaster open redirect, but the sender is not Ticketmaster. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'links.engage.ticketmaster.com'
and .href_url.path =~ '/ctt'
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'ticketmaster.com'
and headers.return_path.domain.root_domain != "ticketmaster.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the Ticketmaster open redirect, but the sender is not Ticketmaster. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'links.engage.ticketmaster.com'
- .href_url.path is '/ctt'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'ticketmaster.com'
- headers.return_path.domain.root_domain is not 'ticketmaster.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.return_path.domain.root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | links.engage.ticketmaster.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /ctt |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "links.engage.ticketmaster.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/ctt"
headers.return_path.domain.root_domain ne "ticketmaster.com"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "ticketmaster.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
Open redirect: TikTok
#Message contains use of an open redirect on TikTok. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "tiktok.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'target=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'aid=')
)
// attempt to remove any FPs sent by TikTok actual
and not (
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("tiktok.com")
and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of an open redirect on TikTok. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'tiktok.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'target='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'aid='
not:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('tiktok.com')
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | tiktok.com |
strings.icontains | substring | target= |
strings.icontains | substring | aid= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "tiktok.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "aid="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "target="
not
and
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "tiktok.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass | eq | true | excludes:headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass field:"headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass" value:"true" |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | tiktok.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"tiktok.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: tkqlhce.com
#Message contains use of the tkqlhce.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "tkqlhce.com"
and (
(
strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*tkqlhce\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
or (
strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/links/')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/type/dlg/')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.path, 'https?://')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.path,
'/links/[^/]+/type/dlg/(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*tkqlhce\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "tkqlhce.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the tkqlhce.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.
- inbound message
- length(body.links) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'tkqlhce.com'
any of:
all of:
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*tkqlhce\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
all of:
- .href_url.path contains '/links/'
- .href_url.path contains '/type/dlg/'
- .href_url.path matches 'https?://'
not:
- .href_url.path matches '/links/[^/]+/type/dlg/(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*tkqlhce\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'tkqlhce.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (5)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | tkqlhce.com |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
strings.icontains | substring | /links/ |
strings.icontains | substring | /type/dlg/ |
regex.icontains | regex | https?:// |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
or
and
not
body.links.href_url.path regex_match "/links/[^/]+/type/dlg/(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*tkqlhce\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/links/"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/type/dlg/"
body.links.href_url.path regex_match "https?://"
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*tkqlhce\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "tkqlhce.com"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "tkqlhce.com"
body.links length_compare "10"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | tkqlhce.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"tkqlhce.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: tuttocauzioni.it
#Message contains use of the tuttocauzioni.it redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "tuttocauzioni.it"
and .href_url.path == '/redirect.php'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*tuttocauzioni\.it(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// remove uses that originate from tuttocauzioni.it
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "tuttocauzioni.it")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the tuttocauzioni.it redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'tuttocauzioni.it'
- .href_url.path is '/redirect.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*tuttocauzioni\\.it(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'tuttocauzioni.it'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | tuttocauzioni.it |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /redirect.php |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*tuttocauzioni\\.it(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "tuttocauzioni.it"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/redirect.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "tuttocauzioni.it"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: typedrawers.com
#Detects messages containing links or QR codes pointing to typedrawers.com/home/leaving with target parameter, sent from non-trusted domains or authenticated sources failing DMARC checks. Considers sender reputation and requires either unsolicited contact or prior malicious activity without false positives.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect, QR code, Social engineering |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and (
any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "typedrawers.com"
and .href_url.path == "/home/leaving"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'target=')
)
or any(attachments,
(
.file_type in $file_types_images
or .file_extension in $file_extensions_macros
or .file_type == "pdf"
)
and any(file.explode(.),
.scan.qr.type == "url"
and .scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain == "typedrawers.com"
and .scan.qr.url.path == "/home/leaving"
and strings.icontains(.scan.qr.url.query_params, 'target=')
)
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
or sender.email.domain.root_domain == "typedrawers.com"
)
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects messages containing links or QR codes pointing to typedrawers.com/home/leaving with target parameter, sent from non-trusted domains or authenticated sources failing DMARC checks. Considers sender reputation and requires either unsolicited contact or prior malicious activity without false positives.
