Kubernetes Service Account Token Theft from Pod

Severity: high
Group by: name, namespace, username
Compliance: Stratus Red Team k8s.credential-access.steal-serviceaccount-token
Log types: Amazon.EKS.Audit, Azure.MonitorActivity, GCP.AuditLog
Tags: Kubernetes, Credential Access, Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, Unified Detection
Reference: - https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.credential-access.steal-serviceaccount-token/ - https://medium.com/google-cloud/from-whoami-to-whoarewe-with-gke-workload-identity-for-fleets-3795ee942187 - https://dev.to/piyushjajoo/understanding-kubernetes-projected-service-account-tokens-205f
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

This detection monitors for commands executed in pods that attempt to read service account tokens from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. Attackers who gain exec access to a pod can steal its service account token to authenticate as that service account to the Kubernetes API server. This enables privilege escalation and lateral movement within the cluster. This is a known attack technique documented by Stratus Red Team.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1078.004` Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Credential Access	`T1552.007` Unsecured Credentials: Container API
Lateral Movement	`T1550.001` Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: "Kubernetes.Pod.StealServiceAccountToken"
DisplayName: "Kubernetes Service Account Token Theft from Pod"
Enabled: true
Filename: k8s_steal_serviceaccount_token.py
LogTypes:
  - Amazon.EKS.Audit
  - Azure.MonitorActivity
  - GCP.AuditLog
Tags:
  - Kubernetes
  - Credential Access
  - Privilege Escalation
  - Lateral Movement
  - Unified Detection
Severity: High
Description: >
  This detection monitors for commands executed in pods that attempt to read service account tokens from
  /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. Attackers who gain exec access to a pod can steal
  its service account token to authenticate as that service account to the Kubernetes API server. This
  enables privilege escalation and lateral movement within the cluster. This is a known attack technique
  documented by Stratus Red Team.
Runbook: |
  1. Immediately investigate the user executing commands in the pod and determine if they are authorized to access this pod
  2. Review the service account permissions for this pod to assess what privileges the attacker could gain with the stolen token
  3. Search for API operations using the stolen service account token in the past 24 hours by filtering audit logs for this service account principal
Reports:
  Stratus Red Team:
    - k8s.credential-access.steal-serviceaccount-token
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0006:T1552.007 # Credential Access: Unsecured Credentials - Container API
    - TA0004:T1078.004 # Privilege Escalation: Valid Accounts - Cloud Accounts
    - TA0008:T1550.001 # Lateral Movement: Use Alternate Authentication Material - Application Access Token
Reference: >
  - https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.credential-access.steal-serviceaccount-token/
  - https://medium.com/google-cloud/from-whoami-to-whoarewe-with-gke-workload-identity-for-fleets-3795ee942187
  - https://dev.to/piyushjajoo/understanding-kubernetes-projected-service-account-tokens-205f
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - username
  - namespace
  - name
  - p_source_label
Tests:
  - Name: EKS cat service account token
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "sourceIPs": ["203.0.113.42"],
        "userAgent": "kubectl/v1.28.0",
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "webapp-pod",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"],
          "container": "webapp",
          "stdin": false,
          "stdout": true,
          "tty": false
        },
        "requestURI": "/api/v1/namespaces/production/pods/webapp-pod/exec?command=cat&command=%2Fvar%2Frun%2Fsecrets%2Fkubernetes.io%2Fserviceaccount%2Ftoken&stdout=true",
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: AKS read serviceaccount directory
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_log_type": "Azure.MonitorActivity",
        "category": "kube-audit",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read",
        "properties": {
          "log": "{\"kind\":\"Event\",\"apiVersion\":\"audit.k8s.io/v1\",\"verb\":\"create\",\"user\":{\"username\":\"malicious-user@example.com\"},\"sourceIPs\":[\"1.2.3.4\"],\"objectRef\":{\"resource\":\"pods\",\"subresource\":\"exec\",\"namespace\":\"default\",\"name\":\"api-pod\"},\"responseStatus\":{\"code\":101},\"requestObject\":{\"command\":[\"ls\",\"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount\"],\"container\":\"api\"}}"
        },
        "p_source_label": "aks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: GKE steal token with sh -c
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "protoPayload": {
          "authenticationInfo": {"principalEmail": "user@company.com"},
          "authorizationInfo": [{
            "granted": true,
            "permission": "io.k8s.core.v1.pods.exec.create",
            "resource": "core/v1/namespaces/production/pods/database/exec"
          }],
          "methodName": "io.k8s.core.v1.pods.exec.create",
          "requestMetadata": {"callerIP": "8.8.8.8"},
          "resourceName": "core/v1/namespaces/production/pods/database/exec",
          "serviceName": "k8s.io",
          "request": {
            "command": ["sh", "-c", "cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"],
            "container": "postgres"
