AWS Root Account Access Keys

Severity: critical
Compliance: CIS 1.12; PCI 2.2.2, 7.1, 8.2
Tags: AWS, Identity & Access Management, Persistence:Account Manipulation
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Validates that no programmatic access keys exist for the AWS root account. Root access keys provide unrestricted access to all AWS resources and cannot have permissions limited. If compromised, these keys grant attackers complete account control including resource modification, data access, and billing changes.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: policy
Filename: aws_root_account_access_keys.py
PolicyID: "AWS.RootAccount.AccessKeys"
DisplayName: "AWS Root Account Access Keys"
Enabled: true
ResourceTypes:
  - AWS.IAM.RootUser
Tags:
  - AWS
  - Identity & Access Management
  - Persistence:Account Manipulation
Reports:
  CIS:
    - 1.12
  PCI:
    - 2.2.2
    - 7.1
    - 8.2
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0003:T1098
Severity: Critical
Description: >
  Validates that no programmatic access keys exist for the AWS root account. Root access keys provide unrestricted access to all AWS resources and cannot have permissions limited. If compromised, these keys grant attackers complete account control including resource modification, data access, and billing changes.
Runbook: |
  1. Query CloudTrail for all API calls where userIdentity.type equals "Root" in the past 90 days to identify if the root access keys are actively being used and document which applications or automation depend on them
  2. Create IAM users or roles with minimum required permissions, update all applications to use the new IAM credentials, then delete the root access keys via AWS Console Security Credentials page
  3. Enable CloudWatch Events rules to alert on future root account activity and consider implementing AWS Organizations SCPs to prevent root access key creation
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html
Tests:
  - Name: Access Key 1 Active
    ExpectedResult: false
    Resource:
      {
        "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
        "CreateDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "CredentialReport":
          {
            "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
            "AccessKey1Active": true,
            "AccessKey1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2Active": false,
            "AccessKey2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "Cert1Active": false,
            "Cert1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "Cert2Active": false,
            "Cert2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "MfaActive": true,
            "PasswordEnabled": false,
            "PasswordLastChanged": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordLastUsed": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordNextRotation": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserCreationTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserName": "<root_account>",
          },
        "UserID": null,
        "UserName": "root",
        "VirtualMFA": null,
      }
  - Name: Access Key 2 Active
    ExpectedResult: false
    Resource:
      {
        "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
        "CreateDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "CredentialReport":
          {
            "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
            "AccessKey1Active": false,
            "AccessKey1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2Active": true,
            "AccessKey2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "Cert1Active": false,
            "Cert1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "Cert2Active": false,
            "Cert2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "MfaActive": true,
            "PasswordEnabled": false,
            "PasswordLastChanged": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordLastUsed": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordNextRotation": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserCreationTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserName": "<root_account>",
          },
        "UserID": null,
        "UserName": "root",
        "VirtualMFA": null,
      }
  - Name: Access Keys 1 and 2 Active
    ExpectedResult: false
    Resource:
      {
        "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
        "CreateDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "CredentialReport":
          {
            "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
            "AccessKey1Active": true,
            "AccessKey1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2Active": true,
            "AccessKey2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "Cert1Active": false,
            "Cert1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "Cert2Active": false,
            "Cert2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "MfaActive": true,
            "PasswordEnabled": false,
            "PasswordLastChanged": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordLastUsed": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordNextRotation": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserCreationTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserName": "<root_account>",
          },
        "UserID": null,
        "UserName": "root",
        "VirtualMFA": null,
      }
  - Name: No Access Keys Enabled
    ExpectedResult: true
    Resource:
      {
        "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
        "CreateDate": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "CredentialReport":
          {
            "ARN": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root",
            "AccessKey1Active": false,
            "AccessKey1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey1LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2Active": false,
            "AccessKey2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedDate": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedRegion": "N/A",
            "AccessKey2LastUsedService": "N/A",
            "Cert1Active": false,
            "Cert1LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "Cert2Active": false,
            "Cert2LastRotated": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "MfaActive": true,
            "PasswordEnabled": false,
            "PasswordLastChanged": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordLastUsed": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "PasswordNextRotation": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserCreationTime": "2019-01-01T00:00:00Z",
            "UserName": "<root_account>",
          },
        "UserID": null,
        "UserName": "root",
        "VirtualMFA": null,
      }

Detection logic

Condition

not (CredentialReport.AccessKey1Active is_null and CredentialReport.AccessKey2Active is_null)

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`CredentialReport.AccessKey1Active`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`CredentialReport.AccessKey2Active`	is_null	(no value, null check)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)