Sigma rules: 04

title: APT40 Dropbox Tool User Agent
id: 5ba715b6-71b7-44fd-8245-f66893e81b3d
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent string of APT40 Dropbox tool
references:
    - Internal research from Florian Roth
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-11-12
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.143 Safari/537.36'
        cs-host: 'api.dropbox.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Old browsers
level: high

title: Azure Kubernetes Network Policy Change
id: 08d6ac24-c927-4469-b3b7-2e422d6e3c43
status: test
description: Identifies when a Azure Kubernetes network policy is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
    - https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-07
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1485
    - attack.t1496
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/NETWORKING.K8S.IO/NETWORKPOLICIES/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/NETWORKING.K8S.IO/NETWORKPOLICIES/DELETE
            - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/EXTENSIONS/NETWORKPOLICIES/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/EXTENSIONS/NETWORKPOLICIES/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Network Policy being modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Network Policy being modified and deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Kubernetes Pods Deleted
id: b02f9591-12c3-4965-986a-88028629b2e1
status: test
description: Identifies the deletion of Azure Kubernetes Pods.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/065bf48a9987cd8bd826c098a30ce36e6868ee46/rules/integrations/azure/impact_kubernetes_pod_deleted.toml
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/PODS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Pods may be deleted by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Pods deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Suppression Rule Created
id: 92cc3e5d-eb57-419d-8c16-5c63f325a401
status: test
description: Identifies when a suppression rule is created in Azure. Adversary's could attempt this to evade detection.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Suppression Rule created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Change User Account Associated with the FAX Service
id: e3fdf743-f05b-4051-990a-b66919be1743
status: test
description: Detect change of the user account associated with the FAX service to avoid the escalation problem.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361
    - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Fax\ObjectName
    filter:
        Details|contains: NetworkService
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Computer account created with privileges
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a computer account with privileges for later exploitation.
correlation: correlate with ID 4763 (privileges) using field SubjectLogonId. See rule "Privilege SeMachineAccountPrivilege abuse" for advance correlation.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1136-Create%20account
- https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/samaccountname-spoofing
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008380-authentication-updates-cve-2021-42287-9dafac11-e0d0-4cb8-959a-143bd0201041
- https://github.com/WazeHell/sam-the-admin
- https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac
- https://github.com/ly4k/Pachine
- https://cloudbrothers.info/en/exploit-kerberos-samaccountname-spoofing/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098 # account manipulation
- attack.t1136 # user creation
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068 # exploitation for privilege escalation
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4741
  filter:
    PrivilegeList: "-" # Interesting privileges would be "SeMachineAccountPrivilege"
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: CrackMaxpExec share permission enumeration
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker would perform share permission enumeration using CrackMaxExec SMBmodule.
correlation: correlate TargetLogonId from ID 4624 with SubjectLogonId from ID 5145 to identify the source of the enumeration.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1222.001-File%20and%20Directory%20Permissions%20Modification
- https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets/page/crackmapexec
- https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/
- https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/enumeration/enumerate-shares-and-access
tags:
- attack.
- attack.t
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection: # full command: cme smb -u user -p password --shares
  selection_baseline:
    EventID: 5145

  selection_pipes:
    ShareName: '\\*\IPC$'
    RelativeTargetName:
      - srvsvc # May also be triggered by other tools like SharpHound, DonPapi, ...
      - svcctl # May also be triggered by other tools like Tchopper

  selection_admin_share:
    ShareName: '\\*\ADMIN$'
    RelativeTargetName: # RelativeNames with high entropy (eg: nESNaYmfIO, srnCKoBLQW...)

