Kubernetes Long-Lived Service Account Token Created

Status: Experimental
Severity: informational
Group by: name, namespace, username
Compliance: Stratus Red Team k8s.persistence.create-token
Log types: Amazon.EKS.Audit, Azure.MonitorActivity
Tags: Kubernetes, Persistence, Credential Access
Reference: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.persistence.create-token/
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Detects the creation of long-lived service account tokens via the serviceaccounts/token subresource. Kubernetes 1.24+ deprecated automatic token creation, but users with appropriate permissions can still manually create non-expiring tokens for service accounts. Attackers can abuse this to establish persistent access credentials that don't expire automatically. This technique is documented by Stratus Red Team as a persistence mechanism. Note: GCP GKE does not log TokenRequest API operations in Kubernetes audit logs.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation
Credential Access	`T1552` Unsecured Credentials

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: "Kubernetes.ServiceAccount.TokenCreated"
DisplayName: "Kubernetes Long-Lived Service Account Token Created"
Enabled: true
Status: Experimental
Filename: k8s_serviceaccount_token_created.py
LogTypes:
  - Amazon.EKS.Audit
  - Azure.MonitorActivity
Tags:
  - Kubernetes
  - Persistence
  - Credential Access
Severity: Info
Description: >
  Detects the creation of long-lived service account tokens via the serviceaccounts/token subresource. Kubernetes 1.24+
  deprecated automatic token creation, but users with appropriate permissions can still manually create non-expiring tokens
  for service accounts. Attackers can abuse this to establish persistent access credentials that don't expire automatically.
  This technique is documented by Stratus Red Team as a persistence mechanism.
  Note: GCP GKE does not log TokenRequest API operations in Kubernetes audit logs.
Runbook: |
  1. Immediately investigate the user creating the token and determine if they have a legitimate need for long-lived credentials
  2. Review the service account permissions to assess what access the token provides by checking RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBindings
  3. Search for API activity using this service account in the past 24 hours to identify any unauthorized operations
Reports:
  Stratus Red Team:
    - k8s.persistence.create-token
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0003:T1098 # Persistence: Account Manipulation
    - TA0006:T1552 # Credential Access: Unsecured Credentials
Reference: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.persistence.create-token/
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - username
  - namespace
  - name
  - p_source_label
Tests:
  - Name: EKS long-lived token created
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "sourceIPs": ["203.0.113.42"],
        "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.28.0",
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "persistence-sa",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: AKS long-lived token created
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_log_type": "Azure.MonitorActivity",
        "category": "kube-audit",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read",
        "properties": {
          "log": "{\"kind\":\"Event\",\"apiVersion\":\"audit.k8s.io/v1\",\"verb\":\"create\",\"user\":{\"username\":\"persistence-user@example.com\"},\"sourceIPs\":[\"1.2.3.4\"],\"objectRef\":{\"resource\":\"serviceaccounts\",\"subresource\":\"token\",\"namespace\":\"default\",\"name\":\"backdoor-sa\",\"apiVersion\":\"v1\"},\"responseStatus\":{\"code\":201}}"
        },
        "p_source_label": "aks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: Token created in default namespace
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "attacker-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: User creating token in system namespace (alert)
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "kube-system",
          "name": "escalation-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: System principal in user namespace (alert)
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "system:kube-controller-manager"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "app-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: System principal in system namespace (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "system:kube-controller-manager"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "kube-system",
          "name": "legitimate-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Failed token creation (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "denied-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 403},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Service account creation (not token)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "new-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 201},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Get service account (not create)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "get",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "serviceaccounts",
          "subresource": "token",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "existing-sa"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 200},
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }

Detection logic

Condition

not (verb ne "create" or resource ne "serviceaccounts" or subresource ne "token")
not (responseStatus is_not_null and (responseStatus.code ge "400" or (responseStatus.code ge "1" and responseStatus.code le "16")))
not (username is_not_null and (username in ["masterclient", "aksService"] or (username starts_with "system:" and username not contains "serviceaccount")) and namespace is_not_null and namespace in ["kube-system", "gke-system", "kube-node-lease", "kube-public"])

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`
`username`	starts_with	`system:`
`username`	in	`aksService`, `masterclient`
`namespace`	in	`gke-system`, `kube-node-lease`, `kube-public`, `kube-system`
`namespace`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`username`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`1`
`responseStatus.code`	le	`16`
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`400`
`responseStatus`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`resource`	ne	`serviceaccounts`
`subresource`	ne	`token`
`verb`	ne	`create`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`username`
`sourceIPs`
`userAgent`
`namespace`
`verb`
`resource`
`requestURI`
`responseStatus`
`cluster`	`p_source_label`
`name`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)