Crowdstrike Credential Dumping Tool

Severity: critical
Entities: ip_addresses, md5_hashes, sha1_hashes, sha256_hashes, trace_ids
Log types: Crowdstrike.FDREvent
Tags: CrowdStrike, Windows, Credential Access, Post-Exploitation, Lateral Movement, Endpoint Detection
Reference: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversary-credential-theft/
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects execution of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump, and Lazagne that extract passwords, hashes, and Kerberos tickets from memory and credential stores. These tools enable lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistent access by allowing attackers to authenticate as legitimate users. This detection identifies a critical attack phase where adversaries transition from initial compromise to broader network access.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Description: >
  Detects execution of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump, and Lazagne that extract passwords, hashes, and Kerberos tickets from memory and credential stores. These tools enable lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistent access by allowing attackers to authenticate as legitimate users. This detection identifies a critical attack phase where adversaries transition from initial compromise to broader network access.
DisplayName: "Crowdstrike Credential Dumping Tool"
Enabled: true
Filename: crowdstrike_credential_dumping_tool.py
Reference: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversary-credential-theft/
Severity: Critical
Tags:
  - CrowdStrike
  - Windows
  - Credential Access
  - Post-Exploitation
  - Lateral Movement
  - Endpoint Detection
Runbook: |
  1. Review the process tree in CrowdStrike for event:ParentBaseFileName and event:SourceProcessId to determine what launched the credential dumping tool and identify if this was manual execution or automated malware
  2. Search CrowdStrike logs and Windows Event Logs for all users who logged into the affected host (aid and aip) in the 7 days before this alert, then hunt for lateral movement attempts from those user accounts to other systems
  3. Query CrowdStrike for the event:SHA256HashData across all endpoints to identify if the same credential dumping tool was executed on other hosts in the environment
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0006:T1003
    - TA0006:T1003.001
Tests:
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
      aip: 11.10.9.8
      cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      configbuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
      configstatehash: "3799024366"
      entitlements: "15"
      event:
        AuthenticationId: "293628"
        AuthenticodeHashData: 5540c470218d209b7c3eca3d12e190580814d566
        CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mimikatz.exe
        ConfigBuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
        ConfigStateHash: "3799024366"
        EffectiveTransmissionClass: "2"
        Entitlements: "15"
        ImageFileName: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\mimikatz.exe
        ImageSubsystem: "3"
        IntegrityLevel: "12288"
        MD5HashData: 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        ParentAuthenticationId: "293628"
        ParentBaseFileName: pwsh.exe
        ParentProcessId: "4370948876"
        ProcessCreateFlags: "0"
        ProcessEndTime: ""
        ProcessParameterFlags: "24577"
        ProcessStartTime: "1682106752.006"
        ProcessSxsFlags: "64"
        RawProcessId: "1468"
        SHA1HashData: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        SHA256HashData: 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
        SessionId: "2"
        SignInfoFlags: "8683538"
        SourceProcessId: "4370948876"
        SourceThreadId: "6364981533"
        Tags: 25, 27, 40, 151, 874, 924, 12094627905582, 12094627906234, 237494511599633
        TargetProcessId: "4390327988"
        TokenType: "1"
        TreeId: "4295752857"
        UserSid: S-1-5-21-239183934-720705223-383019856-500
        aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
        aip: 11.10.9.8
        cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
        event_platform: Win
        event_simpleName: ProcessRollup2
        id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
        name: ProcessRollup2V19
        timestamp: "1682106752722"
      event_platform: Win
      event_simplename: ProcessRollup2
      fdr_event_type: ProcessRollup2
      id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
      name: ProcessRollup2V19
      p_any_ip_addresses:
        - 11.10.9.8
      p_any_md5_hashes:
        - 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_any_sha1_hashes:
        - "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
      p_any_sha256_hashes:
        - 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
      p_any_trace_ids:
        - "4295752857"
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_event_time: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      p_log_type: Crowdstrike.FDREvent
      p_parse_time: "2023-04-21 20:05:52.94"
      p_row_id: 7ac82dbb43a99bfec196bdda178c8101
      p_schema_version: 0
      p_source_id: 1f33f64c-124d-413c-a9e3-d51ccedd8e77
      p_source_label: Crowdstrike-FDR-Dev
      timestamp: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      treeid: "4295752857"
    Name: mimikatz
  - ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
      aip: 11.10.9.8
      cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      configbuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
      configstatehash: "3799024366"
      entitlements: "15"
      event:
        AuthenticationId: "293628"
        AuthenticodeHashData: 5540c470218d209b7c3eca3d12e190580814d566
        CommandLine: '"C:\Windows\System32\at.exe" at 09:00 /interactive /every:m,t,w,th,f,s,su'
        ConfigBuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
        ConfigStateHash: "3799024366"
        EffectiveTransmissionClass: "2"
        Entitlements: "15"
        ImageFileName: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\at.exe
        ImageSubsystem: "3"
        IntegrityLevel: "12288"
        MD5HashData: 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        ParentAuthenticationId: "293628"
        ParentBaseFileName: pwsh.exe
        ParentProcessId: "4370948876"
        ProcessCreateFlags: "0"
        ProcessEndTime: ""
        ProcessParameterFlags: "24577"
        ProcessStartTime: "1682106752.006"
        ProcessSxsFlags: "64"
        RawProcessId: "1468"
        SHA1HashData: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        SHA256HashData: 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
        SessionId: "2"
        SignInfoFlags: "8683538"
        SourceProcessId: "4370948876"
        SourceThreadId: "6364981533"
        Tags: 25, 27, 40, 151, 874, 924, 12094627905582, 12094627906234, 237494511599633
        TargetProcessId: "4390327988"
        TokenType: "1"
        TreeId: "4295752857"
        UserSid: S-1-5-21-239183934-720705223-383019856-500
        aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
        aip: 11.10.9.8
        cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
        event_platform: Win
        event_simpleName: ProcessRollup2
        id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
        name: ProcessRollup2V19
        timestamp: "1682106752722"
      event_platform: Win
      event_simplename: ProcessRollup2
      fdr_event_type: ProcessRollup2
      id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
      name: ProcessRollup2V19
      p_any_ip_addresses:
        - 11.10.9.8
      p_any_md5_hashes:
        - 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_any_sha1_hashes:
        - "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
      p_any_sha256_hashes:
        - 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
      p_any_trace_ids:
        - "4295752857"
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_event_time: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      p_log_type: Crowdstrike.FDREvent
      p_parse_time: "2023-04-21 20:05:52.94"
      p_row_id: 7ac82dbb43a99bfec196bdda178c8101
      p_schema_version: 0
      p_source_id: 1f33f64c-124d-413c-a9e3-d51ccedd8e77
      p_source_label: Crowdstrike-FDR-Dev
      timestamp: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      treeid: "4295752857"
    Name: Other Event
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
LogTypes:
  - Crowdstrike.FDREvent
RuleID: "Crowdstrike.Credential.Dumping.Tool"
Threshold: 1

Detection logic

Condition

fdr_event_type eq "ProcessRollup2"
event_platform eq "Win"

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`event_platform`	eq	`Win` corpus 7 (panther 7)
`fdr_event_type`	eq	`ProcessRollup2` corpus 10 (panther 10)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`aid`
`user`	`UserName`
`console-link`	`FalconHostLink`
`commandline`	`CommandLine`
`parentcommandline`	`ParentCommandLine`
`filename`	`FileName`
`filepath`	`FilePath`
`description`	`Description`
`action`	`PatternDispositionDescription`
`ComputerName`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)