AWS RDS Activity Stream Stopped

Severity: high
Log types: AWS.CloudTrail
Tags: AWS, Defense Evasion, Impair Defenses, Disable Cloud Logs, RDS
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/DBActivityStreams.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects when RDS Database Activity Streams are stopped. Activity Streams provide real-time monitoring of database activity. Disabling them is a clear evasion technique used by attackers to avoid detection before performing malicious operations.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1562.008` Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_rds_activity_stream_stopped.py
RuleID: "AWS.RDS.ActivityStreamStopped"
DisplayName: "AWS RDS Activity Stream Stopped"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - AWS.CloudTrail
Tags:
  - AWS
  - Defense Evasion
  - Impair Defenses
  - Disable Cloud Logs
  - RDS
Severity: High
Description: >
  Detects when RDS Database Activity Streams are stopped. Activity Streams provide real-time
  monitoring of database activity. Disabling them is a clear evasion technique used by
  attackers to avoid detection before performing malicious operations.
Runbook: |
  1. Find all RDS API calls by the user ARN in the 24 hours before the alert
  2. Check if activity streams have been stopped by this user in the past 90 days to determine if this is routine maintenance
  3. Look for sensitive database operations from this user in the 2 hours after the stream was stopped
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/DBActivityStreams.html
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0005:T1562.008  # Disable or Modify Cloud Logs
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - eventName
  - userIdentity:principalId
  - requestParameters:resourceArn
  - p_any_aws_account_ids
Threshold: 1
Tests:
  - Name: Activity Stream Stopped Successfully
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:user"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/DeveloperRole/user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        sessionContext:
          sessionIssuer:
            type: Role
            principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
            arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DeveloperRole"
            accountId: "123456789012"
            userName: DeveloperRole
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T20:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: StopActivityStream
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "203.0.113.45"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        resourceArn: "arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:123456789012:cluster:production-aurora"
        applyImmediately: true
      responseElements:
        kmsKeyId: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/1234abcd-12ab-34cd-56ef-1234567890ab"
        status: "stopping"
      requestID: "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"
      eventID: "f1e2d3c4-b5a6-7890-1234-567890abcdef"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Activity Stream Stop Failed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/developer"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: developer
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T20:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: StopActivityStream
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        resourceArn: "arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:123456789012:cluster:production-aurora"
      errorCode: AccessDenied
      errorMessage: "User is not authorized to perform: rds:StopActivityStream"
      requestID: "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f1234567890a"
      eventID: "g2f3e4d5-c6b7-8901-2345-678901bcdefg"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Different RDS Event
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:user"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/Admin/user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T20:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: StartActivityStream
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      requestParameters:
        resourceArn: "arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:123456789012:cluster:production-aurora"
      requestID: "c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-1234567890ab"
      eventID: "h3g4f5e6-d7c8-9012-3456-789012cdefgh"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

Detection logic

Condition

eventSource eq "rds.amazonaws.com"
eventName eq "StopActivityStream"
errorCode is_null

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`errorCode`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`eventName`	eq	`StopActivityStream`
`eventSource`	eq	`rds.amazonaws.com`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`eventName`
`eventSource`
`awsRegion`
`recipientAccountId`
`sourceIPAddress`
`userAgent`
`userIdentity`
`userName`	`userIdentity.userName`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)