Sigma rules: 00

title: AddinUtil.EXE Execution From Uncommon Directory
id: 6120ac2a-a34b-42c0-a9bd-1fb9f459f348
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) from a non-standard directory.
references:
    - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html
author: Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
date: 2023-09-18
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\addinutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AddInUtil.exe'
    filter_main_legit_location:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\'
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\'
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm\'
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: AppX Package Deployment Failed Due to Signing Requirements
id: 898d5fc9-fbc3-43de-93ad-38e97237c344
status: test
description: |
    Detects an appx package deployment / installation with the error code "0x80073cff" which indicates that the package didn't meet the signing requirements.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: appxdeployment-server
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 401
        ErrorCode: '0x80073cff' # Check ref section to learn more about this error code
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate AppX packages not signed by MS used part of an enterprise.
level: medium

title: AWS ECS Task Definition That Queries The Credential Endpoint
id: b94bf91e-c2bf-4047-9c43-c6810f43baad
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an Elastic Container Service (ECS) Task Definition includes a command to query the credential endpoint.
    This can indicate a potential adversary adding a backdoor to establish persistence or escalate privileges.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ecs__backdoor_task_def/main.py
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/APIReference/API_RegisterTaskDefinition.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html
author: Darin Smith
date: 2022-06-07
modified: 2023-04-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1525
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'ecs.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'DescribeTaskDefinition'
            - 'RegisterTaskDefinition'
            - 'RunTask'
        requestParameters.containerDefinitions.command|contains: '$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Task Definition being modified to request credentials from the Task Metadata Service for valid reasons
level: medium

title: AWS ElastiCache Security Group Modified or Deleted
id: 7c797da2-9cf2-4523-ba64-33b06339f0cc
status: test
description: Identifies when an ElastiCache security group has been modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/7d5efd68603f42be5e125b5a6a503b2ef3ac0f4e/rules/integrations/aws/impact_elasticache_security_group_modified_or_deleted.toml
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1531
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: elasticache.amazonaws.com
        eventName:
            - 'DeleteCacheSecurityGroup'
            - 'AuthorizeCacheSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'RevokeCacheSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'AuthorizeCacheSecurityGroupEgress'
            - 'RevokeCacheSecurityGroupEgress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A ElastiCache security group deletion may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Security Group deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.


level: low

title: Certificate-Based Authentication Enabled
id: c2496b41-16a9-4016-a776-b23f8910dc58
status: test
description: Detects when certificate based authentication has been enabled in an Azure Active Directory tenant.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/passwordless-persistence-and-privilege-escalation-in-azure-98a01310be3f
    - https://goodworkaround.com/2022/02/15/digging-into-azure-ad-certificate-based-authentication/
author: Harjot Shah Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        OperationName: 'Authentication Methods Policy Update'
        TargetResources.modifiedProperties|contains: 'AuthenticationMethodsPolicy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Cisco ASA Exploitation Activity - Proxy
id: 15697955-6a29-47ca-92e9-0e05efae3260
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious requests to Cisco ASA WebVpn via proxy logs associated with CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 exploitation.
references:
    - https://x.com/defusedcyber/status/1971492272966598683
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025-20333
    - cve.2025-20362
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem:
            - '/+CSCOU+/MacTunnelStart.jar'
            - '/+CSCOL+/csvrloader64.cab'
            - '/+CSCOL+/csvrloader.jar'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Command Executed Via Run Dialog Box - Registry
id: f9d091f6-f1c7-4873-a24f-050b4a02b4dd
related:
    - id: a7df0e9e-91a5-459a-a003-4cde67c2ff5d
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key.
    This technique was seen being abused by threat actors to deceive users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps.
references:
    - https://www.forensafe.com/blogs/runmrukey.html
    - https://medium.com/@shaherzakaria8/downloading-trojan-lumma-infostealer-through-capatcha-1f25255a0e71
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-october-2024/
author: Ahmed Farouk, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2024-11-01
tags:
    - detection.threat-hunting
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU'
    filter_main_mrulist:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\MRUList'
    filter_optional_ping:
        Details|contains: 'ping'
    filter_optional_generic:
        Details:
            - '%appdata%\1'
            - '%localappdata%\1'
            - '%public%\1'
            - '%temp%\1'
            - 'calc\1'
            - 'dxdiag\1'
            - 'explorer\1'
            - 'gpedit.msc\1'
            - 'mmc\1'
            - 'notepad\1'
            - 'regedit\1'
            - 'services.msc\1'
            - 'winver\1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely
level: low

