AWS SAML Activity

Severity: medium
Entities: aws_account_ids, aws_arns, domain_names, trace_ids, usernames
Log types: AWS.CloudTrail
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-user-pools-managing-saml-idp-console.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Identifies when SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could gain backdoor access via SAML.

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWS IAM SAML Provider Created (Elastic)
AWS IAM SAML Provider Updated (Elastic)
AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity (Sigma)
AWS Suspicious SAML Activity (Sigma)

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Description: Identifies when SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could gain backdoor access via SAML.
DisplayName: "AWS SAML Activity"
Enabled: true
Filename: aws_saml_activity.py
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-user-pools-managing-saml-idp-console.html
Severity: Medium
Tests:
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      eventID: EID12345
      eventName: CreateSAMLProvider
      eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
      eventTime: "2021-10-14 21:25:20"
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "0123456789"
      requestID: ABC1234
      sourceIPAddress: 1.2.3.4
      userAgent: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
      userIdentity:
        accessKeyId: ABCDEFGHIJK
        accountId: "0123456789"
        arn: arn:aws:sts::0123456789:assumed-role/role/account
        invokedBy: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
        principalId: 0123456789:AWSCloudFormation
        sessionContext:
          attributes:
            creationDate: "2021-10-14T21:25:20Z"
            mfaAuthenticated: "false"
          sessionIssuer:
            accountId: "0123456789"
            arn: arn:aws:iam::0123456789:role/ServiceRole
            principalId: ABCDEFGI0123
            type: Role
            userName: ServiceRole
          webIdFederationData: {}
        type: AssumedRole
    Name: CreateSAMLProvider
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      eventID: EID12345
      eventName: DeleteSAMLProvider
      eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
      eventTime: "2021-10-14 21:25:20"
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "0123456789"
      requestID: ABC1234
      sourceIPAddress: 1.2.3.4
      userAgent: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
      userIdentity:
        accessKeyId: ABCDEFGHIJK
        accountId: "0123456789"
        arn: arn:aws:sts::0123456789:assumed-role/role/account
        invokedBy: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
        principalId: 0123456789:AWSCloudFormation
        sessionContext:
          attributes:
            creationDate: "2021-10-14T21:25:20Z"
            mfaAuthenticated: "false"
          sessionIssuer:
            accountId: "0123456789"
            arn: arn:aws:iam::0123456789:role/ServiceRole
            principalId: ABCDEFGI0123
            type: Role
            userName: ServiceRole
          webIdFederationData: {}
        type: AssumedRole
    Name: DeleteSAMLProvider
  - ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      eventID: EID12345
      eventName: ListAccessKeys
      eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
      eventTime: "2021-10-13 18:35:08"
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      managementEvent: true
      readOnly: true
      recipientAccountId: "0123456789"
      requestID: requestID12345
      sourceIPAddress: 1.2.3.4
      userAgent: console.amazonaws.com
      userIdentity:
        accessKeyId: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
        accountId: "0123456789"
        arn: arn:aws:iam::0123456789:user/bob
        principalId: ABCDEF012345
        sessionContext:
          attributes:
            creationDate: "2021-10-13T18:35:02Z"
            mfaAuthenticated: "true"
          sessionIssuer: {}
          webIdFederationData: {}
        type: IAMUser
        userName: bob
    Name: Non Target Event
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      eventID: EID12345
      eventName: UpdateSAMLProvider
      eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
      eventTime: "2021-10-14 21:25:20"
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "0123456789"
      requestID: ABC1234
      sourceIPAddress: 1.2.3.4
      userAgent: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
      userIdentity:
        accessKeyId: ABCDEFGHIJK
        accountId: "0123456789"
        arn: arn:aws:sts::0123456789:assumed-role/role/account
        invokedBy: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
        principalId: 0123456789:AWSCloudFormation
        sessionContext:
          attributes:
            creationDate: "2021-10-14T21:25:20Z"
            mfaAuthenticated: "false"
          sessionIssuer:
            accountId: "0123456789"
            arn: arn:aws:iam::0123456789:role/ServiceRole
            principalId: ABCDEFGI0123
            type: Role
            userName: ServiceRole
          webIdFederationData: {}
        type: AssumedRole
    Name: UpdateSAMLProvider
  - Name: Activity from AWSSSO Service Managed Role
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
        "eventCategory": "Management",
        "eventName": "CreateSAMLProvider",
        "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com",