- inbound message
any of:
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'typedrawers.com'
- .href_url.path is '/home/leaving'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'target='
any of
attachmentswhere all hold:any of:
- .file_type in $file_types_images
- .file_extension in $file_extensions_macros
- .file_type is 'pdf'
any of
file.explode(.)where all hold:- .scan.qr.type is 'url'
- .scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain is 'typedrawers.com'
- .scan.qr.url.path is '/home/leaving'
- .scan.qr.url.query_params contains 'target='
any of:
all of:
any of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'typedrawers.com'
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: attachments[].file_extension, attachments[].file_type, body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: file.explode, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $file_extensions_macros, $file_types_images, $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (8)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | typedrawers.com |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /home/leaving |
strings.icontains | substring | target= |
attachments[].file_type | equals | pdf |
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.type | equals | url |
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain | equals | typedrawers.com |
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.url.path | equals | /home/leaving |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | equals | typedrawers.com |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
any(attachments)
and
any(file.explode(attachments))
and
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.type eq "url"
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.url.domain.root_domain eq "typedrawers.com"
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.url.path eq "/home/leaving"
file.explode(attachments[])[].scan.qr.url.query_params contains "target="
or
attachments.file_type eq "pdf"
macro "attachments[].file_extension in file_extensions_macros"
macro "attachments[].file_type in file_types_images"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "typedrawers.com"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/home/leaving"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "target="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
or
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "typedrawers.com"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:eq value:"typedrawers.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: U.S. Antarctic Program Data Center (USAP-DC)
#Message contains use of the U.S. Antarctic Program Data Center (USAP-DC) open redirect.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "usap-dc.org"
and .href_url.path =~ "/tracker"
and strings.starts_with(.href_url.query_params, "type=dataset&url=http")
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the U.S. Antarctic Program Data Center (USAP-DC) open redirect.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'usap-dc.org'
- .href_url.path is '/tracker'
- .href_url.query_params starts with 'type=dataset&url=http'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.starts_with.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | usap-dc.org |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /tracker |
strings.starts_with | prefix | type=dataset&url=http |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "usap-dc.org"
body.links.href_url.path eq "/tracker"
body.links.href_url.query_params starts_with "type=dataset&url=http"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: unitedwaynwvt.org
#Message contains use of the unitedwaynwvt.org open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "ebusiness.unitedwaynwvt.org"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'F=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'F=https?(?:%3a|:)(?:%2f|\/){2}(?:[^\/]+)?unitedwaynwvt.org(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "unitedwaynwvt.org"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the unitedwaynwvt.org open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'ebusiness.unitedwaynwvt.org'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'F='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'F=https?(?:%3a|:)(?:%2f|\\/){2}(?:[^\\/]+)?unitedwaynwvt.org(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'unitedwaynwvt.org'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | ebusiness.unitedwaynwvt.org |
strings.icontains | substring | F= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "F=https?(?:%3a|:)(?:%2f|\\/){2}(?:[^\\/]+)?unitedwaynwvt.org(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "ebusiness.unitedwaynwvt.org"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "F="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "unitedwaynwvt.org"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | unitedwaynwvt.org | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"unitedwaynwvt.org" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: ust.hk
#Message contains use of the ust.hk open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "shib.ust.hk"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/discovery.jsp')
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params, '(?:^|&)return=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the ust.hk open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'shib.ust.hk'
- .href_url.path contains '/discovery.jsp'
- .href_url.query_params matches '(?:^|&)return='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | shib.ust.hk |
strings.icontains | substring | /discovery.jsp |
regex.icontains | regex | (?:^|&)return= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "shib.ust.hk"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/discovery.jsp"
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "(?:^|&)return="
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: vconfex.com
#Message contains use of the vconfex.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "vconfex.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/etl.php')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*vconfex\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "vconfex.com"
// negate messages that also include an unsubscribe for vconfex
and not any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "vconfex.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/unsubscribe.php')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the vconfex.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'vconfex.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/etl.php'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*vconfex\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'vconfex.com'
not:
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'vconfex.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/unsubscribe.php'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | vconfex.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /etl.php |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
not
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "vconfex.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/unsubscribe.php"
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*vconfex\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "vconfex.com"
body.links.href_url.path starts_with "/etl.php"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "vconfex.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
body.links | array_any | excludes:body.links | |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | vconfex.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"vconfex.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: VK
#Message contains use of the VK open redirect, but the sender is not VK. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'vk.com'
and strings.iends_with(.href_url.path, '/away.php')
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'vk.com'
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the VK open redirect, but the sender is not VK. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'vk.com'
- .href_url.path ends with '/away.php'
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'vk.com'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.iends_with.