title: Computer Password Change Via Ksetup.EXE
id: de16d92c-c446-4d53-8938-10aeef41c8b6
status: test
description: Detects password change for the computer's domain account or host principal via "ksetup.exe"
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/1641712700605513729
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/ksetup
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\ksetup.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'ksetup.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /setcomputerpassword '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder
id: 855bc8b5-2ae8-402e-a9ed-b889e6df1900
status: test
description: Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2019-12-30
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1039
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\\*\\*$' # example \\SVR_NAME\ADMIN$
            - '\Sysvol\'
    selection_other_tools:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\robocopy.exe'
              - '\xcopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'robocopy.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
    selection_cmd_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cmd_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'copy'
    selection_pwsh_img:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy-item'
            - 'copy '
            - 'cpi '
            - ' cp '
            - 'move '
            - ' move-item'
            - ' mi '
            - ' mv '
    condition: selection_target and (selection_other_tools or all of selection_cmd_* or all of selection_pwsh_*)
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
level: medium

title: Enable Microsoft Dynamic Data Exchange
id: 63647769-326d-4dde-a419-b925cc0caf42
status: test
description: Enable Dynamic Data Exchange protocol (DDE) in all supported editions of Microsoft Word or Excel.
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/ADV170021
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1559.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_word:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Word\Security\AllowDDE'
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
            - 'DWORD (0x00000002)'
    selection_excel:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Excel\Security\DisableDDEServerLaunch'
            - '\Excel\Security\DisableDDEServerLookup'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Google Cloud DNS Zone Modified or Deleted
id: 28268a8f-191f-4c17-85b2-f5aa4fa829c3
status: test
description: Identifies when a DNS Zone is modified or deleted in Google Cloud.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/reference/v1/managedZones
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-15
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name:
            - Dns.ManagedZones.Delete
            - Dns.ManagedZones.Update
            - Dns.ManagedZones.Patch
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Google Cloud Kubernetes RoleBinding
id: 0322d9f2-289a-47c2-b5e1-b63c90901a3e
status: test
description: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1267
    - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubernetes-api/authorization-resources/cluster-role-v1/#ClusterRole
    - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/role-based-access-control
    - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
    - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name:
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.create
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.create
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.patch
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.patch
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.update
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.update
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.delete
            - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Gpresult Display Group Policy Information
id: e56d3073-83ff-4021-90fe-c658e0709e72
status: test
description: Detects cases in which a user uses the built-in Windows utility gpresult to display the Resultant Set of Policy (RSoP) information
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1615/T1615.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-01
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1615
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\gpresult.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/z'
            - '/v'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Display group policy information via gpresult
      technique: T1615
      atomic_guid: 0976990f-53b1-4d3f-a185-6df5be429d3b
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gpresult_execution/info.yml

title: HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
id: f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e
status: test
description: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
references:
    - https://github.com/HiwinCN/HTran
    - https://github.com/cw1997/NATBypass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.s0040
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\htran.exe'
            - '\lcx.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe -tran '
            - '.exe -slave '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay Execution
id: a7664b14-75fb-4a50-a223-cb9bc0afbacf
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of RemoteKrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool via CommandLine flags and PE metadata.
references:
    - https://github.com/CICADA8-Research/RemoteKrbRelay
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\RemoteKrbRelay.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RemoteKrbRelay.exe'
    selection_cli_required:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -clsid '
            - ' -target '
            - ' -victim '
    # selection_cli_attacks:
    #     # Note: In the current implementation these flags do not require any other flags. Which means they can't be used on their own. They're already covered by "selection_cli_required"
    #     CommandLine|contains:
    #         - '-adcs ' # relay to HTTP Web Enrollment and get certificate
    #         - '-laps ' # relay to LDAP and extract LAPS passwords
    #         - '-ldapwhoami ' # relay to LDAP and get info about relayed user
    #         - '-shadowcred ' # relay to LDAP and setup Shadow Credentials
    selection_cli_attack_smb:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-smb ' # relay to SMB
            - '--smbkeyword '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'interactive'
            - 'secrets'
            - 'service-add'
    selection_cli_attack_rbcd_main:
        CommandLine|contains: '-rbcd ' # relay to LDAP and setup RBCD
    selection_cli_attack_rbcd_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-cn ' # Computer name that will be written to msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
            - '--computername ' # Computer name that will be written to msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
    selection_cli_attack_changepass:
        CommandLine|contains: '-chp ' # relay to LDAP and change user password
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-chpPass ' # new password
            - '-chpUser ' # the name of the user whose password you want to change
    selection_cli_attack_addgrpname:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-addgroupmember ' # relay to LDAP and add user to group
            - '-group '
            - '-groupuser '
    condition: selection_img or selection_cli_required or all of selection_cli_attack_rbcd_* or selection_cli_attack_changepass or selection_cli_attack_addgrpname or selection_cli_attack_smb
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: ISO or Image Mount Indicator in Recent Files
id: 4358e5a5-7542-4dcb-b9f3-87667371839b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of recent element file that points to an .ISO, .IMG, .VHD or .VHDX file as often used in phishing attacks.
    This can be a false positive on server systems but on workstations users should rarely mount .iso or .img files.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore
    - https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/32373/beware-new-wave-of-malware-spreads-via-iso-file-email-attachments/
    - https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/the-dangers-of-vhd-and-vhdx-files/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.iso.lnk'
            - '.img.lnk'
            - '.vhd.lnk'
            - '.vhdx.lnk'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Cases in which a user mounts an image file for legitimate reasons
level: medium

