AppOmni Alert Passthrough

Severity: medium
Group by: appomni.event.id
Log types: AppOmni.Alerts
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Resource Development	`T1608` Stage Capabilities
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts, `T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application, `T1199` Trusted Relationship, `T1566` Phishing
Execution	`T1204` User Execution
Persistence	`T1078` Valid Accounts, `T1098` Account Manipulation, `T1136` Create Account, `T1556` Modify Authentication Process
Privilege Escalation	`T1078` Valid Accounts, `T1098` Account Manipulation, `T1484` Domain or Tenant Policy Modification, `T1548` Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Stealth	`T1078` Valid Accounts, `T1562` Impair Defenses, `T1564` Hide Artifacts
Credential Access	`T1110` Brute Force, `T1111` Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, `T1528` Steal Application Access Token, `T1539` Steal Web Session Cookie, `T1552` Unsecured Credentials, `T1556` Modify Authentication Process
Discovery	`T1087` Account Discovery, `T1518` Software Discovery
Lateral Movement	`T1550` Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection	`T1114` Email Collection, `T1213` Data from Information Repositories, `T1530` Data from Cloud Storage
Command & Control	`T1090` Proxy
Exfiltration	`T1537` Transfer Data to Cloud Account, `T1567` Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact	`T1485` Data Destruction, `T1486` Data Encrypted for Impact, `T1531` Account Access Removal, `T1565` Data Manipulation

