Detection rules › Sublime MQL
Open redirect: PIRL San Diego
Message contains use of the PIRL San Diego open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Event coverage
| Message attribute |
|---|
| body |
| body.links (collection) |
| headers.auth_summary |
| sender.email |
| type |
Rule body MQL
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "pirlsandiego.net"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/LinkClick.aspx')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.url, 'link=')
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the PIRL San Diego open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'pirlsandiego.net'
- .href_url.path contains '/LinkClick.aspx'
- .href_url.url contains 'link='
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.url, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (3)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain | equals | pirlsandiego.net |
strings.icontains | substring | /LinkClick.aspx |
strings.icontains | substring | link= |