AWS User Login Profile Created or Modified

Severity: low
Compliance: Stratus Red Team aws.persistence.iam-create-user-login-profile, aws.privilege-escalation.iam-update-user-login-profile
Log types: AWS.CloudTrail
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_examples_aws_my-sec-creds-self-manage-pass-accesskeys-ssh.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

An attacker with iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console. May be legitimate account administration.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation, `T1108` Redundant Access
Stealth	`T1108` Redundant Access
Lateral Movement	`T1550` Use Alternate Authentication Material

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWS IAM Login Profile Added for Root (Elastic)
AWS IAM Login Profile Added to User (Elastic)
AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation (Sigma)
AWS User Login Profile Was Modified (Sigma)
DEPRECATED - AWS User Login Profile Modified (Panther)
High-Risk Cross-Cloud User Impersonation (Kusto)
IAM Login Profile Created (Sigma)
IAM Login Profile Deleted (Sigma)

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_cloudtrail_loginprofilecreatedormodified.py
RuleID: "AWS.CloudTrail.LoginProfileCreatedOrModified"
DisplayName: "AWS User Login Profile Created or Modified"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
    - AWS.CloudTrail
Severity: Low

Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0003:T1098
    - TA0005:T1108
    - TA0005:T1550
    - TA0008:T1550

  Stratus Red Team:
    - aws.persistence.iam-create-user-login-profile
    - aws.privilege-escalation.iam-update-user-login-profile

Description: An attacker with iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console. May be legitimate account administration.
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
Threshold: 1
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_examples_aws_my-sec-creds-self-manage-pass-accesskeys-ssh.html
Tests:
    - Name: ChangeOwnPassword
      ExpectedResult: false
      Log:
        { "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
            "eventCategory": "Management",
            "eventID": "1234",
            "eventName": "UpdateLoginProfile",
            "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com",
            "eventTime": "2022-09-15 13:45:24",
            "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
            "eventVersion": "1.08",
            "managementEvent": true,
            "readOnly": false,
            "recipientAccountId": "987654321",
            "requestParameters":
              { "passwordResetRequired": false,
                  "userName": "alice" },
            "sessionCredentialFromConsole": true,
            "sourceIPAddress": "AWS Internal",
            "userAgent": "AWS Internal",
            "userIdentity":
              { "accessKeyId": "ABC1234",
                  "accountId": "987654321",
                  "arn": "arn:aws:sts::98765432:assumed-role/IAM/alice",
                  "principalId": "ABCDE:alice",
                  "sessionContext":
                    { "attributes":
                        { "creationDate": "2022-09-15T13:36:47Z",
                            "mfaAuthenticated": "true" },
                        "sessionIssuer":
                          { "accountId": "987654321",
                              "arn": "arn:aws:iam::9876432:role/IAM",
                              "principalId": "1234ABC",
                              "type": "Role",
                              "userName": "IAM" },
                        "webIdFederationData": { } },
                  "type": "AssumedRole" } }
    - Name: User changed password for other
      ExpectedResult: true
      Log:
        { "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
            "eventCategory": "Management",
            "eventID": "1234",
            "eventName": "UpdateLoginProfile",
            "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com",
            "eventTime": "2022-09-15 13:45:24",
            "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
            "eventVersion": "1.08",
            "managementEvent": true,
            "readOnly": false,
            "recipientAccountId": "987654321",
            "requestParameters":
              { "passwordResetRequired": false,
                  "userName": "bob" },
            "sessionCredentialFromConsole": true,
            "sourceIPAddress": "AWS Internal",
            "userAgent": "AWS Internal",
            "userIdentity":
              { "accessKeyId": "ABC1234",
                  "accountId": "987654321",
                  "arn": "arn:aws:sts::98765432:assumed-role/IAM/alice",
                  "principalId": "ABCDE:alice",
                  "sessionContext":
                    { "attributes":
                        { "creationDate": "2022-09-15T13:36:47Z",
                            "mfaAuthenticated": "true" },
                        "sessionIssuer":
                          { "accountId": "987654321",
                              "arn": "arn:aws:iam::9876432:role/IAM",
                              "principalId": "1234ABC",
                              "type": "Role",
                              "userName": "IAM" },
                        "webIdFederationData": { } },
                  "type": "AssumedRole" } }

Detection logic

Condition

not (errorCode is_not_null or errorMessage is_not_null)
eventSource eq "iam.amazonaws.com"
eventName in ["UpdateLoginProfile", "CreateLoginProfile", "DeleteLoginProfile"]
requestParameters.passwordResetRequired is_null

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`errorCode`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`errorMessage`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`eventName`	in	`CreateLoginProfile` `DeleteLoginProfile` `UpdateLoginProfile`
`eventSource`	eq	`iam.amazonaws.com`
`requestParameters.passwordResetRequired`	is_null	(no value, null check)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`eventName`
`eventSource`
`awsRegion`
`recipientAccountId`
`sourceIPAddress`
`userAgent`
`userIdentity`
`arn`	`userIdentity.arn`
`userName`	`requestParameters.userName`

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)