          }
        },
        "resource": {
          "type": "k8s_cluster",
          "labels": {"project_id": "test-project"}
        },
        "p_log_type": "GCP.AuditLog",
        "p_source_label": "gke-cluster"
      }
  - Name: EKS copy entire serviceaccount directory
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "compromised-pod"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["tar", "czf", "-", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-cluster"
      }
  - Name: Regular exec without token access
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "debug-pod"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["/bin/sh"],
          "stdin": true,
          "tty": true
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Regular user in system namespace (alert)
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "admin@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "kube-system",
          "name": "system-pod"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: System principal in regular namespace (alert)
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:controller"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "app-pod"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: System principal in system namespace (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:kube-proxy"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "kube-system",
          "name": "system-pod"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: Failed exec (excluded)
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "secure-pod"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 403},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"]
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit"
      }
  - Name: EKS IRSA token theft
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "kind": "Event",
        "apiVersion": "audit.k8s.io/v1",
        "verb": "create",
        "user": {"username": "attacker@example.com"},
        "sourceIPs": ["10.0.1.50"],
        "objectRef": {
          "resource": "pods",
          "subresource": "exec",
          "namespace": "production",
          "name": "irsa-pod",
          "apiVersion": "v1"
        },
        "responseStatus": {"code": 101},
        "requestObject": {
          "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount/token"],
          "container": "app",
          "stdout": true
        },
        "p_log_type": "Amazon.EKS.Audit",
        "p_source_label": "eks-prod-cluster"
      }
  - Name: AKS workload identity token theft
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_log_type": "Azure.MonitorActivity",
        "category": "kube-audit",
        "operationName": "Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read",
        "properties": {
          "log": "{\"kind\":\"Event\",\"apiVersion\":\"audit.k8s.io/v1\",\"verb\":\"create\",\"user\":{\"username\":\"attacker@company.com\"},\"sourceIPs\":[\"192.168.1.10\"],\"objectRef\":{\"resource\":\"pods\",\"subresource\":\"exec\",\"namespace\":\"production\",\"name\":\"workload-id-pod\"},\"responseStatus\":{\"code\":101},\"requestObject\":{\"command\":[\"cat\",\"/var/run/secrets/azure/tokens/azure-identity-token\"],\"container\":\"main\"}}"
        },
        "p_source_label": "aks-prod-cluster"
      }
  - Name: GKE workload identity token theft
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "protoPayload": {
          "authenticationInfo": {"principalEmail": "malicious@example.com"},
          "authorizationInfo": [{
            "granted": true,
            "permission": "io.k8s.core.v1.pods.exec.create",
            "resource": "core/v1/namespaces/default/pods/gke-pod/exec"
          }],
          "methodName": "io.k8s.core.v1.pods.exec.create",
          "requestMetadata": {"callerIP": "35.1.2.3"},
          "resourceName": "core/v1/namespaces/default/pods/gke-pod/exec",
          "serviceName": "k8s.io",
          "request": {
            "command": ["cat", "/var/run/secrets/tokens/gcp-ksa/token"],
            "container": "application"
          }
        },
        "resource": {
          "type": "k8s_cluster",
          "labels": {"project_id": "production-project"}
        },
        "p_log_type": "GCP.AuditLog",
        "p_source_label": "gke-production"
      }

Detection logic

Condition

not (verb ne "create" or resource ne "pods" or subresource ne "exec")
not (responseStatus is_not_null and (responseStatus.code ge "400" or (responseStatus.code ge "1" and responseStatus.code le "16")))
not (username is_not_null and (username in ["masterclient", "aksService"] or (username starts_with "system:" and username not contains "serviceaccount")) and namespace is_not_null and namespace in ["kube-system", "gke-system", "kube-node-lease", "kube-public"])

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`
`username`	starts_with	`system:`
`username`	in	`aksService`, `masterclient`
`namespace`	in	`gke-system`, `kube-node-lease`, `kube-public`, `kube-system`
`namespace`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`username`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`1`
`responseStatus.code`	le	`16`
`responseStatus.code`	ge	`400`
`responseStatus`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`resource`	ne	`pods`
`subresource`	ne	`exec`
`verb`	ne	`create`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`username`	contains	`serviceaccount`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`username`
`sourceIPs`
`userAgent`
`namespace`
`verb`
`resource`
`requestURI`
`responseStatus`
`cluster`	`p_source_label`
`name`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)