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: appomni_alert_passthrough.py
RuleID: "AppOmni.Alert.Passthrough"
DisplayName: "AppOmni Alert Passthrough"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - AppOmni.Alerts
Severity: Medium
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0001:T1566
    - TA0001:T1528
    - TA0001:T1190
    - TA0001:T1078
    - TA0001:T1199
    - TA0004:T1548
    - TA0005:T1562
    - TA0005:T1090
    - TA0005:T1564
    - TA0005:T1556
    - TA0005:T1550
    - TA0005:T1078
    - TA0006:T1110
    - TA0006:T1111
    - TA0006:T1550
    - TA0006:T1528
    - TA0006:T1552
    - TA0006:T1539
    - TA0040:T1486
    - TA0040:T1565
    - TA0040:T1485
    - TA0040:T1531
    - TA0002:T1204
    - TA0003:T1114
    - TA0003:T1098
    - TA0003:T1556
    - TA0003:T1078
    - TA0003:T1136
    - TA0004:T1484
    - TA0007:T1518
    - TA0007:T1087
    - TA0008:T1550
    - TA0042:T1608
    - TA0009:T1530
    - TA0009:T1213
    - TA0009:T1114
    - TA0004:T1078
    - TA0010:T1537
    - TA0010:T1567
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
Threshold: 1
Tests:
  - Name: Alert Type Severity 2
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      appomni:
        alert:
          channel: prod
        event:
          dataset: appomni_alert
          id: 2ae1e281-4df1-5d26-81e2-7b75589e5dd4
          sortable_event_id: 01HQ6JKJ5VE68CAT71JM27Z1D2
          sortable_ingest_id: 01HQ6KGT23SN874A9ATHZCM1JH
        organization:
          id: 285
      event:
        created: "2024-02-21T19:50:42.499Z"
        kind: alert
        severity: 2
      message: Security issue detected in GitHub repository 'appomni/ao_factory_interfaces'
      related:
        event:
          - cf8e782f-1657-5a4e-bdc2-cff1d147c912
        services:
          id:
            - 12477
          type:
            - github
      rule:
        name: Repository Security Issue Detected
        ruleset: 1423ff39-3250-4d53-aafb-142e740668bd
        threat:
          framework: MITRE ATT&CK
          tactic:
            id:
              - TA0001
            name:
              - Initial Access
          technique:
            id:
              - T1195
            name:
              - Supply Chain Compromise
        uuid: 6d873f19-4847-4412-9b70-6dca598ee64c
        version: "1"
      timestamp: "2024-02-21T19:34:44.155Z"
      version: 2.0.0
  - Name: Event Type
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      appomni:
        event:
          collected_time: "2024-02-28T19:53:34.266Z"
          dataset: ao_auditlogs
          id: e4431a54-e57d-5cab-8b24-af194d49ebec
          ingestion_time: "2024-02-28T19:53:34.298Z"
        organization:
          id: 6
        service:
          account_id: "6"
          id: 0
          name: AppOmni
          type: appomni
      event:
        action: update_token
        category:
          - authentication
        code: access_token_refreshed_refreshtoken
        created: "2024-02-28T19:53:34.266Z"
        dataset: ao_auditlogs
        id: b90b4447-ae6a-4257-95fe-a3f9c5577158
        ingested: "2024-02-28T19:53:34.298Z"
        kind: event
        module: appomni
        original: '{"action_at":"2024-02-28T19:53:34.256900+00:00","action_data":{"md_kind":"core.aoaudit.auditdata","md_version":1},"action_type":"access_token_refreshed_refreshtoken","log_id":"b90b4447-ae6a-4257-95fe-a3f9c5577158","org_id":6,"perspective_id":1487,"service_id":34,"service_type":"workday"}'
        type:
          - change
      timestamp: "2024-02-28T19:53:34.256Z"
      version: 2.0.0
  - Name: External App Install - Severity 3
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      "@timestamp": "2024-02-26T18:02:09.044Z"
      appomni:
        alert:
          channel: prod
        event:
          dataset: appomni_alert
          id: e927e832-bfb1-55d7-9159-0e5cd84dcc65
          sortable_event_id: 01HQK99M8MZKWGZG24B5WV4JDK
          sortable_ingest_id: 01HQK9DFC5DS5MYM0YEFFW7PF8
        organization:
          id: 6
      event:
        created: "2024-02-26T18:04:15.109Z"
        kind: alert
        severity: 3
      message: An external application has been installed by appomni_int_justinz in Workday
      related:
        event:
          - cb786453-a105-5438-97a6-903d15e0cb7e
        ip:
          - 71.218.228.62
        services:
          id:
            - 34
          type:
            - workday
        user:
          - appomni_int_justinz
      rule:
        name: External Application Installed
        ruleset: 1423ff39-3250-4d53-aafb-142e740668bd
        threat:
          framework: MITRE ATT&CK
          tactic:
            id:
              - TA0005
              - TA0008
              - TA0010
            name:
              - Defense Evasion
              - Lateral Movement
              - Exfiltration
          technique:
            id:
              - T1550
              - T1550
              - T1567
            name:
              - Use Alternate Authentication Material
              - Use Alternate Authentication Material
              - Exfiltration Over Web Service
        uuid: 2aadaafd-4ec5-4a09-be6e-c2d70b555d19
        version: "1"
      version: 2.0.0
  - Name: Multiple Services
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      appomni:
        alert:
          channel: prod
        event:
          dataset: appomni_alert
          id: 2ae1e281-4df1-5d26-81e2-7b75589e5dd4
          sortable_event_id: 01HQ6JKJ5VE68CAT71JM27Z1D2
          sortable_ingest_id: 01HQ6KGT23SN874A9ATHZCM1JH
        organization:
          id: 285
      event:
        created: "2024-02-21T19:50:42.499Z"
        kind: alert
        severity: 2
      message: Security issue detected in GitHub repository 'appomni/ao_factory_interfaces'
      related:
        event:
          - cf8e782f-1657-5a4e-bdc2-cff1d147c912
        services:
          id:
            - 12477
          type:
            - github
            - workday
      rule:
        name: Repository Security Issue Detected
        ruleset: 1423ff39-3250-4d53-aafb-142e740668bd
        threat:
          framework: MITRE ATT&CK
          tactic:
            id:
              - TA0001
            name:
              - Initial Access
          technique:
            id:
              - T1195
            name:
              - Supply Chain Compromise
        uuid: 6d873f19-4847-4412-9b70-6dca598ee64c
        version: "1"
      timestamp: "2024-02-21T19:34:44.155Z"
      version: 2.0.0

Detection logic

Condition

event.kind eq "alert"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`event.kind`	eq	`alert`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`threat`	`rule.threat`
`related`
`message`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)