Upwind API Detection Passthrough

Status: Experimental
Severity: medium
Group by: id, severity
Log types: Upwind.Detections
Tags: Upwind, Passthrough, API, Initial Access, Exploit Public-Facing Application
Reference: https://docs.upwind.io/restapi/v1/get-threat-detection
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Re-raises Upwind API security detections in Panther. Covers broken authentication, authorization flaws, injection, mass assignment, token misuse, and sensitive data exposure patterns detected at the API layer.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: Upwind.Detection.API.Passthrough
DisplayName: Upwind API Detection Passthrough
Description: >
  Re-raises Upwind API security detections in Panther. Covers broken authentication,
  authorization flaws, injection, mass assignment, token misuse, and sensitive data
  exposure patterns detected at the API layer.
Runbook: |
  1. Query Upwind.Detections for all API threat detections against resource.name in the 24 hours before and after this alert to establish the scope of API abuse
  2. Review triggers[].events[].initiator fields (name, arn, userName, accountId) and determine whether this initiating entity has a history of legitimate access to this service in the past 30 days
  3. Search for other alerts from the same triggers[].events[].initiator.arn or triggers[].events[].initiator.accountId in the past 7 days to identify credential misuse or account compromise
Reference: https://docs.upwind.io/restapi/v1/get-threat-detection
Enabled: true
Filename: upwind_api_detection_passthrough.py
Severity: Medium
Status: Experimental
LogTypes:
  - Upwind.Detections
DedupPeriodMinutes: 720
Threshold: 1
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0001:T1190  # Initial Access: Exploit Public-Facing Application
Tags:
  - Upwind
  - Passthrough
  - API
  - Initial Access
  - Exploit Public-Facing Application
Tests:
  - Name: High API Detection
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T12:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "ee1122ff3344ee1122ff3344ee1122ff",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "API Threat",
        "description": "Broken object-level authorization detected on a REST API endpoint.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T11:50:00Z",
        "id": "det-api-001",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T12:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 7,
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "BOLA - Unauthorized Object Access",
        "type": "api_threat",
        "upwind_console_link": "https://console.upwind.io/detections/det-api-001",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "cloud_account_name": "prod-aws",
          "cloud_provider": "AWS",
          "name": "payments-api",
          "namespace": "production",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Service",
          "upwind_asset_id": "asset-api-001"
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [
          {
            "tactic_id": "TA0001",
            "tactic_name": "Initial Access",
            "technique_id": "T1190",
            "technique_name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
          }
        ],
        "triggers": [
          {
            "policy_id": "pol-api-001",
            "policy_name": "Detect BOLA/IDOR Patterns",
            "events": [
              {
                "timestamp": "2026-03-18T11:55:00Z",
                "type": "api_request",
                "description": "Access to another user's resource",
                "initiator": {
                  "name": "external-user",
                  "type": "IAMUser",
                  "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/external-user",
                  "userName": "external-user",
                  "accountId": "123456789012",
                  "accessKeyId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
                },
                "data": {
                  "description": "GET /api/v1/users/999/orders returned 200"
                }
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      }
  - Name: Non-API Category - Not Matched
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T12:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "ff2233aa4455ff2233aa4455ff2233aa",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "Network Anomaly",
        "description": "Port scan detected.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T11:50:00Z",
        "id": "det-network-003",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T12:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 3,
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "Port Scan from Pod",
        "type": "network_threat",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "name": "scan-pod",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Pod"
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [],
        "triggers": []
      }
  - Name: API Category with Unknown Severity - Suppressed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T12:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "aa3344bb5566aa3344bb5566aa3344bb",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "API Threat",
        "description": "Low-confidence API anomaly.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T11:50:00Z",
        "id": "det-api-002",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T12:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 1,
        "severity": "INFO",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "Unusual API Parameter",
        "type": "api_anomaly",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "name": "internal-api",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Service"
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [],
        "triggers": []
      }

Detection logic

Condition

category contains "api"

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`category`	contains	`api`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`detection_id`	`id`
`category`
`type`
`status`
`occurrence_count`
`title`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)