Detection rules › Sublime MQL

Open redirect: Dell

Severity
medium
Type
rule
Source
github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules

Message contains use of the Dell open redirect, but the sender is not Dell.

Threat classification

Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).

CategoryValues
Attack typesCredential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware
Tactics and techniquesOpen redirect

Event coverage

Rule body MQL

type.inbound
and any(body.links,
        .href_url.domain.domain == 't.em.home.dell.com'
        and .href_url.path =~ '/r/'
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('dell.com', 'dell.ca')

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

Detection logic

Scope: inbound message.

Message contains use of the Dell open redirect, but the sender is not Dell.

  1. inbound message
  2. any of body.links where all hold:
    • .href_url.domain.domain is 't.em.home.dell.com'
    • .href_url.path is '/r/'
  3. sender.email.domain.root_domain not in ('dell.com', 'dell.ca')
  4. any of:
    • all of:
      • sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
      • not:
        • headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    • sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains

Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.

Indicators matched (4)

FieldMatchValue
body.links[].href_url.domain.domainequalst.em.home.dell.com
body.links[].href_url.pathequals/r/
sender.email.domain.root_domainmemberdell.com
sender.email.domain.root_domainmemberdell.ca