Kubernetes Role With Pod Exec Permissions Created

Severity: high
Group by: name, resource, username
Log types: Amazon.EKS.Audit, Azure.MonitorActivity, GCP.AuditLog
Tags: Kubernetes, Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, RBAC, Unified Detection
Reference: - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/#referring-to-resources - https://seifrajhi.github.io/blog/kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation-mitigation/#%EF%B8%8F-rolebinding-permissions-in-kubernetes-implications-and-safeguards
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

This detection monitors for Roles or ClusterRoles being created that grant permissions to exec into pods. The pods/exec subresource allows executing arbitrary commands inside containers, which can be abused for lateral movement, credential theft, or container escape. Attackers who gain RBAC modification permissions often create roles with pods/exec to establish backdoor access for executing commands across the cluster.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1078.004` Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Lateral Movement	`T1021` Remote Services

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: "Kubernetes.Role.PodExec"
DisplayName: "Kubernetes Role With Pod Exec Permissions Created"
Enabled: true
Filename: k8s_role_pod_exec.py
LogTypes:
  - Amazon.EKS.Audit
  - Azure.MonitorActivity
  - GCP.AuditLog
Tags:
  - Kubernetes
  - Privilege Escalation
  - Lateral Movement
  - RBAC
  - Unified Detection
Severity: High
Description: >
  This detection monitors for Roles or ClusterRoles being created that grant permissions to exec into pods.
  The pods/exec subresource allows executing arbitrary commands inside containers, which can be abused for
  lateral movement, credential theft, or container escape. Attackers who gain RBAC modification permissions
  often create roles with pods/exec to establish backdoor access for executing commands across the cluster.
Runbook: |
  1. Review the role rules to identify what verbs and API groups were granted alongside pods/exec and determine if this role creation is expected
  2. Identify all API operations by the creating user in the 2 hours before and after the alert and search for any RoleBindings or ClusterRoleBindings that reference this role
  3. Search for all exec operations across the cluster in the past 24 hours to identify if this permission has already been abused
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0004:T1078.004 # Privilege Escalation: Valid Accounts - Cloud Accounts
    - TA0008:T1021 # Lateral Movement: Remote Services
Reference: >
  - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/#referring-to-resources
  - https://seifrajhi.github.io/blog/kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation-mitigation/#%EF%B8%8F-rolebinding-permissions-in-kubernetes-implications-and-safeguards
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - username
  - resource
  - name
  - p_source_label
Tests:
  - Name: EKS ClusterRole with pods/exec
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "sourceIPs": ["203.0.113.42"],
        "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.28.0",
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "clusterroles",
          "name": "pod-exec-role",
          "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "requestObject": {
          "kind": "ClusterRole",
          "metadata": {"name": "pod-exec-role"},
          "rules": [
            {
              "apiGroups": [""],
              "resources": ["pods/exec"],
              "verbs": ["create", "get"]
            }
          ]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: AKS Role with pods/exec in namespace
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_log_type": "Azure.MonitorActivity",
        "category": "kube-audit",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read",
        "properties": {
          "log": "{\"kind\":\"Event\",\"apiVersion\":\"audit.k8s.io/v1\",\"verb\":\"create\",\"user\":{\"username\":\"malicious-user@example.com\"},\"sourceIPs\":[\"1.2.3.4\"],\"objectRef\":{\"resource\":\"roles\",\"namespace\":\"production\",\"name\":\"debug-role\",\"apiGroup\":\"rbac.authorization.k8s.io\"},\"responseStatus\":{\"code\":201},\"requestObject\":{\"kind\":\"Role\",\"metadata\":{\"name\":\"debug-role\",\"namespace\":\"production\"},\"rules\":[{\"apiGroups\":[\"\"],\"resources\":[\"pods/exec\"],\"verbs\":[\"create\"]}]}}"
        },
        "p_source_label": "aks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: GKE ClusterRole with multiple resources including pods/exec
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "protoPayload": {
          "authenticationInfo": {"principalEmail": "user@company.com"},
          "authorizationInfo": [{
            "granted": true,
            "permission": "io.k8s.rbac.v1.clusterroles.create",
            "resource": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/clusterroles/privileged-role"
          }],
          "methodName": "io.k8s.rbac.v1.clusterroles.create",
          "requestMetadata": {"callerIP": "8.8.8.8"},
          "resourceName": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/clusterroles/privileged-role",
          "serviceName": "k8s.io",
          "request": {
            "kind": "ClusterRole",
            "metadata": {"name": "privileged-role"},
            "rules": [
              {
                "apiGroups": [""],
                "resources": ["pods", "pods/log"],
                "verbs": ["get", "list"]
              },
              {
                "apiGroups": [""],
                "resources": ["pods/exec"],
                "verbs": ["create"]
              }
            ]
          }
        },
        "resource": {
          "type": "k8s_cluster",
          "labels": {"project_id": "test-project"}
        },
        "p_log_type": "GCP.AuditLog",
        "p_source_label": "gke-cluster"
      }
  - Name: Role without pods/exec (only pods)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "roles",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "pod-reader",
          "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "requestObject": {
          "kind": "Role",
          "rules": [
            {
              "apiGroups": [""],
              "resources": ["pods", "pods/log"],
              "verbs": ["get", "list"]
            }
          ]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: ClusterRole with only read permissions
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "clusterroles",
          "name": "view-role",
          "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "requestObject": {
          "kind": "ClusterRole",
          "rules": [
            {
              "apiGroups": [""],
              "resources": ["pods", "services", "configmaps"],
              "verbs": ["get", "list", "watch"]
            }
          ]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: System principal creating role (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:operator"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "clusterroles",
          "name": "operator-role"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "requestObject": {
          "kind": "ClusterRole",
          "rules": [
            {
              "apiGroups": [""],
              "resources": ["pods/exec"],
              "verbs": ["create"]
            }
          ]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Failed request (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "clusterroles",
          "name": "exec-role"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 403},
        "requestObject": {
          "kind": "ClusterRole",
          "rules": [
            {
              "apiGroups": [""],
              "resources": ["pods/exec"],
              "verbs": ["create"]
            }
          ]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Updating existing role (not creating)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "update",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "clusterroles",
          "name": "existing-role"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "requestObject": {
          "kind": "ClusterRole",
          "rules": [
            {
              "apiGroups": [""],
              "resources": ["pods/exec"],
              "verbs": ["create"]
            }
          ]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }

Detection logic

Condition

not (verb ne "create" or resource not in ["roles", "clusterroles"])
not (responseStatus is_not_null and (responseStatus.code ge "400" or (responseStatus.code ge "1" and responseStatus.code le "16")))
not (username is_not_null and (username in ["masterclient", "aksService"] or (username starts_with "system:" and username not contains "serviceaccount")))
requestObject.rules array_any

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`
`username`	starts_with	`system:`
`username`	in	`aksService`, `masterclient`
`username`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`1`
`responseStatus.code`	le	`16`
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`400`
`responseStatus`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`resource`	in	`clusterroles`, `roles`
`verb`	ne	`create`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`resource`	in	`clusterroles` `roles`
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`username`
`sourceIPs`
`userAgent`
`namespace`
`verb`
`resource`
`requestURI`
`responseStatus`
`cluster`	`p_source_label`
`name`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)