title: Kerberos Network Traffic RC4 Ticket Encryption
id: 503fe26e-b5f2-4944-a126-eab405cc06e5
status: test
description: Detects kerberos TGS request using RC4 encryption which may be indicative of kerberoasting
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458
author: sigma
date: 2020-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: kerberos
detection:
    selection:
        request_type: 'TGS'
        cipher: 'rc4-hmac'
    computer_acct:
        service|startswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not computer_acct
falsepositives:
    - Normal enterprise SPN requests activity
level: medium

title: Launch-VsDevShell.PS1 Proxy Execution
id: 45d3a03d-f441-458c-8883-df101a3bb146
status: test
description: Detects the use of the 'Launch-VsDevShell.ps1' Microsoft signed script to execute commands.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535981653239255040
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_script:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Launch-VsDevShell.ps1'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VsWherePath '
            - 'VsInstallationPath '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the script by a developer
level: medium

title: LSASS Crash Via Netlogon Stack Buffer Overflow - CVE-2026-41089
id: f8a66a02-4a16-46e5-b7fd-a42c8a93d137
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a crash of the LSASS process where netlogon.dll is the faulting module and the exception code is STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN (0xc0000409).
    This crash, especially on Domain Controllers, might indicate the exploitation of CVE-2026-41089, a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability,
    which exists in the Netlogon component of Windows and can be triggered by sending specially crafted requests to the Netlogon service,
    leading to a stack-based buffer overflow and subsequent crash of the LSASS process.
references:
    - https://aretiq.ai/research/vul260513-cve-2026-41089-microsoft-windows-netlogon-buildsamlogonresponse-stack-based-buffer-overflow-rce/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/shows/inside/c0000409
    - https://github.com/p3Nt3st3r-sTAr/CVE-2026-41089
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-41089
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-06-02
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499
    - cve.2026-41089
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'lsass.exe'
        ModuleName: 'netlogon.dll'
        ExceptionCode: 'c0000409' # STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New Connection Initiated To Potential Dead Drop Resolver Domain
id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
related:
    - id: d7b09985-95a3-44be-8450-b6eadf49833e
      type: obsolete
    - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
      type: similar
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
      type: similar
    - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable, which is not an internet browser or known application, initiating network connections to legit popular websites, which were seen to be used as dead drop resolvers in previous attacks.
    In this context attackers leverage known websites such as "facebook", "youtube", etc. In order to pass through undetected.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220830134315/https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41/
    - https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/
    - https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2021/04/dead-drop-resolvers-espionage-inspired.html
    - https://github.com/kleiton0x00/RedditC2
    - https://twitter.com/kleiton0x7e/status/1600567316810551296
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kleiton-kurti_github-kleiton0x00redditc2-abusing-reddit-activity-7009939662462984192-5DbI/?originalSubdomain=al
author: Sorina Ionescu, X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1102.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.t.me'
            - '0x0.st'
            - '4shared.com'
            - 'abuse.ch'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'cloudflare.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'docs.google.com'
            - 'drive.google.com'
            - 'dropbox.com'
            - 'dropmefiles.com'
            - 'facebook.com'
            - 'feeds.rapidfeeds.com'
            - 'fotolog.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co/'
            - 'githubusercontent.com'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'imgur.com'
            - 'livejournal.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onedrive.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'reddit.com'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'steamcommunity.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'technet.microsoft.com'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'twitter.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'vimeo.com'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'wetransfer.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
            - 'youtube.com'
    # Note: Add/Remove browsers/applications that you don't use or those that have custom install locations
    # Note: To avoid complex conditions the filters for some apps are generic by name only. A custom tuning is recommended for best results
    filter_main_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_chrome_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_firefox_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_main_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_main_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_main_safari:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Safari\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Safari\'
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_main_defender:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender executable
            - '\MsSense.exe' # Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service Executable
    filter_main_prtg:
        # Paessler's PRTG Network Monitor
