Auth0 Fraud Risk by Volume

Severity: high
Log types: Auth0.Events
Reference: https://github.com/auth0/auth0-customer-detections/blob/main/detections/risk_of_signup_fraud_by_volume.yml
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects a surge in either failed, successful or suspicious login attempts using leaked passwords over a window of time and a threshold. Exceeding set threshold may indicate potential fraud.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1136` Create Account

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: "Auth0.FraudRisk.Volume"
Filename: auth0_fraud_risk_volume.py
LogTypes:
  - Auth0.Events
DisplayName: "Auth0 Fraud Risk by Volume"
Description: Detects a surge in either failed, successful or suspicious login attempts using leaked passwords over a window of time and a threshold. Exceeding set threshold may indicate potential fraud.
Enabled: true
Severity: High
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0003:T1136
Reference: https://github.com/auth0/auth0-customer-detections/blob/main/detections/risk_of_signup_fraud_by_volume.yml
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
Threshold: 20
Tests:
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      data:
        client_id: 1HXWWGKk1Zj3JF8GvMrnCSirccDs4qvr
        client_name: ""
        date: "2025-10-10 10:27:51.149000000"
        description: Someone behind the IP address ip attempted to login with a leaked password.
        details:
          request:
            auth:
              credentials:
                jti: 0000000000311abf72f7a0ce7a303592
              strategy: jwt
              user:
                email: denethor@lotr.com
                name: Homer Simpson
                user_id: google-oauth2|105261262156475850461
            body:
              integration_id: 64bee519-818f-4473-ab08-7c380f28da77
            channel: https://manage.auth0.com/
            ip: 12.12.12.12
            method: post
            path: /api/v2/integrations/installed
            query: {}
            userAgent: >-
              Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36
              (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.2.3.4 Safari/537.36
          response:
            body:
              integration_id: 64bee519-818f-4473-ab08-7c380f28da77
            statusCode: 200
        ip: 12.12.12.12
        log_id: "90020230523204756343781000000000000001223372037583230452"
        type: signup_pwd_leak
        user_agent: >-
          Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
          like Gecko) Chrome/1.2.3.4 Safari/537.36
        user_id: google-oauth2|105261262156475850461
      log_id: "90020230523204756343781000000000000001223372037583230452"
    Name: Auth0 Sign-up Password Leak Event
  - ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      data:
        client_id: 1HXWWGKk1Zj3JF8GvMrnCSirccDs4qvr
        client_name: ""
        date: "2023-05-23 20:47:51.149000000"
        description: Install an available integration
        details:
          request:
            auth:
              credentials:
                jti: 0000000000326251194afdc164440a73
                scopes:
                  - create:actions
                  - create:actions_log_sessions
                  - create:authentication_methods
                  - create:client_credentials
                  - create:client_grants
                  - create:clients
                  - create:connections
                  - create:custom_domains
                  - create:email_provider
                  - create:email_templates
                  - create:guardian_enrollment_tickets
                  - create:integrations
                  - create:log_streams
                  - create:organization_connections
                  - create:organization_invitations
                  - create:organization_member_roles
                  - create:organization_members
                  - create:organizations
                  - create:requested_scopes
                  - create:resource_servers
                  - create:roles
                  - create:rules
                  - create:shields
                  - create:signing_keys
                  - create:tenant_invitations
                  - create:test_email_dispatch
                  - create:users
                  - delete:actions
                  - delete:anomaly_blocks
                  - delete:authentication_methods
                  - delete:branding
                  - delete:client_credentials
                  - delete:client_grants
                  - delete:clients
                  - delete:connections
                  - delete:custom_domains
                  - delete:device_credentials
                  - delete:email_provider
                  - delete:email_templates
                  - delete:grants
                  - delete:guardian_enrollments
                  - delete:integrations
                  - delete:log_streams
                  - delete:organization_connections
                  - delete:organization_invitations
                  - delete:organization_member_roles
                  - delete:organization_members
                  - delete:organizations
                  - delete:owners
                  - delete:requested_scopes
                  - delete:resource_servers
                  - delete:roles
                  - delete:rules
                  - delete:rules_configs
                  - delete:shields
                  - delete:tenant_invitations
                  - delete:tenant_members
                  - delete:tenants
                  - delete:users
                  - read:actions
                  - read:anomaly_blocks
                  - read:attack_protection
                  - read:authentication_methods
                  - read:branding
                  - read:checks
                  - read:client_credentials
                  - read:client_grants
                  - read:client_keys
                  - read:clients
                  - read:connections
                  - read:custom_domains
                  - read:device_credentials
                  - read:email_provider
                  - read:email_templates
                  - read:email_triggers
                  - read:entity_counts
                  - read:grants
                  - read:guardian_factors
                  - read:insights
                  - read:integrations
                  - read:log_streams
                  - read:logs
                  - read:mfa_policies
                  - read:organization_connections
                  - read:organization_invitations
                  - read:organization_member_roles
                  - read:organization_members
                  - read:organizations
                  - read:prompts
                  - read:requested_scopes
                  - read:resource_servers
                  - read:roles
                  - read:rules
                  - read:rules_configs
                  - read:shields
                  - read:signing_keys
                  - read:stats
                  - read:tenant_invitations
                  - read:tenant_members
                  - read:tenant_settings
                  - read:triggers
                  - read:users
                  - run:checks
                  - update:actions
                  - update:attack_protection
                  - update:authentication_methods
                  - update:branding
                  - update:client_credentials
                  - update:client_grants
                  - update:client_keys
                  - update:clients
                  - update:connections
                  - update:custom_domains
                  - update:email_provider
                  - update:email_templates
                  - update:email_triggers
                  - update:guardian_factors
                  - update:integrations
                  - update:log_streams
                  - update:mfa_policies
                  - update:organization_connections
                  - update:organizations
                  - update:prompts
                  - update:requested_scopes
                  - update:resource_servers
                  - update:roles
                  - update:rules
                  - update:rules_configs
                  - update:shields
                  - update:signing_keys
                  - update:tenant_members
                  - update:tenant_settings
                  - update:triggers
                  - update:users
              strategy: jwt
              user:
                email: john@justice.org
                name: User Name
                user_id: google-oauth2|105261262156475850461
            body:
              AfterAuthentication: false
            channel: https://manage.auth0.com/
            ip: 12.12.12.12
            method: patch
            path: /api/v2/risk-assessment/config
            query: {}
            userAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.2.3.4 Safari/537.36
          response:
            body:
              AfterAuthentication: false
              BeforeLoginPrompt: false
              BeforeLoginPromptMonitoring: false
            statusCode: 200
        ip: 12.12.12.12
        log_id: "90020230523204756343781000000000000001223372037583230452"
        type: sapi
        user_agent: >-
          Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
          like Gecko) Chrome/1.2.3.4 Safari/537.36
        user_id: google-oauth2|105261262156475850461
      log_id: "90020230523204756343781000000000000001223372037583230452"
    Name: Other Event

Detection logic

Condition

data.type in ["fs", "ss", "signup_pwd_leak"]

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`data.type`	in	`fs` `signup_pwd_leak` `ss`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`email`	`data.details.request.auth.user.email`
`type`	`data.type`
`p_source_label`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)