AWS RDS Automated Backup Deleted

Severity: critical
Group by: awsRegion, recipientAccountId, requestParameters.dbiResourceId
Log types: AWS.CloudTrail
Tags: AWS, Impact, Defense Evasion, Data Destruction, Inhibit System Recovery, Ransomware, RDS
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_WorkingWithAutomatedBackups.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects deletion of RDS automated backups. This is a classic ransomware tactic where attackers delete automated backups before encrypting or destroying databases to prevent recovery. Any automated backup deletion should be investigated immediately.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Impact	`T1485` Data Destruction, `T1490` Inhibit System Recovery

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_rds_automated_backup_deleted.py
RuleID: "AWS.RDS.AutomatedBackupDeleted"
DisplayName: "AWS RDS Automated Backup Deleted"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - AWS.CloudTrail
Tags:
  - AWS
  - Impact
  - Defense Evasion
  - Data Destruction
  - Inhibit System Recovery
  - Ransomware
  - RDS
Severity: Critical
Description: >
  Detects deletion of RDS automated backups. This is a classic ransomware tactic where
  attackers delete automated backups before encrypting or destroying databases to prevent
  recovery. Any automated backup deletion should be investigated immediately.
Runbook: |
  1. Find all automated backup deletion events by the user ARN in the past 24 hours to identify bulk deletion patterns
  2. Check if this user has deleted automated backups in the past 90 days to determine if this is normal behavior
  3. Look for database deletion or modification events from this user in the 6 hours after this backup deletion
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_WorkingWithAutomatedBackups.html
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0040:T1485  # Data Destruction
    - TA0040:T1490  # Inhibit System Recovery
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - eventName
  - userIdentity:principalId
  - requestParameters:dbiResourceId
  - requestParameters:dbClusterResourceId
  - p_any_aws_account_ids
Threshold: 1
Tests:
  - Name: Automated Backup Deleted
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:attacker"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/CompromisedRole/attacker"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
      eventTime: "2024-01-16T10:00:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: DeleteDBInstanceAutomatedBackup
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "185.220.101.50"
      userAgent: "python-requests/2.28.0"
      requestParameters:
        dbiResourceId: "db-ABCDEF1234567890"
      responseElements:
        dBInstanceAutomatedBackupArn: "arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:123456789012:auto-backup:ab-1234567890abcdef"
        dbiResourceId: "db-ABCDEF1234567890"
        status: "deleting"
        allocatedStorage: 100
        engine: "mysql"
        engineVersion: "8.0.35"
      requestID: "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"
      eventID: "f1e2d3c4-b5a6-7890-1234-567890abcdef"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Cluster Automated Backup Deleted
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/malicious-user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: malicious-user
      eventTime: "2024-01-16T10:00:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: DeleteDBClusterAutomatedBackup
      awsRegion: us-west-2
      sourceIPAddress: "198.51.100.200"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dbClusterResourceId: "cluster-GHIJKL9876543210"
      responseElements:
        dBClusterAutomatedBackupArn: "arn:aws:rds:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster-auto-backup:cab-9876543210fedcba"
        dbClusterResourceId: "cluster-GHIJKL9876543210"
        status: "deleting"
        engine: "aurora-mysql"
        engineVersion: "8.0.mysql_aurora.3.04.0"
      requestID: "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f1234567890a"
      eventID: "g2f3e4d5-c6b7-8901-2345-678901bcdefg"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Automated Backup Deletion Failed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/developer"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: developer
      eventTime: "2024-01-16T10:00:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: DeleteDBInstanceAutomatedBackup
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dbiResourceId: "db-ABCDEF1234567890"
      errorCode: AccessDenied
      errorMessage: "User is not authorized to perform: rds:DeleteDBInstanceAutomatedBackup"
      requestID: "c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-1234567890ab"
      eventID: "h3g4f5e6-d7c8-9012-3456-789012cdefgh"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Different RDS Event
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:user"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/Admin/user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
      eventTime: "2024-01-16T10:00:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: CreateDBInstanceReadReplica
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      requestParameters:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "replica-instance"
        sourceDBInstanceIdentifier: "primary-instance"
      requestID: "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-def0-1234567890bc"
      eventID: "i4h5g6f7-e8d9-0123-4567-890123defghi"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

Detection logic

Condition

eventSource eq "rds.amazonaws.com"
eventName in ["DeleteDBInstanceAutomatedBackup", "DeleteDBClusterAutomatedBackup"]
errorCode is_null

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`errorCode`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`eventName`	in	`DeleteDBClusterAutomatedBackup` `DeleteDBInstanceAutomatedBackup`
`eventSource`	eq	`rds.amazonaws.com`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`eventName`
`eventSource`
`awsRegion`
`recipientAccountId`
`sourceIPAddress`
`userAgent`
`userIdentity`
`dbiResourceId`	`requestParameters.dbiResourceId`
`userName`	`userIdentity.userName`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)