Detection rules › Sublime MQL

Open redirect: smore.com

Severity
medium
Type
rule
Source
github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules

Message contains use of the smore.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.

Threat classification

Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).

CategoryValues
Attack typesCredential Phishing
Tactics and techniquesOpen redirect

Event coverage

Rule body MQL

type.inbound
and any(body.links,
        .href_url.domain.root_domain == "smore.com"
        and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/app/reporting/button/')
        and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'u=')
        and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
                                'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*smore\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
        )
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "smore.com"

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

Detection logic

Scope: inbound message.

Message contains use of the smore.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild for phishing.

  1. inbound message
  2. any of body.links where all hold:
    • .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'smore.com'
    • .href_url.path contains '/app/reporting/button/'
    • .href_url.query_params contains 'u='
    • not:
      • .href_url.query_params matches 'u=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*smore\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
  3. not:
    • sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'smore.com'
  4. any of:
    • all of:
      • sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
      • not:
        • headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    • sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains

Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.

Indicators matched (5)

FieldMatchValue
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domainequalssmore.com
strings.icontainssubstring/app/reporting/button/
strings.icontainssubstringu=
regex.icontainsregexu=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*smore\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)
sender.email.domain.root_domainequalssmore.com