Upwind Runtime Detection Passthrough

Status: Experimental
Severity: medium
Group by: id, severity
Log types: Upwind.Detections
Tags: Upwind, Passthrough, Runtime, Execution, Privilege Escalation, Command and Scripting Interpreter
Reference: https://docs.upwind.io/restapi/v1/get-threat-detection
Source: github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis

Re-raises Upwind runtime security detections in Panther. Covers process execution anomalies, syscall-based threats, container escapes, and other host/container behavioral threats.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1059` Command and Scripting Interpreter
Privilege Escalation	`T1611` Escape to Host

Rule body yaml

AnalysisType: rule
RuleID: Upwind.Detection.Runtime.Passthrough
DisplayName: Upwind Runtime Detection Passthrough
Description: >
  Re-raises Upwind runtime security detections in Panther. Covers process execution anomalies,
  syscall-based threats, container escapes, and other host/container behavioral threats.
Runbook: |
  1. Query Upwind.Detections for all detections against the same resource.name and resource.namespace in the 24 hours before this alert to determine if this is an isolated event or part of a pattern
  2. Review the commands observed in triggers[].events[].data.command and the process user in triggers[].events[].data.user_name to assess whether the activity is consistent with normal workload behavior for this resource
  3. Search for other HIGH or CRITICAL severity alerts from the same resource.cloud_account_id or resource.cluster_id in the past 7 days to identify lateral movement or broader compromise
Reference: https://docs.upwind.io/restapi/v1/get-threat-detection
Enabled: true
Filename: upwind_runtime_detection_passthrough.py
Severity: Medium
Status: Experimental
LogTypes:
  - Upwind.Detections
DedupPeriodMinutes: 720
Threshold: 1
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0002:T1059  # Execution: Command and Scripting Interpreter
    - TA0004:T1611  # Privilege Escalation: Escape to Host
Tags:
  - Upwind
  - Passthrough
  - Runtime
  - Execution
  - Privilege Escalation
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter
Tests:
  - Name: Critical Runtime Detection
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "aabbcc112233aabbcc112233aabbcc11",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "Container Execution",
        "description": "Suspicious process execution detected inside a container.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T09:55:00Z",
        "id": "det-runtime-001",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 3,
        "severity": "CRITICAL",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "Suspicious Container Process Execution",
        "type": "runtime_threat",
        "upwind_console_link": "https://console.upwind.io/detections/det-runtime-001",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "cloud_account_name": "prod-aws",
          "cloud_provider": "AWS",
          "cluster_id": "cluster-abc123",
          "name": "api-server-pod",
          "namespace": "production",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Pod",
          "upwind_asset_id": "asset-abc-001",
          "internet_exposure": {
            "ingress": {
              "active_communication": true
            }
          }
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [
          {
            "tactic_id": "TA0002",
            "tactic_name": "Execution",
            "technique_id": "T1059",
            "technique_name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
          }
        ],
        "triggers": [
          {
            "policy_id": "pol-001",
            "policy_name": "Detect Suspicious Shell Execution",
            "events": [
              {
                "timestamp": "2026-03-18T09:55:00Z",
                "type": "process_execution",
                "description": "bash executed inside container",
                "data": {
                  "command": "/bin/bash -c whoami",
                  "user_name": "root",
                  "execution_count": 3
                }
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      }
  - Name: Non-Runtime Category - Not Matched
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "bb2233dd4455bb2233dd4455bb2233dd",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "Network Anomaly",
        "description": "Port scanning detected.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T09:55:00Z",
        "id": "det-network-001",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 5,
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "Internal Port Scan",
        "type": "network_threat",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "name": "scan-pod",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Pod"
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [],
        "triggers": []
      }
  - Name: Compound Category Container Vulnerability - Defers to Vulnerability Rule
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "dd4455ee6677dd4455ee6677dd4455ee",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "Container Vulnerability",
        "description": "Critical CVE found in a running container image.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T09:55:00Z",
        "id": "det-runtime-compound-001",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 1,
        "severity": "CRITICAL",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "Critical CVE in Container",
        "type": "vulnerability",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "name": "api-server-pod",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Pod"
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [],
        "triggers": []
      }
  - Name: Runtime Category with Unknown Severity - Suppressed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      {
        "p_event_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "p_log_type": "Upwind.Detections",
        "p_row_id": "cc3344ee5566cc3344ee5566cc3344ee",
        "p_schema_version": 0,
        "category": "Process Execution",
        "description": "Informational process event.",
        "first_seen_time": "2026-03-18T09:55:00Z",
        "id": "det-runtime-002",
        "last_seen_time": "2026-03-18T10:00:00Z",
        "occurrence_count": 1,
        "severity": "INFO",
        "status": "open",
        "title": "Low-Level Process Observed",
        "type": "runtime_event",
        "resource": {
          "cloud_account_id": "123456789012",
          "name": "worker-pod",
          "region": "us-east-1",
          "type": "Pod"
        },
        "mitre_attacks": [],
        "triggers": []
      }

Detection logic

Condition

category contains "runtime" or category contains "execution" or category contains "process" or category contains "container"
not (category contains "api" or category contains "vulnerab" or category contains "network")

This rule also runs imperative logic the parser cannot express as a filter; the conditions above are the structured part it could extract.

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`category`	contains	`api`
`category`	contains	`network`
`category`	contains	`vulnerab`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`category`	contains	`container` `execution` `process` `runtime`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`detection_id`	`id`
`category`
`type`
`status`
`occurrence_count`
`title`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)