Azure Key Vault Certificate Accessed

Severity: informational
Log types: Azure.MonitorActivity
Tags: AZT604, AZT604.2, Credential Access, Collection, Credentials from Password Stores, Data from Cloud Storage
Reference: https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/CredentialAccess/AZT604/AZT604-2
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects when Azure Key Vault certificates are accessed via read operations. Adversaries may attempt to dump certificates to extract credentials for service principals or establish persistence through certificate-based authentication.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1555` Credentials from Password Stores
Collection	`T1530` Data from Cloud Storage

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: azure_keyvault_certificate_accessed.py
RuleID: "Azure.MonitorActivity.KeyVault.CertificateAccessed"
DisplayName: "Azure Key Vault Certificate Accessed"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - Azure.MonitorActivity
Severity: Info
Description: >
  Detects when Azure Key Vault certificates are accessed via read operations.
  Adversaries may attempt to dump certificates to extract credentials for service
  principals or establish persistence through certificate-based authentication.
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0006:T1555 # Credential Access: Credentials from Password Stores
    - TA0009:T1530 # Collection: Data from Cloud Storage
Tags:
  - AZT604
  - AZT604.2
  - Credential Access
  - Collection
  - Credentials from Password Stores
  - Data from Cloud Storage
Runbook: |
  1. Find all Key Vault certificate and secret operations by the callerIpAddress in the 6 hours before and after this alert to identify patterns of bulk credential access
  2. Query for the certificate details to determine which service principals or applications use this certificate for authentication
  3. Check if the identity accessing the certificate has a history of Key Vault access in the past 30 days to determine if this is normal behavior
Reference: https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/CredentialAccess/AZT604/AZT604-2
SummaryAttributes:
  - resourceId
  - callerIpAddress
  - correlationId
Tests:
  - Name: Certificate Accessed Successfully
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "time": "2025-12-23T10:30:00.0000000Z",
        "resourceId": "/subscriptions/12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc/resourceGroups/myresourcegroup/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/myvault/certificates/app-service-cert",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/certificates/read",
        "operationVersion": "7.0",
        "category": "Administrative",
        "resultType": "Success",
        "callerIpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
        "location": "eastus",
        "correlationId": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
        "identity": {
          "claims": {
            "appid": "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
          }
        },
        "tenantId": "87654321-4321-4321-4321-111111111111"
      }
  - Name: Certificate Read with Succeeded Status
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "time": "2025-12-23T11:00:00.0000000Z",
        "resourceId": "/subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111/resourceGroups/prod-rg/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/prodvault/certificates/service-principal-cert",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/certificates/read",
        "operationVersion": "7.0",
        "category": "Administrative",
        "resultType": "Succeeded",
        "callerIpAddress": "2.2.2.2",
        "location": "westus",
        "correlationId": "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f12345678901",
        "identity": {
          "claims": {
            "appid": "87654321-4321-4321-4321-123456789abc"
          }
        },
        "tenantId": "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222"
      }
  - Name: Case Insensitive Match
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "time": "2025-12-23T12:00:00.0000000Z",
        "resourceId": "/subscriptions/33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333/resourceGroups/security-rg/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secvault/certificates/ssl-cert",
        "operationName": "microsoft.keyvault/vaults/certificates/read",
        "operationVersion": "7.0",
        "category": "Administrative",
        "resultType": "Success",
        "callerIpAddress": "3.3.3.3",
        "location": "centralus",
        "correlationId": "c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-333333333333",
        "tenantId": "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333"
      }
  - Name: Different Operation
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "time": "2025-12-23T14:00:00.0000000Z",
        "resourceId": "/subscriptions/55555555-5555-5555-5555-555555555555/resourceGroups/myresourcegroup/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/myvault/certificates/cert2",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/certificates/write",
        "operationVersion": "7.0",
        "category": "Administrative",
        "resultType": "Success",
        "callerIpAddress": "5.5.5.5",
        "location": "eastus",
        "correlationId": "e5f6a7b8-c9d0-1234-ef01-555555555555",
        "tenantId": "55555555-5555-5555-5555-555555555555"
      }

Detection logic

Condition

operationName eq "MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT/VAULTS/CERTIFICATES/READ"
resultType in ["Success", "Succeeded"]

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`operationName`	eq	`MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT/VAULTS/CERTIFICATES/READ`
`resultType`	in	`Succeeded` `Success`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field
`callerIpAddress`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)