AWS WAF Managed IP Reputation Passthrough Rule

Severity: informational
Log types: AWS.WAFWebACL
Tags: AWS, WAF, Managed Rules, Initial Access:Exploit Public-Facing Application, Reconnaissance, Defense Evasion
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/aws-managed-rule-groups-ip-rep.html
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects AWS WAF IP Reputation and Anonymous IP List managed rule group matches. Flags requests from IPs on Amazon threat intelligence lists including known bots, reconnaissance sources, DDoS participants, TOR nodes, temporary proxies, and hosting/cloud provider IPs.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Reconnaissance	`T1595` Active Scanning
Initial Access	`T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application
Command & Control	`T1090` Proxy

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_waf_managed_ip_reputation.py
RuleID: "AWS.WAF.Managed.IPReputation"
DisplayName: "AWS WAF Managed IP Reputation Passthrough Rule"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - AWS.WAFWebACL
Tags:
  - AWS
  - WAF
  - Managed Rules
  - Initial Access:Exploit Public-Facing Application
  - Reconnaissance
  - Defense Evasion
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0001:T1190
    - TA0043:T1595
    - TA0005:T1090
Severity: Info
Description: >
  Detects AWS WAF IP Reputation and Anonymous IP List managed rule group matches. Flags requests
  from IPs on Amazon threat intelligence lists including known bots, reconnaissance sources, DDoS
  participants, TOR nodes, temporary proxies, and hosting/cloud provider IPs.
Runbook: |
  1. Find all requests from httpRequest:clientIp across all WAF sources in the 24 hours before and after this alert to assess the scope of activity
  2. Check if httpRequest:clientIp is associated with known threat actors, botnets, or DDoS infrastructure in threat intelligence feeds
  3. Search for other alerts from httpRequest:clientIp across all detection rules in the past 7 days to identify correlated malicious behavior
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/aws-managed-rule-groups-ip-rep.html
Tests:
  - Name: Blocked reputation IP via terminatingRuleId
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:30:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "AWS-AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList"
      terminatingRuleType: "MANAGED_RULE_GROUP"
      action: "BLOCK"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "203.0.113.45"
        country: "US"
        uri: "/"
        httpMethod: "GET"

  - Name: Reconnaissance list match in ruleGroupList
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:35:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "AWS-AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList"
      action: "BLOCK"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "198.51.100.22"
        country: "CN"
        uri: "/api/v1/users"
        httpMethod: "GET"
      ruleGroupList:
        - ruleGroupId: "AWS#AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList"
          terminatingRule:
            ruleId: "AWSManagedReconnaissanceList"
            action: "BLOCK"

  - Name: Non-terminating IP reputation match (COUNT mode)
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:40:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "Default_Action"
      action: "ALLOW"
      httpSourceName: "CF"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "192.0.2.100"
        country: "RU"
        uri: "/index.html"
        httpMethod: "GET"
      ruleGroupList:
        - ruleGroupId: "AWS#AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList"
          nonTerminatingMatchingRules:
            - ruleId: "AWSManagedIPReputationList"
              action: "COUNT"

  - Name: DDoS list match
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:45:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "AWS-AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList"
      action: "BLOCK"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "203.0.113.99"
        country: "BR"
        uri: "/"
        httpMethod: "GET"
      ruleGroupList:
        - ruleGroupId: "AWS#AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList"
          terminatingRule:
            ruleId: "AWSManagedIPDDoSList"
            action: "BLOCK"

  - Name: Anonymous IP blocked via terminatingRuleId
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:47:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "AWS-AWSManagedRulesAnonymousIpList"
      terminatingRuleType: "MANAGED_RULE_GROUP"
      action: "BLOCK"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "203.0.113.50"
        country: "NL"
        uri: "/api/login"
        httpMethod: "POST"

  - Name: AnonymousIPList match in ruleGroupList
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:48:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "AWS-AWSManagedRulesAnonymousIpList"
      action: "BLOCK"
      httpSourceName: "CF"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "198.51.100.55"
        country: "DE"
        uri: "/api/data"
        httpMethod: "GET"
      ruleGroupList:
        - ruleGroupId: "AWS#AWSManagedRulesAnonymousIpList"
          terminatingRule:
            ruleId: "AnonymousIPList"
            action: "BLOCK"

  - Name: HostingProviderIPList non-terminating (COUNT mode)
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:49:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "Default_Action"
      action: "ALLOW"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "192.0.2.200"
        country: "US"
        uri: "/index.html"
        httpMethod: "GET"
      ruleGroupList:
        - ruleGroupId: "AWS#AWSManagedRulesAnonymousIpList"
          nonTerminatingMatchingRules:
            - ruleId: "HostingProviderIPList"
              action: "COUNT"

  - Name: Different rule group - no alert
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:50:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "AWS-AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet"
      action: "BLOCK"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "203.0.113.45"

  - Name: Normal traffic - no alert
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: "2024-03-20T10:55:00.000Z"
      webaclId: "arn:aws:wafv2:us-east-1:123456789012:regional/webacl/test/a1b2c3d4"
      terminatingRuleId: "Default_Action"
      action: "ALLOW"
      httpSourceName: "ALB"
      httpRequest:
        clientIp: "198.51.100.10"

DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
Threshold: 1

Detection logic

Condition

nonTerminatingMatchingRules array_any or ruleGroupList array_any

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`matched_rule`	`terminatingRuleId`
`client_ip`	`httpRequest.clientIp`
`country`	`httpRequest.country`
`http_method`	`httpRequest.httpMethod`
`uri`	`httpRequest.uri`
`action`
`source`	`httpSourceName`
`source_id`	`httpSourceId`
`terminating_rule_id`	`terminatingRuleId`
`terminating_rule_type`	`terminatingRuleType`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)