Failed Root Console Login

Severity: high
Compliance: CIS 3.6
Log types: AWS.CloudTrail
Tags: AWS, Identity & Access Management, Authentication, DemoThreatHunting, Credential Access:Brute Force
Reference: https://amzn.to/3aMSmTd
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

A Root console login failed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1110` Brute Force

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWS Console Login (Panther)
AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge (Splunk)
AWS ConsoleLogin Failed Authentication (Sigma)
AWS CreateLoginProfile (Splunk)
AWS Credential Access Failed Login (Splunk)
AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User (Splunk)
AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip (Splunk)
AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User (Splunk)

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_console_root_login_failed.py
RuleID: "AWS.Console.RootLoginFailed"
DisplayName: "Failed Root Console Login"
Enabled: true
DedupPeriodMinutes: 15
LogTypes:
  - AWS.CloudTrail
Tags:
  - AWS
  - Identity & Access Management
  - Authentication
  - DemoThreatHunting
  - Credential Access:Brute Force
Threshold: 5
Reports:
  CIS:
    - 3.6
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0006:T1110
Severity: High
Description: A Root console login failed.
Runbook: https://docs.runpanther.io/alert-runbooks/built-in-rules/aws-console-login-failed
Reference: https://amzn.to/3aMSmTd
SummaryAttributes:
  - userAgent
  - sourceIpAddress
  - recipientAccountId
  - p_any_aws_arns
Tests:
  - Name: Failed Root Login
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "eventVersion": "1.05",
        "userIdentity":
          {
            "type": "Root",
            "principalId": "1111",
            "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
            "accountId": "123456789012",
            "userName": "root",
          },
        "eventTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "eventSource": "signin.amazonaws.com",
        "eventName": "ConsoleLogin",
        "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
        "sourceIPAddress": "111.111.111.111",
        "userAgent": "Mozilla",
        "requestParameters": null,
        "responseElements": { "ConsoleLogin": "Failure" },
        "additionalEventData":
          {
            "LoginTo": "https://console.aws.amazon.com/console/",
            "MobileVersion": "No",
            "MFAUsed": "No",
          },
        "eventID": "1",
        "eventType": "AwsConsoleSignIn",
        "recipientAccountId": "123456789012",
      }
  - Name: Successful Login
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "eventVersion": "1.05",
        "userIdentity":
          {
            "type": "Root",
            "principalId": "1111",
            "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
            "accountId": "123456789012",
            "userName": "root",
          },
        "eventTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "eventSource": "signin.amazonaws.com",
        "eventName": "ConsoleLogin",
        "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
        "sourceIPAddress": "111.111.111.111",
        "userAgent": "Mozilla",
        "requestParameters": null,
        "responseElements": { "ConsoleLogin": "Success" },
        "additionalEventData":
          {
            "LoginTo": "https://console.aws.amazon.com/console/",
            "MobileVersion": "No",
            "MFAUsed": "No",
          },
        "eventID": "1",
        "eventType": "AwsConsoleSignIn",
        "recipientAccountId": "123456789012",
      }
  - Name: Non-Login Event
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "eventVersion": "1.06",
        "userIdentity":
          {
            "type": "AssumedRole",
            "principalId": "1111:tester",
            "arn": "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:user/tester",
            "accountId": "123456789012",
            "accessKeyId": "1",
            "sessionContext":
              {
                "sessionIssuer":
                  {
                    "type": "Role",
                    "principalId": "1111",
                    "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/tester",
                    "accountId": "123456789012",
                    "userName": "tester",
                  },
                "attributes":
                  {
                    "creationDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
                    "mfaAuthenticated": "true",
                  },
              },
          },
        "eventTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "eventSource": "dynamodb.amazonaws.com",
        "eventName": "DescribeTable",
        "awsRegion": "us-west-2",
        "sourceIPAddress": "111.111.111.111",
        "userAgent": "console.amazonaws.com",
        "requestParameters": { "tableName": "table" },
        "responseElements": null,
        "requestID": "1",
        "eventID": "1",
        "readOnly": true,
        "resources":
          [
            {
              "accountId": "123456789012",
              "type": "AWS::DynamoDB::Table",
              "ARN": "arn::::table/table",
            },
          ],
        "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
        "apiVersion": "2012-08-10",
        "managementEvent": true,
        "recipientAccountId": "123456789012",
      }

Detection logic

Condition

eventName eq "ConsoleLogin"
userIdentity.type eq "Root"
responseElements.ConsoleLogin eq "Failure"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`eventName`	eq	`ConsoleLogin`
`responseElements.ConsoleLogin`	eq	`Failure`
`userIdentity.type`	eq	`Root`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field
`eventName`
`eventSource`
`awsRegion`
`recipientAccountId`
`sourceIPAddress`
`userAgent`
`userIdentity`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)