Indicators matched (2)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | vk.com |
strings.iends_with | suffix | /away.php |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "vk.com"
body.links.href_url.path ends_with "/away.php"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "vk.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
Open redirect: weblinkconnect.com
#Message contains use of the weblinkconnect.com open redirect, but the sender is not weblinkconnect.com. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Evasion, Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and length(filter(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == 'weblinkconnect.com'
)
) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == 'api-internal.weblinkconnect.com'
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/click")
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "url=")
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'weblinkconnect.com'
and not any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "weblinkinternational.com")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the weblinkconnect.com open redirect, but the sender is not weblinkconnect.com. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
- length(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'weblinkconnect.com')) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'api-internal.weblinkconnect.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/click'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is not 'weblinkconnect.com'
not:
any of
headers.domainswhere:- .root_domain is 'weblinkinternational.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, headers.domains, headers.domains[].root_domain, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | weblinkconnect.com |
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | api-internal.weblinkconnect.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /click |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "api-internal.weblinkconnect.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/click"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "url="
not
any(headers.domains)
headers.domains.root_domain eq "weblinkinternational.com"
filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.root_domain == 'weblinkconnect.com') length_compare "10"
sender.email.domain.root_domain ne "weblinkconnect.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
headers.domains | array_any | excludes:headers.domains |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | ne |
| field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" kind:ne value:"weblinkconnect.com" |
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: whitefox.pl
#Message contains use of the whitefox.pl open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "demo.whitefox.pl"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/Home/SetCulture')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'cultureName=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'returnUrl=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'returnUrl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*whitefox\.pl(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "whitefox.pl"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the whitefox.pl open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'demo.whitefox.pl'
- .href_url.path contains '/Home/SetCulture'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'cultureName='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'returnUrl='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'returnUrl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*whitefox\\.pl(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'whitefox.pl'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | demo.whitefox.pl |
strings.icontains | substring | /Home/SetCulture |
strings.icontains | substring | cultureName= |
strings.icontains | substring | returnUrl= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "returnUrl=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*whitefox\\.pl(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)"
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "demo.whitefox.pl"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/Home/SetCulture"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "cultureName="
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "returnUrl="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain eq "whitefox.pl"
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | eq | whitefox.pl | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"whitefox.pl" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: Xfinity CMP Redirection to Google AMP
#Detects when non-Xfinity senders abuse Xfinity's CMP redirection service to reach Google AMP pages. The rule specifically looks for targetURL parameters containing Google AMP paths in links from untrusted or previously malicious senders.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect, Evasion |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "cmp.cws.xfinity.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "&targetURL=")
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&targetUrl=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?google\.[^\&]*\/+amp\/+s\/+'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("xfinity.com", "comcast.net")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Detects when non-Xfinity senders abuse Xfinity's CMP redirection service to reach Google AMP pages. The rule specifically looks for targetURL parameters containing Google AMP paths in links from untrusted or previously malicious senders.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'cmp.cws.xfinity.com'
- .href_url.query_params contains '&targetURL='
- .href_url.query_params matches '&targetUrl=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?google\\.[^\\&]*\\/+amp\\/+s\\/+'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('xfinity.com', 'comcast.net')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | cmp.cws.xfinity.com |
strings.icontains | substring | &targetURL= |
regex.icontains | regex | &targetUrl=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?google\.[^\&]*\/+amp\/+s\/+ |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.domain eq "cmp.cws.xfinity.com"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "&targetURL="
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&targetUrl=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?google\\.[^\\&]*\\/+amp\\/+s\\/+"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["comcast.net", "xfinity.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | comcast.net, xfinity.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"comcast.net" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"xfinity.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: xfinity.com
#Message contains use of the xfinity.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "xfinity.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, "/learn/cima/login")
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "referer=")
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'referer=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?xfinity\.com+'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("xfinity.com", "comcast.net")
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the xfinity.com open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'xfinity.com'
- .href_url.path contains '/learn/cima/login'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'referer='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'referer=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?xfinity\\.com+'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('xfinity.com', 'comcast.net')
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | xfinity.com |
strings.icontains | substring | /learn/cima/login |
strings.icontains | substring | referer= |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
not
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "referer=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?xfinity\\.com+"
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "xfinity.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "/learn/cima/login"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "referer="
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
not
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ["comcast.net", "xfinity.com"]
type.inbound eq "true"Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
sender.email.domain.root_domain | in | comcast.net, xfinity.com | excludes:sender.email.domain.root_domain field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"comcast.net" field:"sender.email.domain.root_domain" value:"xfinity.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |
Open redirect: YouTube
#Looks for use of the YouTube open redirect coming from someone other than YouTube.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and (
any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.sld == "youtube"
and (
strings.icontains(.href_url.url, "attribution_link?")
