Detection rules › Sublime MQL
Open redirect: api.spently.com
Message contains use of the api.spently.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Threat classification
Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).
| Category | Values |
|---|---|
| Attack types | Credential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware |
| Tactics and techniques | Open redirect |
Event coverage
| Message attribute |
|---|
| body |
| body.links (collection) |
| headers.auth_summary |
| sender.email |
| type |
Rule body MQL
type.inbound
// there are less than 10 unique links for api.spently.com within the body.links
and length(distinct(filter(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "api.spently.com"
),
.href_url.url
)
) < 10
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "api.spently.com"
and strings.istarts_with(.href_url.path, '/api/spently/click')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'type=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*spently\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "spently.com"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Detection logic
Scope: inbound message.
Message contains use of the api.spently.com redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
- inbound message
- length(distinct(filter(body.links, .href_url.domain.domain == 'api.spently.com'), .href_url.url)) < 10
any of
body.linkswhere all hold:- .href_url.domain.domain is 'api.spently.com'
- .href_url.path starts with '/api/spently/click'
- .href_url.query_params contains 'url='
- .href_url.query_params contains 'type='
not:
- .href_url.query_params matches 'url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\\/){2}[^&]*spently\\.com(?:\\&|\\/|$|%2f)'
not:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain is 'spently.com'
any of:
all of:
- sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
not:
- headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
- sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.domain, body.links[].href_url.path, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: regex.icontains, strings.icontains, strings.istarts_with. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.
Indicators matched (6)
| Field | Match | Value |
|---|---|---|
body.links[].href_url.domain.domain | equals | api.spently.com |
strings.istarts_with | prefix | /api/spently/click |
strings.icontains | substring | url= |
strings.icontains | substring | type= |
regex.icontains | regex | url=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*spently\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f) |
sender.email.domain.root_domain | equals | spently.com |