Detection rules › Panther

Azure User Elevated to User Access Administrator Role

Severity
high
Log types
Azure.Audit
Tags
Persistence, Account Manipulation
Reference
https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/azure/privilege_escalation_entra_id_elevate_to_user_administrator_access.toml
Source
github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects when a user elevates their permissions to the "User Access Administrator" role in Azure, which grants full control over access management for Azure resources. The User Access Administrator role is one of the most powerful privileged roles in Azure, allowing the holder to manage user access to all Azure resources, assign roles to other users including administrative roles, and effectively control the entire Azure subscription's permission structure.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: azure_elevate_user_access_admin.py
RuleID: "Azure.Audit.ElevateUserAccessAdministrator"
DisplayName: "Azure User Elevated to User Access Administrator Role"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - Azure.Audit
Severity: High
Description: >
  Detects when a user elevates their permissions to the "User Access Administrator" role in Azure,
  which grants full control over access management for Azure resources. The User Access Administrator
  role is one of the most powerful privileged roles in Azure, allowing the holder to manage user access
  to all Azure resources, assign roles to other users including administrative roles, and effectively
  control the entire Azure subscription's permission structure.
Tags:
  - Persistence
  - Account Manipulation
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0004:T1098
    - TA0004:T1098.003
Runbook: |
  1. Query Azure.Audit logs for all role assignment operations and permission changes by properties:initiatedBy:user:userPrincipalName in the 24 hours after the elevation to identify what privileged actions the user performed with the elevated access
  2. Verify with the user or their manager whether this elevation was authorized and required for a specific operational task, incident response activity, or break-glass scenario documented in your organization's procedures
  3. Review Azure.Audit logs for role assignments made during the elevated access period to identify if the user granted themselves or others persistent administrative roles that should be revoked, and check if the User Access Administrator role was properly removed after the task completion
Reference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/azure/privilege_escalation_entra_id_elevate_to_user_administrator_access.toml
SummaryAttributes:
  - properties:initiatedBy:user:userPrincipalName
  - properties:initiatedBy:user:ipAddress
  - tenantId
Tests:
  - Name: User Elevated to User Access Administrator
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "time": "2025-01-15 08:45:30.123",
        "resourceId": "/subscriptions/sub-123/providers/Microsoft.Authorization",
        "operationName": "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources",
        "operationVersion": "1.0",
        "category": "AuditLogs",
        "tenantId": "tenant-123",
        "durationMs": 0,
        "callerIpAddress": "2.2.2.2",
        "correlationId": "elevate-access-001",
        "Level": "4",
        "properties":
          {
            "activityDateTime": "2025-01-15T08:45:30.1234567Z",
            "loggedByService": "Microsoft.Authorization",
            "operationType": "Assign",
            "initiatedBy":
              {
                "user":
                  {
                    "id": "user-admin-789",
                    "displayName": "Senior Administrator",
                    "userPrincipalName": "denethor@lotr.com",
                    "ipAddress": "2.2.2.2",
                  },
              },
            "additionalDetails":
              [
                { "key": "Action", "value": "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action" },
                { "key": "Scope", "value": "/subscriptions/sub-123" },
              ],
          },
        "result": "SUCCESS",
        "p_event_time": "2025-01-15 08:45:30.123",
        "p_log_type": "Azure.Audit",
      }
  - Name: Different Operation
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "time": "2025-01-15 14:15:35.345",
        "resourceId": "/subscriptions/sub-def/providers/Microsoft.Authorization",
        "operationName": "Delete role assignment",
        "operationVersion": "1.0",
        "category": "AuditLogs",
        "tenantId": "tenant-def",
        "resultSignature": "None",
        "durationMs": 0,
        "callerIpAddress": "198.51.100.150",
        "correlationId": "role-remove-001",
        "Level": "4",
        "properties":
          {
            "result": "success",
            "operationName": "Delete role assignment",
            "activityDisplayName": "Remove role assignment",
            "activityDateTime": "2025-01-15T14:15:35.3456789Z",
            "loggedByService": "Microsoft.Authorization",
            "operationType": "Unassign",
            "initiatedBy":
              {
                "user":
                  {
                    "id": "user-security-777",
                    "displayName": "Security Admin",
                    "userPrincipalName": "secadmin@company.com",
                    "ipAddress": "198.51.100.150",
                  },
              },
            "targetResources":
              [
                {
                  "id": "user-former-888",
                  "displayName": "Former Employee",
                  "userPrincipalName": "former@company.com",
                  "type": "User",
                },
              ],
            "additionalDetails":
              [
                { "key": "RoleName", "value": "Reader" },
                { "key": "Scope", "value": "/subscriptions/sub-def" },
              ],
          },
        "p_event_time": "2025-01-15 14:15:35.345",
        "p_log_type": "Azure.Audit",
      }

Detection logic

Condition

operationName contains "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator"
result eq "success"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
operationNamecontains
  • User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator
resulteq
  • success

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

FieldSource
userPrincipalNameproperties.initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName