Azure High-Risk Sign-In

Severity: high
Log types: Azure.Audit
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-configure-risk-policies
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects high-risk sign-in attempts flagged by Microsoft Entra ID Protection. These alerts indicate potential account compromise where Microsoft's machine learning has identified suspicious authentication patterns. High-risk sign-ins may result from credential theft, impossible travel, or unfamiliar locations.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: azure_high_risk_signin.py
RuleID: "Azure.Audit.HighRiskSignIn"
DisplayName: "Azure High-Risk Sign-In"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - Azure.Audit
Severity: High
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
Description: >
  Detects high-risk sign-in attempts flagged by Microsoft Entra ID Protection. These alerts indicate potential account compromise where Microsoft's machine learning has identified suspicious authentication patterns. High-risk sign-ins may result from credential theft, impossible travel, or unfamiliar locations.
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0001:T1078
Runbook: |
  1. Query Azure.Audit sign-in logs for all authentication events by properties:userPrincipalName in the 24 hours before and after the alert to establish normal sign-in patterns
  2. Check if callerIpAddress has been used by this user in the past 30 days and verify if the location matches expected geographic regions for the user
  3. Find other high-risk or failed sign-in attempts for this user or from this IP address in the past 7 days to identify potential credential compromise patterns
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-configure-risk-policies
SummaryAttributes:
  - properties:userPrincipalName
  - properties:servicePrincipalName
  - callerIpAddress
  - properties:riskLevelAggregated
  - properties:riskLevelDuringSignIn
  - properties:riskEventTypes
Tests:
  - Name: High Risk During Sign-In
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "callerIpAddress": "4.4.4.4",
        "category": "SignInLogs",
        "correlationId": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
        "durationMs": 0,
        "Level": "4",
        "location": "RU",
        "operationName": "Sign-in activity",
        "operationVersion": "1.0",
        "p_event_time": "2025-01-15 14:23:10.123",
        "p_log_type": "Azure.Audit",
        "properties":
          {
            "userId": "user123-456-789",
            "userPrincipalName": "john@justice.org",
            "appId": "00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-111111111111",
            "authenticationProtocol": "oAuth2",
            "conditionalAccessStatus": "success",
            "correlationId": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
            "createdDateTime": "2025-01-15T14:23:10.1234567Z",
            "ipAddress": "4.4.4.4",
            "isInteractive": true,
            "location":
              {
                "city": "Moscow",
                "countryOrRegion": "RU",
                "geoCoordinates": { "latitude": 55.7558, "longitude": 37.6173 },
                "state": "Moscow",
              },
            "resourceDisplayName": "Microsoft 365",
            "resourceId": "00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-111111111111",
            "riskDetail": "aiConfirmedSigninSafe",
            "riskLevelAggregated": "none",
            "riskLevelDuringSignIn": "high",
            "riskState": "atRisk",
            "riskEventTypes": ["unfamiliarFeatures", "anonymizedIPAddress"],
            "status": { "errorCode": 0 },
            "tokenIssuerType": "AzureAD",
            "clientAppUsed": "Browser",
          },
        "resourceId": "/tenants/tenant-id-123/providers/Microsoft.aadiam",
        "resultSignature": "SUCCESS",
        "resultType": "0",
        "tenantId": "tenant-id-123",
        "time": "2025-01-15 14:23:10.123",
      }
  - Name: High Risk Dismissed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "callerIpAddress": "4.4.4.4",
        "category": "SignInLogs",
        "correlationId": "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-def0-333333333333",
        "durationMs": 0,
        "Level": "4",
        "location": "US",
        "operationName": "Sign-in activity",
        "operationVersion": "1.0",
        "p_event_time": "2025-01-15 17:10:15.234",
        "p_log_type": "Azure.Audit",
        "properties":
          {
            "userId": "user234-567-890",
            "userPrincipalName": "cross@lotr.com",
            "appId": "00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-111111111111",
            "authenticationProtocol": "oAuth2",
            "conditionalAccessStatus": "success",
            "correlationId": "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-def0-333333333333",
            "createdDateTime": "2025-01-15T17:10:15.2345678Z",
            "ipAddress": "4.4.4.4",
            "isInteractive": true,
            "resourceDisplayName": "Microsoft 365",
            "resourceId": "00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-111111111111",
            "riskDetail": "adminDismissedAllRiskForUser",
            "riskLevelAggregated": "high",
            "riskLevelDuringSignIn": "high",
            "riskState": "dismissed",
            "status": { "errorCode": 0 },
            "tokenIssuerType": "AzureAD",
          },
        "resourceId": "/tenants/tenant-id-012/providers/Microsoft.aadiam",
        "resultSignature": "SUCCESS",
        "resultType": "0",
        "tenantId": "tenant-id-012",
        "time": "2025-01-15 17:10:15.234",
      }

Detection logic

Condition

operationName eq "Sign-in activity"
properties.riskState not in ["dismissed", "remediated"]
properties.riskLevelDuringSignIn eq "high" or properties.riskLevelAggregated eq "high"

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`properties.riskState`	in	`dismissed`, `remediated`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`operationName`	eq	`Sign-in activity`
`properties.riskLevelAggregated`	eq	`high`
`properties.riskLevelDuringSignIn`	eq	`high`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ipAddress`	`properties.ipAddress`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)