Kubernetes All Secrets Dumped Across Namespaces

Status: Experimental
Severity: critical
Group by: username
Compliance: Stratus Red Team k8s.credential-access.dump-secrets
Log types: Amazon.EKS.Audit, Azure.MonitorActivity, GCP.AuditLog
Tags: Kubernetes, Credential Access, Mass Exfiltration, Secrets Management, Unified Detection
Reference: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.credential-access.dump-secrets/
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

This detection monitors for cluster-wide secret list operations that dump all secrets across all namespaces in a single API call. Attackers with list secrets permissions at the cluster level can trivially access every secret in the cluster using the LIST /api/v1/secrets API, exposing all credentials, tokens, and sensitive configuration data. This is a known attack technique documented by Stratus Red Team and represents mass credential theft.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1552.007` Unsecured Credentials: Container API
Collection	`T1530` Data from Cloud Storage

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: "Kubernetes.Secrets.DumpAllNamespaces"
DisplayName: "Kubernetes All Secrets Dumped Across Namespaces"
Enabled: true
Status: Experimental
Filename: k8s_secrets_dump_all_namespaces.py
LogTypes:
  - Amazon.EKS.Audit
  - Azure.MonitorActivity
  - GCP.AuditLog
Tags:
  - Kubernetes
  - Credential Access
  - Mass Exfiltration
  - Secrets Management
  - Unified Detection
Severity: Critical
Description: >
  This detection monitors for cluster-wide secret list operations that dump all secrets across all namespaces in a
  single API call. Attackers with list secrets permissions at the cluster level can trivially access every secret in
  the cluster using the LIST /api/v1/secrets API, exposing all credentials, tokens, and sensitive configuration data.
  This is a known attack technique documented by Stratus Red Team and represents mass credential theft.
Runbook: |
  1. Immediately investigate the user or service account performing this operation and determine if they are compromised
  2. Review what secrets exist in the cluster to assess the scope of credential exposure and rotate all sensitive credentials
  3. Search for other suspicious API activity by this user in the past 24 hours and check for data exfiltration or lateral movement attempts
Reports:
  Stratus Red Team:
    - k8s.credential-access.dump-secrets
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0006:T1552.007 # Credential Access: Unsecured Credentials - Container API
    - TA0009:T1530 # Collection: Data from Cloud Storage Object
Reference: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.credential-access.dump-secrets/
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - username
  - p_source_label
Tests:
  - Name: EKS cluster-wide secret list
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
        "stage": "ResponseComplete",
        "verb": "list",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "sourceIPs": ["203.0.113.42"],
        "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.28.0",
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "secrets",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/secrets?limit=500",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: AKS cluster-wide secret list
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_log_type": "Azure.MonitorActivity",
        "category": "kube-audit",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read",
        "properties": {
          "log": "{\"kind\":\"Event\",\"apiVersion\":\"audit.k8s.io/v1\",\"stage\":\"ResponseComplete\",\"verb\":\"list\",\"user\":{\"username\":\"compromised-user@example.com\"},\"sourceIPs\":[\"1.2.3.4\"],\"objectRef\":{\"resource\":\"secrets\",\"apiVersion\":\"v1\"},\"requestURI\":\"/api/v1/secrets\",\"responseStatus\":{\"code\":200}}"
        },
        "p_source_label": "aks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: GKE cluster-wide secret list
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "protoPayload": {
          "authenticationInfo": {"principalEmail": "user@company.com"},
          "authorizationInfo": [{
            "granted": true,
            "permission": "io.k8s.core.v1.secrets.list",
            "resource": "core/v1/secrets"
          }],
          "methodName": "io.k8s.core.v1.secrets.list",
          "requestMetadata": {"callerIP": "8.8.8.8"},
          "resourceName": "core/v1/secrets",
          "serviceName": "k8s.io",
          "requestURI": "/api/v1/secrets?limit=500"
        },
        "resource": {
          "type": "k8s_cluster",
          "labels": {"project_id": "test-project"}
        },
        "p_log_type": "GCP.AuditLog",
        "p_source_label": "gke-cluster"
      }
  - Name: EKS cluster-wide secret list with watch parameter
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "list",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {"resource": "secrets", "apiVersion": "v1"},
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/secrets?watch=true",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: Namespaced secret list (not cluster-wide)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "list",
        "user": {"username": "developer@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "secrets",
          "namespace": "production",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/production/secrets",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Get single secret (not list)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "get",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "secrets",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "api-token",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets/api-token",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: System component listing secrets (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "list",
        "user": {"username": "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:namespace-controller"},
        "objectRef": {"resource": "secrets", "apiVersion": "v1"},
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/secrets",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Kube-state-metrics listing secrets (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "list",
        "user": {"username": "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:kube-state-metrics"},
        "objectRef": {"resource": "secrets", "apiVersion": "v1"},
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/secrets",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Failed cluster-wide list (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "list",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {"resource": "secrets", "apiVersion": "v1"},
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/secrets",
        "responseStatus": {"code": 403},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }

Detection logic

Condition

not (verb ne "list" or resource ne "secrets" or (responseStatus is_not_null and (responseStatus.code ge "400" or (responseStatus.code ge "1" and responseStatus.code le "16"))))
not (namespace is_not_null or (requestURI is_not_null and requestURI contains "/namespaces/"))
not ((username is_not_null and (username in ["masterclient", "aksService"] or (username starts_with "system:" and username not contains "serviceaccount"))) or username in ["system:serviceaccount:kube-system:namespace-controller", "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:kube-state-metrics", "system:apiserver"])

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`
`username`	starts_with	`system:`
`username`	in	`aksService`, `masterclient`
`username`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`username`	in	`system:apiserver`, `system:serviceaccount:kube-system:kube-state-metrics`, `system:serviceaccount:kube-system:namespace-controller`
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`1`
`responseStatus.code`	le	`16`
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`400`
`responseStatus`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`resource`	ne	`secrets`
`verb`	ne	`list`
`requestURI`	contains	`/namespaces/`
`requestURI`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`namespace`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`username`
`sourceIPs`
`userAgent`
`namespace`
`verb`
`resource`
`requestURI`
`responseStatus`
`cluster`	`p_source_label`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)