Detection rules › Panther
IAM User Policy Attached with Administrator Access
An IAM user policy was attached with Administrator Access, which could indicate a potential security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Persistence | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Privilege Escalation | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Stealth | T1078 Valid Accounts |
Rule body yaml
AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_iam_attach_admin_user_policy.py
RuleID: "AWS.IAM.AttachAdminUserPolicy"
DisplayName: "IAM User Policy Attached with Administrator Access"
Enabled: true
CreateAlert: false
LogTypes:
- AWS.CloudTrail
Reports:
CIS:
- 1.1
MITRE ATT&CK:
- TA0007:T1078
Severity: Info
Description: >
An IAM user policy was attached with Administrator Access, which could indicate a potential security risk.
Runbook: Check if the user policy was attached by an authorized user. If not, investigate the user policy attachment.
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html
Tests:
- Name: IAM User Policy Attached with Administrator Access
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"eventVersion": "1.05",
"userIdentity":
{
"type": "AssumedRole",
"principalId": "tester",
"arn": "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/tester",
"accountId": "123456789012",
"accessKeyId": "1",
"sessionContext":
{
"sessionIssuer":
{
"type": "Role",
"principalId": "1111",
"arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/tester",
"accountId": "123456789012",
"userName": "Tester",
},
"webIdFederationData": {},
"attributes":
{
"mfaAuthenticated": "true",
"creationDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
},
},
},
"eventTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com",
"eventName": "AttachUserPolicy",
"awsRegion": "us-west-2",
"sourceIPAddress": "111.111.111.111",
"userAgent": "console.amazonaws.com",
"requestParameters":
{
"policyArn": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess",
"userName": "new-user"
},
"responseElements": null,
"requestID": "1",
"eventID": "1",
"readOnly": false,
"eventType": "AwsApiCall",
"recipientAccountId": "123456789012",
}
- Name: IAM User Policy Attached without Administrator Access
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
{
"eventVersion": "1.05",
"userIdentity":
{
"type": "AssumedRole",
"principalId": "tester",
"arn": "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/tester",
"accountId": "123456789012",
"accessKeyId": "1",
"sessionContext":
{
"sessionIssuer":
{
"type": "Role",
"principalId": "1111",
"arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/tester",
"accountId": "123456789012",
"userName": "Tester",
},
"webIdFederationData": {},
"attributes":
{
"mfaAuthenticated": "true",
"creationDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
},
},
},
"eventTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com",
"eventName": "AttachUserPolicy",
"awsRegion": "us-west-2",
"sourceIPAddress": "111.111.111.111",
"userAgent": "console.amazonaws.com",
"requestParameters":
{
"policyArn": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess",
"userName": "new-user"
},
"responseElements": null,
"requestID": "1",
"eventID": "1",
"readOnly": false,
"eventType": "AwsApiCall",
"recipientAccountId": "123456789012",
}
Detection logic
Condition
not (errorCode is_not_null or errorMessage is_not_null or eventName ne "AttachUserPolicy")
requestParameters.policyArn ends_with "AdministratorAccess"
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
errorCode | is_not_null | |
errorMessage | is_not_null | |
eventName | ne | AttachUserPolicy |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
requestParameters.policyArn | ends_with |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field |
|---|
eventName |
eventSource |
awsRegion |
recipientAccountId |
sourceIPAddress |
userAgent |
userIdentity |