  filter:
    IpAddress: '%administration_hosts%' # List of IPs of your administration host to reduce false positive

  condition: selection_baseline and not filter and (selection_pipes or selection_admin_share) | count(Computer) by IpAddress > 20
  timeframe: 15m
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity, backup solutions, Windows Server Manager
level: medium

title: Delete Defender Scan ShellEx Context Menu Registry Key
id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6
related:
    - id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of registry key that adds 'Scan with Defender' option in context menu. Attackers may use this to make it harder for users to scan files that are suspicious.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/
    - https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: registry_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP'
    filter_main_defender:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
        Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely as this weakens defenses and normally would not be done even if using another AV.
level: medium

title: Elevated System Shell Spawned From Uncommon Parent Location
id: 178e615d-e666-498b-9630-9ed363038101
related:
    - id: 61065c72-5d7d-44ef-bf41-6a36684b545f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges from a uncommon parent location.
references:
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP
author: frack113, Tim Shelton (update fp)
date: 2022-12-05
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_shell:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_user:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        LogonId: '0x3e7'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Example 1:
        #   C:\Program Files\erl-23.2\erts-11.1.4\bin\erl.exe" -service_event ErlSrv_RabbitMQ -nohup -sname rabbit@localhost -s rabbit boot -boot start_sasl +W w +MBas ageffcbf +MHas ageffcbf +MBlmbcs 512 +MHlmbcs 512 +MMmcs 30 +P 1048576 +t 5000000 +stbt db +zdbbl 128000 +sbwt none +sbwtdcpu none +sbwtdio none -kernel inet_dist_listen_min 25672 -kernel inet_dist_listen_max 25672 -lager crash_log false -lager handlers []
        # Example 2:
        #   ParentImage: C:\Program Files (x86)\Varonis\DatAdvantage\GridCollector\VrnsRealTimeAlertsSvc.exe" /appid 000000ad-cb03-500b-9459-c46d000000ad
        #   CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c C:\Program Files "(x86)\Varonis\DatAdvantage\GridCollector\handle_scopes.cmd C:\Collector" Working Share\VaronisWorkDirectoryCollector
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\' # Installers
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    filter_optional_manageengine:
        # Example:
        #   ParentImage: C:/ManageEngine/ADManager Plus/pgsql/bin/postgres.exe" --forkarch 5380
        #   CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "IF EXIST archive.bat (archive.bat pg_wal\000000010000008E000000EA 000000010000008E000000EA)
        ParentImage|endswith: ':\ManageEngine\ADManager Plus\pgsql\bin\postgres.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    filter_optional_asgard:
        CommandLine|contains: ':\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c "'
        CurrentDirectory|contains: ':\WINDOWS\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
    filter_optional_ibm_spectrumprotect:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\IBM\SpectrumProtect\webserver\scripts\'
        CommandLine|contains: ':\IBM\SpectrumProtect\webserver\scripts\'
    filter_main_parent_null:
        ParentImage: null
    filter_main_parent_empty:
        ParentImage:
            - ''
            - '-'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate applications may spawn shells from uncommon parent locations. Apply additional filters and perform an initial baseline before deploying.
level: medium

title: Formbook Process Creation
id: 032f5fb3-d959-41a5-9263-4173c802dc2b
status: test
description: Detects Formbook like process executions that inject code into a set of files in the System32 folder, which executes a special command command line to delete the dropper from the AppData Temp folder. We avoid false positives by excluding all parent process with command line parameters.
references:
    - https://inquest.net/blog/2018/06/22/a-look-at-formbook-stealer
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/388d5802-aa48-4826-b069-250420504758/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/8e22486b-5edc-4cef-821c-373e945f296c/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/62bb01ae-25a4-4180-b278-8e464a90b8d7/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-09-30
modified: 2022-10-06
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        # Parent command line should not contain a space value
        # This avoids false positives not caused by process injection
        # e.g. wscript.exe /B sysmon-install.vbs
        ParentCommandLine|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        ParentCommandLine|endswith: '.exe'
    selection2:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/c'
              - 'del'
              - 'C:\Users\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/c'
              - 'del'
              - 'C:\Users\'
              - '\Desktop\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/C'
              - 'type nul >'
              - 'C:\Users\'
              - '\Desktop\'
    selection3:
        CommandLine|endswith: '.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Google Cloud Storage Buckets Modified or Deleted
id: 4d9f2ee2-c903-48ab-b9c1-8c0f474913d0
status: test
description: Detects when storage bucket is modified or deleted in Google Cloud.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/json_api/v1/buckets
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name:
            - storage.buckets.delete
            - storage.buckets.insert
            - storage.buckets.update
            - storage.buckets.patch
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Storage Buckets being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Storage Buckets modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: HackTool - GMER Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution
id: 9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d
status: test
description: Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields.
references:
    - http://www.gmer.net/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-05
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\gmer.exe'
    selection_sysmon_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'MD5=E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04'
            - 'SHA1=539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57'
            - 'SHA256=E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: InfDefaultInstall.exe .inf Execution
id: ce7cf472-6fcc-490a-9481-3786840b5d9b
status: test
description: Executes SCT script using scrobj.dll from a command in entered into a specially prepared INF file.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-4---infdefaultinstallexe-inf-execution
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Infdefaultinstall/
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-13
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'InfDefaultInstall.exe '
            - '.inf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_infdefaultinstall_execute_sct_scripts/info.yml

