Detection rules › Panther
GitHub Org Authentication Method Changed
Detects critical changes to GitHub organization authentication settings including SAML SSO, 2FA requirements, SAML provider configuration, and OAuth restrictions. These foundational security controls protect entire organizations, and unauthorized modifications can enable attackers to bypass identity management, maintain persistence, or prepare for data exfiltration. Legitimate changes are rare and should be well-documented with proper authorization.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Privilege Escalation | T1098 Account Manipulation |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- GitHub Enterprise Disable 2FA Requirement (Splunk)
- Github High Risk Configuration Disabled (Sigma)
- GitHub OAuth Application Access Restrictions Disabled (YARA-L)
- GitHub SSO Configuration Modified (YARA-L)
- GitHub Two Factor Auth Disable (Kusto)
- GitHub Two-Factor Authentication Requirement Disabled (YARA-L)
- NRT GitHub Two Factor Auth Disable (Kusto)
Rule body yaml
AnalysisType: rule
Filename: github_org_auth_modified.py
RuleID: "GitHub.Org.AuthChange"
DisplayName: "GitHub Org Authentication Method Changed"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
- GitHub.Audit
Tags:
- GitHub
- Persistence
- Account Manipulation
- Identity and Access Management
- Security Configuration
- Privilege Escalation
- Defense Evasion
- Organization Security
Reports:
MITRE ATT&CK:
- TA0003:T1098
Severity: Critical
SummaryAttributes:
- actor
- action
Description: >
Detects critical changes to GitHub organization authentication settings including SAML SSO, 2FA requirements, SAML provider configuration, and OAuth restrictions. These foundational security controls protect entire organizations, and unauthorized modifications can enable attackers to bypass identity management, maintain persistence, or prepare for data exfiltration. Legitimate changes are rare and should be well-documented with proper authorization.
Runbook: |
1. Query GitHub audit logs for all actions by the actor in the 48 hours around this authentication change to identify other suspicious activities such as adding organization members, creating personal access tokens, modifying repository permissions, or accessing private repositories
2. Review the organization membership changes, team permission modifications, and repository access grants in the 6 hours around this event to determine if the actor used elevated access to establish additional persistence mechanisms
3. Check GitHub audit logs for authentication failures, suspicious login locations, or unusual access patterns from the actor's account in the 7 days before this change that might indicate account compromise
Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/about-authentication-to-github
Tests:
- Name: GitHub - SAML Disabled
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "cat",
"action": "org.saml_disabled",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
"repo": "my-org/my-repo",
}
- Name: GitHub - Two Factor Requirement Disabled
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "admin-user",
"action": "org.disable_two_factor_requirement",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
}
- Name: GitHub - Two Factor Requirement Enabled
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "security-admin",
"action": "org.enable_two_factor_requirement",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
}
- Name: GitHub - OAuth App Restrictions Disabled
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "org-owner",
"action": "org.disable_oauth_app_restrictions",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
}
- Name: GitHub - OAuth App Restrictions Enabled
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "security-admin",
"action": "org.enable_oauth_app_restrictions",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
}
- Name: GitHub - SAML Provider Settings Updated
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "it-admin",
"action": "org.update_saml_provider_settings",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
}
- Name: GitHub - SAML Enabled
ExpectedResult: true
Log:
{
"actor": "security-team",
"action": "org.saml_enabled",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"org": "my-org",
}
- Name: GitHub - Non Auth Related Org Change
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
{
"actor": "cat",
"action": "invite_member",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"org": "my-org",
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"repo": "my-org/my-repo",
}
- Name: GitHub - Non Org Action
ExpectedResult: false
Log:
{
"actor": "developer",
"action": "repo.create",
"created_at": 1621305118553,
"org": "my-org",
"p_log_type": "GitHub.Audit",
"repo": "my-org/new-repo",
}
Detection logic
Condition
action starts_with "org."
action in ["org.saml_disabled", "org.saml_enabled", "org.disable_two_factor_requirement", "org.enable_two_factor_requirement", "org.update_saml_provider_settings", "org.enable_oauth_app_restrictions", "org.disable_oauth_app_restrictions"]
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field |
|---|
actor |