Databricks Workspace Admin Privileged Role Assignment

Status: Experimental
Severity: medium
Group by: workspaceId
Log types: Databricks.Audit
Tags: Databricks, Privilege Escalation, Persistence
Reference: https://github.com/databricks-solutions/cybersec-workspace-detection-app/blob/main/base/detections/event-based/workspace_admin_privileged_role_assignment.py
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects when workspace-level admin privileges are granted in Databricks through direct role assignments or administrative group membership. This simplified version detects direct admin grants and additions to admin groups. For nested group resolution (detecting when groups are added to admin groups), consider implementing a correlation rule. Successful grants to the system 'admins' group are elevated to HIGH severity.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation, `T1136` Create Account
Privilege Escalation	`T1098` Account Manipulation

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
Filename: databricks_workspace_admin_privileged_role_assignment.py
RuleID: "Databricks.Audit.WorkspaceAdminPrivilegedRoleAssignment"
DisplayName: "Databricks Workspace Admin Privileged Role Assignment"
Enabled: true
Status: Experimental
LogTypes:
  - Databricks.Audit
Tags:
  - Databricks
  - Privilege Escalation
  - Persistence
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0004:T1098 # Account Manipulation
    - TA0003:T1136 # Create Account
Severity: Medium
Description: >
  Detects when workspace-level admin privileges are granted in Databricks through direct role
  assignments or administrative group membership. This simplified version detects direct admin
  grants and additions to admin groups. For nested group resolution (detecting when groups are
  added to admin groups), consider implementing a correlation rule. Successful grants to the
  system 'admins' group are elevated to HIGH severity.
Runbook: |
  1. Query audit logs for all workspace administrative actions by the target principal in the 24 hours after this privilege grant
  2. Check if the target principal created clusters, modified notebooks, or accessed sensitive data in the 6 hours after receiving admin rights
  3. Find all workspace admin grants for this workspace in the past 90 days to establish baseline
Reference: https://github.com/databricks-solutions/cybersec-workspace-detection-app/blob/main/base/detections/event-based/workspace_admin_privileged_role_assignment.py
SummaryAttributes:
  - actor
  - target_principal
  - principal_type
  - target_group
Tests:
  - Name: Direct Workspace Admin Grant
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "setAdmin"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      sourceIPAddress: "198.51.100.1"
      requestParams:
        targetUserName: "newadmin@example.com"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Add to System Admins Group
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "addPrincipalToGroup"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        principal: "user@example.com"
        targetGroupName: "admins"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Add to Workspace Admins Group
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "addPrincipalsToGroup"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        targetUserName: "user@example.com"
        targetGroupName: "workspace-admins"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Service Principal Admin Grant
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "addPrincipalToGroup"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        principal: "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
        targetGroupName: "workspace-administrators"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Account-Level Event Should Not Alert
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "ACCOUNT_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "setAccountAdmin"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        targetUserName: "user@example.com"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Failed Admin Grant
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "setAdmin"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "attacker@example.com"
      requestParams:
        targetUserName: "attacker@example.com"
      response:
        statusCode: 403
  - Name: Remove Admin Should Not Alert
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "removeAdmin"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        targetUserName: "user@example.com"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Remove From Admin Group Should Not Alert
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "removePrincipalFromGroup"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        principal: "user@example.com"
        targetGroupName: "admins"
      response:
        statusCode: 200
  - Name: Account-Level Without Workspace Context
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "ACCOUNT_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "setAdmin"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        targetUserName: "user@example.com"
  - Name: Non-Admin Group
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      timestamp: 1234567890000
      auditLevel: "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
      serviceName: "accounts"
      actionName: "addPrincipalToGroup"
      workspaceId: "1234567890123456"
      userIdentity:
        email: "admin@example.com"
      requestParams:
        principal: "user@example.com"
        targetGroupName: "data-engineers"

Detection logic

Condition

auditLevel eq "WORKSPACE_LEVEL"
actionName not in ["removeAdmin", "removePrincipalFromGroup"]

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`actionName`	in	`removeAdmin`, `removePrincipalFromGroup`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`auditLevel`	eq	`WORKSPACE_LEVEL`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`workspaceId`
`email`	`userIdentity.email`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)