Detection rules › Panther
Databricks Attempted Logon From Denied IP
Detects blocked login attempts from IP addresses explicitly denied by workspace IP access control policies. This excludes known service agents and telemetry operations. While these attempts were successfully blocked, they may indicate reconnaissance or unauthorized access attempts.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078 Valid Accounts |
Rule body yaml
AnalysisType: rule
Filename: databricks_attempted_logon_from_denied_ip.py
RuleID: "Databricks.Audit.AttemptedLogonFromDeniedIP"
DisplayName: "Databricks Attempted Logon From Denied IP"
Enabled: true
Status: Experimental
LogTypes:
- Databricks.Audit
Tags:
- Databricks
- Initial Access
- Reconnaissance
Reports:
MITRE ATT&CK:
- TA0001:T1078 # Valid Accounts
Severity: Info
Description: >
Detects blocked login attempts from IP addresses explicitly denied by workspace IP access
control policies. This excludes known service agents and telemetry operations. While these
attempts were successfully blocked, they may indicate reconnaissance or unauthorized access attempts.
Runbook: |
1. Count all login attempts from the source IP (sourceIPAddress) in the 1 hour before and after this blocked attempt
2. Check if the source IP is associated with known VPN services, cloud providers, or threat intelligence feeds
3. Find all successful and failed login attempts for this user in the 24 hours around the alert to identify credential stuffing patterns
Reference: https://github.com/databricks-solutions/cybersec-workspace-detection-app/blob/main/base/detections/event-based/attempted_logon_from_denied_ip.py
Tests:
- Name: Blocked Login from Denied IP
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
timestamp: 1234567890000
serviceName: "accounts"
actionName: "IpAccessDenied"
workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
sourceIPAddress: "192.0.2.100"
userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0"
userIdentity:
email: "user@example.com"
requestParams:
path: "/login"
response:
statusCode: 403
- Name: Service Agent Blocked
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
timestamp: 1234567890000
serviceName: "accounts"
actionName: "IpAccessDenied"
sourceIPAddress: "192.0.2.100"
userAgent: "Databricks-Runtime/12.0"
userIdentity:
email: "user@example.com"
requestParams:
path: "/api/data"
- Name: Telemetry Path Blocked
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
timestamp: 1234567890000
serviceName: "accounts"
actionName: "IpAccessDenied"
sourceIPAddress: "192.0.2.100"
userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0"
userIdentity:
email: "user@example.com"
requestParams:
path: "/telemetry/events"
- Name: Token Identity Blocked
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
timestamp: 1234567890000
serviceName: "accounts"
actionName: "IpAccessDenied"
sourceIPAddress: "192.0.2.100"
userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0"
userIdentity:
email: "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
requestParams:
path: "/api/data"
- Name: Different Action
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
timestamp: 1234567890000
serviceName: "accounts"
actionName: "login"
sourceIPAddress: "192.0.2.100"
userIdentity:
email: "user@example.com"
Detection logic
Condition
serviceName eq "accounts"
actionName eq "IpAccessDenied"
not (userAgent contains "Databricks-Service/driver" or userAgent contains "Databricks-Runtime" or userAgent contains "Delta-Sharing-SparkStructuredStreaming" or userAgent contains "RawDBHttpClient" or userAgent contains "mlflow-python" or userAgent contains "obsSDK-scala" or userAgent contains "wsfs" or userAgent contains "feature-store" or requestParams.path contains "/telemetry" or requestParams.path contains "/delta-commit" or requestParams.path contains "/health" or requestParams.path contains "/metrics" or requestParams.path contains "/status" or userIdentity.email regex_match "[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}")
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
requestParams.path | contains | /delta-commit |
requestParams.path | contains | /health |
requestParams.path | contains | /metrics |
requestParams.path | contains | /status |
requestParams.path | contains | /telemetry |
userAgent | contains | Databricks-Runtime |
userAgent | contains | Databricks-Service/driver |
userAgent | contains | Delta-Sharing-SparkStructuredStreaming |
userAgent | contains | RawDBHttpClient |
userAgent | contains | feature-store |
userAgent | contains | mlflow-python |
userAgent | contains | obsSDK-scala |
userAgent | contains | wsfs |
userIdentity.email | regex_match | [0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12} |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
actionName | eq |
|
serviceName | eq |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
sourceIPAddress | |
email | userIdentity.email |
workspaceId |