AWS RDS Security Group Ingress Authorized

Severity: medium
Group by: awsRegion, recipientAccountId, requestParameters.dBSecurityGroupName
Log types: AWS.CloudTrail
Tags: AWS, Persistence, Defense Evasion, Account Manipulation, Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall, RDS
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_WorkingWithSecurityGroups.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects when ingress rules are added to RDS security groups. Overly permissive rules, especially 0.0.0.0/0, expose databases to the internet and may indicate attackers opening network access for persistence or data exfiltration.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation
Stealth	`T1562.007` Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

RDS Database Security Group Modification (Sigma)

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_rds_security_group_ingress_authorized.py
RuleID: "AWS.RDS.SecurityGroupIngressAuthorized"
DisplayName: "AWS RDS Security Group Ingress Authorized"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - AWS.CloudTrail
Tags:
  - AWS
  - Persistence
  - Defense Evasion
  - Account Manipulation
  - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
  - RDS
Severity: Medium
Description: >
  Detects when ingress rules are added to RDS security groups. Overly permissive rules,
  especially 0.0.0.0/0, expose databases to the internet and may indicate attackers
  opening network access for persistence or data exfiltration.
Runbook: |
  1. Find all security group ingress authorizations by the user ARN in the past 24 hours
  2. Check if the CIDR range in requestParameters:cIDRIP is overly permissive or previously used by this user
  3. Look for database connection attempts from external IPs in the 6 hours after this rule was added
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_WorkingWithSecurityGroups.html
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0003:T1098  # Account Manipulation
    - TA0005:T1562.007  # Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - eventName
  - userIdentity:principalId
  - requestParameters:dBSecurityGroupName
  - requestParameters:cIDRIP
  - p_any_aws_account_ids
Threshold: 1
Tests:
  - Name: Ingress Authorized from Specific CIDR
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:user"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/NetworkAdmin/user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
      eventTime: "2024-01-17T09:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "production-db-sg"
        cIDRIP: "203.0.113.0/24"
      responseElements:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "production-db-sg"
        iPRanges:
          - cIDRIP: "203.0.113.0/24"
            status: "authorizing"
      requestID: "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"
      eventID: "f1e2d3c4-b5a6-7890-1234-567890abcdef"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Ingress Authorized from Public Internet - Critical
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/contractor"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: contractor
      eventTime: "2024-01-17T09:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress
      awsRegion: us-west-2
      sourceIPAddress: "198.51.100.50"
      userAgent: "Boto3/1.26.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "database-sg"
        cIDRIP: "0.0.0.0/0"
      responseElements:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "database-sg"
        iPRanges:
          - cIDRIP: "0.0.0.0/0"
            status: "authorizing"
      requestID: "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f1234567890a"
      eventID: "g2f3e4d5-c6b7-8901-2345-678901bcdefg"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Ingress Authorized from EC2 Security Group
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:admin"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/AdminRole/admin"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
      eventTime: "2024-01-17T09:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.50"
      userAgent: "console.amazonaws.com"
      requestParameters:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "app-db-sg"
        eC2SecurityGroupName: "app-servers-sg"
        eC2SecurityGroupId: "sg-0123456789abcdef0"
        eC2SecurityGroupOwnerId: "123456789012"
      responseElements:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "app-db-sg"
        eC2SecurityGroups:
          - eC2SecurityGroupName: "app-servers-sg"
            eC2SecurityGroupId: "sg-0123456789abcdef0"
            eC2SecurityGroupOwnerId: "123456789012"
            status: "authorizing"
      requestID: "c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-1234567890ab"
      eventID: "h3g4f5e6-d7c8-9012-3456-789012cdefgh"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Authorization Failed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/developer"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: developer
      eventTime: "2024-01-17T09:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.2.100"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "production-db-sg"
        cIDRIP: "0.0.0.0/0"
      errorCode: AccessDenied
      errorMessage: "User is not authorized to perform: rds:AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress"
      requestID: "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-def0-1234567890bc"
      eventID: "i4h5g6f7-e8d9-0123-4567-890123defghi"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: Different RDS Event
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:user"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/Admin/user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
      eventTime: "2024-01-17T09:30:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: RevokeDBSecurityGroupIngress
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      requestParameters:
        dBSecurityGroupName: "production-db-sg"
        cIDRIP: "0.0.0.0/0"
      requestID: "e5f6a7b8-c9d0-1234-ef01-234567890bcd"
      eventID: "j5i6h7g8-f9e0-1234-5678-901234efghij"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

Detection logic

Condition

eventSource eq "rds.amazonaws.com"
eventName eq "AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress"
errorCode is_null

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`errorCode`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`eventName`	eq	`AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress`
`eventSource`	eq	`rds.amazonaws.com`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`eventName`
`eventSource`
`awsRegion`
`recipientAccountId`
`sourceIPAddress`
`userAgent`
`userIdentity`
`dBSecurityGroupName`	`requestParameters.dBSecurityGroupName`
`userName`	`userIdentity.userName`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
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`Enter`	Open highlighted result
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)