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Powershell
id: 86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Katz Stealer DLL Loaded
id: e6c7ab7c-c79d-4b84-b913-b2ec3f8e8a98
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects loading of DLLs associated with Katz Stealer malware 2025 variants.
    Katz Stealer is a malware variant that is known to be used for stealing sensitive information from compromised systems.
    The process that loads these DLLs are very likely to be malicious.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1129
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\katz_ontop.dll'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\received_dll.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: MERCURY APT Activity
id: a62298a3-1fe0-422f-9a68-ffbcbc5a123d
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command line patterns seen being used by MERCURY APT
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-26
modified: 2023-03-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.g0069
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-exec bypass -w 1 -enc'
            - 'UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA'  # Start-Job -ScriptBlock
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MMC20 Lateral Movement
id: f1f3bf22-deb2-418d-8cce-e1a45e46a5bd
status: test
description: Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view?usp=sharing
author: '@2xxeformyshirt (Security Risk Advisors) - rule; Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea)'
date: 2020-03-04
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '-Embedding'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Nltest.EXE Execution
id: 903076ff-f442-475a-b667-4f246bcc203b
related:
    - id: 5cc90652-4cbd-4241-aa3b-4b462fa5a248
      type: similar
    - id: eeb66bbb-3dde-4582-815a-584aee9fe6d1
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects nltest commands that can be used for information discovery
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/nltest.htm
author: Arun Chauhan
date: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\nltest.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'nltestrk.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: low

title: Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-5054 or CVE-2025-4598
id: 33b3cfb1-574e-44b9-b527-fbf9303b9d7b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts of an attacker to enable core dumps for set-user-ID (SUID) processes by modifying the system file /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable, typically by setting its value to 1 or 2.
    Enabling this feature allows memory dumps (core dumps) of SUID processes, which usually run with elevated privileges.
    These dumps may contain sensitive information such as passwords, cryptographic keys or other secrets.
    CVE-2025-5054: Information leak via core dumps from SUID binaries using apport.
    CVE-2025-4598: Information disclosure in systemd-coredump due to insecure handling of SUID process memory dumps.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5054
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4598
    - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2025/05/29/qualys-tru-discovers-two-local-information-disclosure-vulnerabilities-in-apport-and-systemd-coredump-cve-2025-5054-and-cve-2025-4598
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1548
    - attack.t1003
    - cve.2025-5054
    - cve.2025-4598
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_suid_dumpable_sysctl:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sbin/sysctl'
            - '/bin/sysctl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'fs.suid_dumpable='
    selection_echo_proc_write:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/sh'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 2 > /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 1 >/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 2 >/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 1> /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 2> /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 1>/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
            - 'echo 2>/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - System administrators enabling debugging temporarily
    - Legitimate crash diagnostic operations
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via GlobalFlags
id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
related:
    - id: c81fe886-cac0-4913-a511-2822d72ff505
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry persistence technique using the GlobalFlags and SilentProcessExit keys
references:
    - https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/
author: Karneades, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Florian Roth
date: 2018-04-11
modified: 2023-06-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.012
    - car.2013-01-002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_global_flag:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\'
            - '\Image File Execution Options\'
            - '\GlobalFlag'
    selection_silent_process:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\'
            - '\SilentProcessExit\'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\ReportingMode'
            - '\MonitorProcess'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_globalflags/info.yml