        "eventTime": "2022-12-12 21:46:17.000000000",
        "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
        "eventVersion": "1.08",
        "managementEvent": true,
        "p_alert_context":
          {
            "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
            "eventName": "CreateSAMLProvider",
            "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com",
            "recipientAccountId": "123412341234",
            "sourceIPAddress": "sso.amazonaws.com",
            "userAgent": "sso.amazonaws.com",
            "userIdentity":
              {
                "accessKeyId": "ASIAXXXXNLMHSP3MFXX",
                "accountId": "123412341234",
                "arn": "arn:aws:sts::123412341234:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForSSO/AWS-SSO",
                "invokedBy": "sso.amazonaws.com",
                "principalId": "AROAT7BCMNLMONMOFFFFF:AWS-SSO",
                "sessionContext":
                  {
                    "attributes":
                      {
                        "creationDate": "2022-12-12T21:46:16Z",
                        "mfaAuthenticated": "false",
                      },
                    "sessionIssuer":
                      {
                        "accountId": "123412341234",
                        "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123412341234:role/aws-service-role/sso.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForSSO",
                        "principalId": "AROAT7BCMNLMONMOFFFFF",
                        "type": "Role",
                        "userName": "AWSServiceRoleForSSO",
                      },
                    "webIdFederationData": {},
                  },
                "type": "AssumedRole",
              },
          },
        "p_alert_creation_time": "2022-12-12 21:51:37.115853000",
        "p_alert_update_time": "2022-12-12 21:51:37.115853000",
        "p_any_aws_account_ids": ["123412341234"],
        "p_any_aws_arns":
          [
            "arn:aws:iam::123412341234:role/aws-service-role/sso.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForSSO",
            "arn:aws:iam::123412341234:saml-provider/AWSSSO_abdf34fd171b4a7e_DO_NOT_DELETE",
            "arn:aws:sts::123412341234:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForSSO/AWS-SSO",
          ],
        "p_any_domain_names": ["sso.amazonaws.com"],
        "p_any_trace_ids": ["ASIAXXXXNLMHSP3MFXX"],
        "p_any_usernames": ["AWSServiceRoleForSSO"],
        "p_event_time": "2022-12-12 21:46:17.000000000",
        "p_log_type": "AWS.CloudTrail",
        "p_parse_time": "2022-12-12 21:49:13.694384486",
        "p_rule_id": "AWS.Suspicious.SAML.Activity",
        "p_source_label": "YourOrg - Cloudtrail - Label",
        "readOnly": false,
        "recipientAccountId": "123412341234",
        "requestID": "cb89df1f-6019-427f-9a69-00b8b904ce0d",
        "requestParameters":
          {
            "name": "AWSSSO_abdf34fd171b4a7e_DO_NOT_DELETE",
            "sAMLMetadataDocument": '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?></xml>',
          },
        "responseElements":
          {
            "sAMLProviderArn": "arn:aws:iam::123412341234:saml-provider/AWSSSO_abdf34fd171b4a7e_DO_NOT_DELETE",
          },
        "sourceIPAddress": "sso.amazonaws.com",
        "userAgent": "sso.amazonaws.com",
        "userIdentity":
          {
            "accessKeyId": "ASIAXXXXNLMHSP3MFXX",
            "accountId": "123412341234",
            "arn": "arn:aws:sts::123412341234:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForSSO/AWS-SSO",
            "invokedBy": "sso.amazonaws.com",
            "principalId": "AROAT7BCMNLMONMOFFFFF:AWS-SSO",
            "sessionContext":
              {
                "attributes":
                  {
                    "creationDate": "2022-12-12T21:46:16Z",
                    "mfaAuthenticated": "false",
                  },
                "sessionIssuer":
                  {
                    "accountId": "123412341234",
                    "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123412341234:role/aws-service-role/sso.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForSSO",
                    "principalId": "AROAT7BCMNLMONMOFFFFF",
                    "type": "Role",
                    "userName": "AWSServiceRoleForSSO",
                  },
                "webIdFederationData": {},
              },
            "type": "AssumedRole",
          },
      }
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
LogTypes:
  - AWS.CloudTrail
RuleID: "AWS.Suspicious.SAML.Activity"
Threshold: 1

Detection logic

Condition

userIdentity.arn not ends_with ":assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForSSO/AWS-SSO"
errorCode is_null
eventSource eq "iam.amazonaws.com"
eventName in ["UpdateSAMLProvider", "CreateSAMLProvider", "DeleteSAMLProvider"]

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`userIdentity.arn`	ends_with	`:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForSSO/AWS-SSO`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`errorCode`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`eventName`	in	`CreateSAMLProvider` `DeleteSAMLProvider` `UpdateSAMLProvider`
`eventSource`	eq	`iam.amazonaws.com`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`eventName`
`eventSource`
`awsRegion`
`recipientAccountId`
`sourceIPAddress`
`userAgent`
`userIdentity`
`arn`	`userIdentity.arn`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)