or .href_url.path == "/redirect"
)
)
or any(attachments,
(
.file_extension in~ $file_extensions_macros
or .file_extension in~ $file_extensions_common_archives
or (
.file_extension is null
and .file_type == "unknown"
and .content_type == "application/octet-stream"
and .size < 100000000
)
)
and any(file.oletools(.).relationships,
.name == "hyperlink"
and .target_url.domain.sld == "youtube"
and (
strings.icontains(.target_url.path, "attribution_link?")
or .target_url.path == "/redirect"
)
)
)
)
and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.root_domain == "youtube.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Looks for use of the YouTube open redirect coming from someone other than YouTube.
- inbound message
any of:
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.sld is 'youtube'
any of:
- .href_url.url contains 'attribution_link?'
- .href_url.path is '/redirect'
any of
attachmentswhere all hold:any of:
- .file_extension in $file_extensions_macros
- .file_extension in $file_extensions_common_archives
all of:
- .file_extension is missing
- .file_type is 'unknown'
- .content_type is 'application/octet-stream'
- .size < 100000000
any of
file.oletools(.).relationshipswhere all hold:- .name is 'hyperlink'
- .target_url.domain.sld is 'youtube'
any of:
- .target_url.path contains 'attribution_link?'
- .target_url.path is '/redirect'
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.root_domain is 'youtube.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
any of:
not:
- profile.by_sender().solicited
- profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
Inspects: attachments[].content_type, attachments[].file_extension, attachments[].file_type, attachments[].size, body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.sld, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.url, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.root_domain, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: file.oletools, profile.by_sender, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $file_extensions_common_archives, $file_extensions_macros, $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (9)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.sld | equals | youtube |
strings.icontains | substring | attribution_link? |
body.links[].href_url.path | equals | /redirect |
attachments[].file_type | equals | unknown |
attachments[].content_type | equals | application/octet-stream |
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].name | equals | hyperlink |
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].target_url.domain.sld | equals | youtube |
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].target_url.path | equals | /redirect |
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.root_domain | equals | youtube.com |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
or
any(attachments)
and
any(file.oletools(attachments).relationships)
and
or
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].target_url.path contains "attribution_link?"
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].target_url.path eq "/redirect"
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].name eq "hyperlink"
file.oletools(attachments[]).relationships[].target_url.domain.sld eq "youtube"
or
and
attachments.content_type eq "application/octet-stream"
attachments.file_extension is_null
attachments.file_type eq "unknown"
attachments.size lt "100000000"
macro "attachments[].file_extension in file_extensions_common_archives"
macro "attachments[].file_extension in file_extensions_macros"
any(body.links)
and
or
body.links.href_url.path eq "/redirect"
body.links.href_url.url contains "attribution_link?"
body.links.href_url.domain.sld eq "youtube"
or
and
not
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass eq "true"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
macro "sender.email.domain.root_domain not in high_trust_sender_root_domains"
or
not
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().solicited"
profile.by_sender func_call "profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam"
headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.root_domain eq "youtube.com"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
Open redirect: YouTube --> Google Redirection Chain
#Message contains use of a redirect chain which involves YouTube and Google amp. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sublime | Inbound email message |
Message attributes
Rule body
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
(
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "youtube.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, 'logout')
// the redirect field
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, "continue=")
and regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'&continue=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?google\.com[^\&]*\/+amp\/+s\/+'
)
)
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of a redirect chain which involves YouTube and Google amp. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'youtube.com'
- .href_url.path contains 'logout'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'continue='
- .href_url.query_params matches '&continue=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?google\\.com[^\\&]*\\/+amp\\/+s\\/+'
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains.
Indicators matched (4)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | youtube.com |
strings.icontains | substring | logout |
strings.icontains | substring | continue= |
regex.icontains | regex | &continue=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\:)?(?:\/|%2f){2})?google\.com[^\&]*\/+amp\/+s\/+ |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: mql_rule
and
any(body.links)
and
body.links.href_url.domain.root_domain eq "youtube.com"
body.links.href_url.path contains "logout"
body.links.href_url.query_params contains "continue="
body.links.href_url.query_params regex_match "&continue=(?:https?)?(?:(?:%3a|\\:)?(?:\\/|%2f){2})?google\\.com[^\\&]*\\/+amp\\/+s\\/+"
type.inbound eq "true"Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
type.inbound | eq |
| field:"type.inbound" kind:eq value:"true" |