title: Potential SAM Database Dump
id: 4e87b8e2-2ee9-4b2a-a715-4727d297ece0
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files that look like exports of the local SAM (Security Account Manager)
references:
    - https://github.com/search?q=CVE-2021-36934
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210725081645/https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-36934
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=%22reg.exe+save%22+sam
    - https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal
    - https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\Temp\sam'
              - '\sam.sav'
              - '\Intel\sam'
              - '\sam.hive'
              - '\Perflogs\sam'
              - '\ProgramData\sam'
              - '\Users\Public\sam'
              - '\AppData\Local\sam'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\sam'
              - '_ShadowSteal.zip'       # https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal
              - '\Documents\SAM.export'  # https://github.com/n3tsurge/CVE-2021-36934/
              - ':\sam'
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\hive_sam_'             # https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare
              - '\sam.save'
              - '\sam.export'
              - '\~reg_sam.save'
              - '\sam_backup'
              - '\sam.bck'
              - '\sam.backup'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare cases of administrative activity
level: high

title: Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock
id: cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2022/03/21/unconstrained-delegation/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adcomputer?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: frack113
date: 2025-03-05
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1558
    - attack.t1589.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enable'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-Properties*TrustedForDelegation'
            - '-Properties*TrustedToAuthForDelegation'
            - '-Properties*msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
            - '-Properties*PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount'
            - '-LDAPFilter*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_potential_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/info.yml

title: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension
id: e9f8f8cc-07cc-4e81-b724-f387db9175e4
related:
    - id: cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities with an uncommon extension.
references:
    - https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4718?s=09
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\Regsvcs.exe'
              - '\Regasm.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more potentially uncommon extensions
            - '.dat'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
            - '.txt'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Public IP Created
id: 390a6131-d707-47b2-96f9-71ec40ed3ed6
status: test
description:
    Creates a public IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/ip-services/monitor-public-ip-reference#activity-log
author: Fukusuke Takahashi
date: 2025-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.NETWORK/PUBLICIPADDRESSES/WRITE
        properties.statusCode: Created
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
level: informational

title: Recon Command Output Piped To Findstr.EXE
id: ccb5742c-c248-4982-8c5c-5571b9275ad3
related:
    - id: fe63010f-8823-4864-a96b-a7b4a0f7b929
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a potential recon command where the results are piped to "findstr". This is meant to trigger on inline calls of "cmd.exe" via the "/c" or "/k" for example.
    Attackers often time use this technique to extract specific information they require in their reconnaissance phase.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02cb591f75064ffe1e0df9ac3ed5972a2e491c97/atomics/T1057/T1057.md#atomic-test-6---discover-specific-process---tasklist
    - https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/manage-engine-vulnerability-sector-alert-tlpclear.pdf
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/d/spring4shell-exploited-to-deploy-cryptocurrency-miners.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-07-06
modified: 2025-10-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1057
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add additional CLI to increase and enhance coverage
            # Note: We use wildcards in this instance to avoid writing a lot of variations that can be avoided easily. You can switch to regex if its supported by your backend.
            - 'ipconfig*|*find'
            - 'net*|*find'
            - 'netstat*|*find'
            - 'ping*|*find'
            - 'systeminfo*|*find'
            - 'tasklist*|*find'
            - 'whoami*|*find'
    filter_optional_xampp:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe /c TASKLIST /V |'
            - 'FIND /I'
            - '\xampp\'
            - '\catalina_start.bat'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_recon_pipe_output/info.yml

title: RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Staged in RS-Prefixed Temp Dir
id: f2e4b7d9-5c3a-4f8b-9e1d-7a6c2b3f4e5d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file named TieringEngineService.exe inside a directory whose path contains the RS- prefix characteristic
    of RedSun's staging directory (e.g. %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\TieringEngineService.exe).
    RedSun registers a Cloud Files sync root under this RS-prefixed path and drops a masqueraded placeholder there as part of its oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain.