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
    filter_main_brave:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\'
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_main_maxthon:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Maxthon\'
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_main_opera:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_main_seamonkey:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\'
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_main_vivaldi:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\'
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_main_whale:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Naver\Naver Whale\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Naver\Naver Whale\'
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    # Note: The TOR browser shouldn't be something you allow in your corporate network.
    # filter_main_tor:
    #     Image|contains: '\Tor Browser\'
    filter_main_whaterfox:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Waterfox\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Waterfox\'
        Image|endswith: '\Waterfox.exe'
    filter_main_midori:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\midori-ng\'
        Image|endswith: '\Midori Next Generation.exe'
    filter_main_slimbrowser:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SlimBrowser\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SlimBrowser\'
        Image|endswith: '\slimbrowser.exe'
    filter_main_flock:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Flock\'
        Image|endswith: '\Flock.exe'
    filter_main_phoebe:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Phoebe\'
        Image|endswith: '\Phoebe.exe'
    filter_main_falkon:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Falkon\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Falkon\'
        Image|endswith: '\falkon.exe'
    filter_main_qtweb:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\QtWeb\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\QtWeb\'
        Image|endswith: '\QtWeb.exe'
    filter_main_avant:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avant Browser\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avant Browser\'
        Image|endswith: '\avant.exe'
    filter_main_whatsapp:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\WhatsApp.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'facebook.com'
    filter_main_telegram:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Telegram Desktop\'
        Image|endswith: '\Telegram.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.t.me'
    filter_main_onedrive:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
        Image|endswith: '\OneDrive.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'onedrive.com'
    filter_main_dropbox:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Dropbox.exe'
            - '\DropboxInstaller.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'dropbox.com'
    filter_main_mega:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: This is a basic/best effort filter in order to avoid FP with the MEGA installer and executable.
            #       In practice please apply exact path to avoid basic path bypass techniques.
            - '\MEGAsync.exe'
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup32_*RC.exe' # Beta versions
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup32.exe' # Installers 32bit
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup64.exe' # Installers 64bit
            - '\MEGAupdater.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
    filter_main_googledrive:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Drive File Stream\'
        Image|endswith: 'GoogleDriveFS.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'drive.google.com'
    filter_main_discord:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Discord\'
        Image|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
    filter_main_null:
        Image: null
    filter_main_empty:
        Image: ''
    # filter_optional_qlik:
    #     Image|endswith: '\Engine.exe' # Process from qlik.com app
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - One might need to exclude other internet browsers found in it's network or other applications like ones mentioned above from Microsoft Defender.
    - Ninite contacting githubusercontent.com
level: high

title: New Generic Credentials Added Via Cmdkey.EXE
id: b1ec66c6-f4d1-4b5c-96dd-af28ccae7727
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of "cmdkey.exe" to add generic credentials.
    As an example, this can be used before connecting to an RDP session via command line interface.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md#t1021001---remote-desktop-protocol
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-03
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmdkey.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'cmdkey.exe'
    selection_cli_generic:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -g' # Generic
    selection_cli_user:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -u' # User
    selection_cli_password:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -p' # Password
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage for administration purposes
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_adding_generic_creds/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: RDP to DomainController
      technique: T1021.001
      atomic_guid: 355d4632-8cb9-449d-91ce-b566d0253d3e

title: Potential Server Side Template Injection In Velocity
id: 16c86189-b556-4ee8-b4c7-7e350a195a4f
status: test
description: Detects exceptions in velocity template renderer, this most likely happens due to dynamic rendering of user input and may lead to RCE.
references:
    - https://antgarsil.github.io/posts/velocity/
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: velocity
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'ParseErrorException'
        - 'VelocityException'
        - 'TemplateInitException'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
    - Missing .vm files
level: high