Detection rules › Sublime MQL

Open redirect: TikTok

Severity
medium
Type
rule
Source
github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules

Message contains use of an open redirect on TikTok. This has been exploited in the wild.

Threat classification

Sublime's own taxonomy (not MITRE ATT&CK).

CategoryValues
Attack typesCredential Phishing, Malware/Ransomware
Tactics and techniquesOpen redirect

Event coverage

Rule body MQL

type.inbound
and any(body.links,
        .href_url.domain.root_domain == "tiktok.com"
        and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'target=')
        and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'aid=')
)
// attempt to remove any FPs sent by TikTok actual
and not (
  sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("tiktok.com")
  and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

Detection logic

Scope: inbound message.

Message contains use of an open redirect on TikTok. This has been exploited in the wild.

  1. inbound message
  2. any of body.links where all hold:
    • .href_url.domain.root_domain is 'tiktok.com'
    • .href_url.query_params contains 'target='
    • .href_url.query_params contains 'aid='
  3. not:
    • all of:
      • sender.email.domain.root_domain in ('tiktok.com')
      • headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  4. any of:
    • all of:
      • sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
      • not:
        • headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    • sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains

Inspects: body.links, body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domain, body.links[].href_url.query_params, headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, sender.email.domain.root_domain, type.inbound. Sensors: strings.icontains. Reference lists: $high_trust_sender_root_domains.

Indicators matched (4)

FieldMatchValue
body.links[].href_url.domain.root_domainequalstiktok.com
strings.icontainssubstringtarget=
strings.icontainssubstringaid=
sender.email.domain.root_domainmembertiktok.com