AWS User Takeover Via Password Reset

Severity: high
Time window: 1h
Match by: p_alert_context.ip_and_username
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1098.001` Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: correlation_rule
RuleID: "AWS.User.Takeover.Via.Password.Reset"
DisplayName: "AWS User Takeover Via Password Reset"
Enabled: true
Severity: High
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0004:T1098.001 # Additional Cloud Credentials
Detection:
    - Sequence:
        - ID: Password Reset
          RuleID: AWS.CloudTrail.LoginProfileCreatedOrModified
        - ID: Login
          RuleID: AWS.Console.Login
      Transitions:
        - ID: Password Reset TO Login ON IP Addr
          From: Password Reset
          To: Login
          WithinTimeFrameMinutes: 60
          Match:
            - On: p_alert_context.ip_and_username
      Schedule:
        RateMinutes: 1440
        TimeoutMinutes: 10
      LookbackWindowMinutes: 2160
Tests:
    - Name: Password Reset, Then Login From Same IP
      ExpectedResult: true
      RuleOutputs:
        - ID: Password Reset
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:01:01Z"
        - ID: Login
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:02:01Z"
    - Name: Password Reset, Then Login From different user
      ExpectedResult: false
      RuleOutputs:
        - ID: Password Reset
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:01:01Z"
        - ID: Login
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1bob":
                - "2024-06-01T10:02:01Z"
    - Name: Password Reset, Then Login From Different IPs
      ExpectedResult: false
      RuleOutputs:
        - ID: Password Reset
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:01:01Z"
        - ID: Login
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "2.2.2.2alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:02:01Z"
    - Name: Password Reset Without Login
      ExpectedResult: false
      RuleOutputs:
        - ID: Password Reset
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:01:01Z"
    - Name: Login Without Password Reset
      ExpectedResult: false
      RuleOutputs:
        - ID: Login
          Matches:
            p_alert_context.ip_and_username:
              "1.1.1.1alice":
                - "2024-06-01T10:01:01Z"

Detection logic

Stage 1: `step Password Reset` ordered before `$Login`

References detection AWS.CloudTrail.LoginProfileCreatedOrModified.

Stage 2: `step Login` ordered after `$Password Reset`

References detection AWS.Console.Login.

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AWS User Takeover Via Password Reset

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Detection logic

Stage 1: `step Password Reset` ordered before `$Login`

Stage 2: `step Login` ordered after `$Password Reset`

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AWS User Takeover Via Password Reset

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Detection logic

Stage 1: step Password Reset ordered before $Login

Stage 2: step Login ordered after $Password Reset

Stage 1: `step Password Reset` ordered before `$Login`

Stage 2: `step Login` ordered after `$Password Reset`