    The RS-{GUID} directory name is generated by RedSun itself and has no legitimate system usage,
    making the combination of this path prefix and the TieringEngineService.exe filename a highly
    specific indicator of RedSun activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun/blob/7456cc8cf066f5e5fc6cdf7d3272a466ebd6b2f6/RedSun.cpp#L591
    - https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/04/public-disclosure-response-for-cve-2026.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost
date: 2026-04-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\Temp'
            - '\RS-{'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\TieringEngineService.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2026/Exploits/RedSun/file_event_win_exploit_redsun_indicators/info.yml

title: RedTail Cryptominer User-Agent
id: 6fd25dd1-527b-47c8-baa4-2a0e77279c6f
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects inbound web requests using the "libredtail-http" User-Agent.
    libredtail-http is a unique User-Agent string associated with a campaign of automated, malicious scans and attacks targeting exposed container environments and web applications,notably identified in activities stemming from late 2024 through early 2026.
    It is primarily used by the RedTail cryptominer malware to identify and exploit vulnerabilities for deploying cryptocurrency miners.
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Danger+of+Libredtail+Guest+Diary/32936/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/24/detecting-investigating-defending-against-trivy-supply-chain-compromise/
    - https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/honey-for-hackers-a-study-of-attacks-targeting-the-recent-cve-2026-21962-and-other-critical-weblogic-vulnerabilities-on-a-high-interactive-oracle-honeypot
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2026-04-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-user-agent: 'libredtail-http'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: ServiceDll Hijack
id: 612e47e9-8a59-43a6-b404-f48683f45bd6
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry.
    This is often used as a method of persistence.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md#atomic-test-4---tinyturla-backdoor-service-w64time
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-04
modified: 2026-08-31
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\System\'
            - 'ControlSet'
            - '\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Parameters\ServiceDll'
    filter_main_printextensionmanger_1:
        Details: 'C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\x64\3\PrintConfig.dll'
    filter_main_printextensionmanger_2:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Services\PrintNotify\Parameters\ServiceDll'
        Details|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\'
        Details|endswith: '\arm64\PrintConfig.dll'
    filter_main_domain_controller:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Services\NTDS\Parameters\ServiceDll'
        Details: '%%systemroot%%\system32\ntdsa.dll'
    filter_main_poqexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'
    filter_optional_safetica:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        Details: 'C:\Windows\System32\STAgent.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
    - Installation of a service
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: TinyTurla backdoor service w64time
      technique: T1543.003
      atomic_guid: ef0581fd-528e-4662-87bc-4c2affb86940

title: Suspicious DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
id: 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793
related:
    - id: 242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to load the target DLL file.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -LoadDLL '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Appdata\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Tasks\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious modification of a fake domain controller SPN (DCshadow)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker updates the Service Principal Name (SPN) of a fake domain controller account in order to perform DCshadow attack.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1207-creating-rogue-domain-controllers-with-dcshadow
- https://medium.com/@maarten.goet/dcshadow-detecting-a-rogue-domain-controller-replicating-malicious-changes-to-your-active-1e22440df9ad
- https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/detecting-dcshadow-with-event-logs/
- https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/05/dcshadow-sacl.html
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/creating-persistence-with-dcshadow/
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4742
    ServicePrincipalNames|contains: 'GC/'
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- New domain controller registration
level: high

title: Suspicious Spool Service Child Process
id: dcdbc940-0bff-46b2-95f3-2d73f848e33b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes.
references:
    - https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Exploits/Print%20Spooler%20RCE/Suspicious%20Spoolsv%20Child%20Process.md
author: Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule)
date: 2021-07-11
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    spoolsv:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\spoolsv.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    suspicious_unrestricted:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\gpupdate.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\taskmgr.exe'
            - '\sc.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\wget.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\accesschk.exe'
            - '\wevtutil.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\fsutil.exe'
            - '\cipher.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\write.exe'
            - '\wuauclt.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
    suspicious_net:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
    suspicious_net_filter:
        CommandLine|contains: 'start'
    suspicious_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    suspicious_cmd_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.spl'
            - 'route add'
            - 'program files'
    suspicious_netsh:
        Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
    suspicious_netsh_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'add portopening'
            - 'rule name'
    suspicious_powershell:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    suspicious_powershell_filter:
        CommandLine|contains: '.spl'
    suspicious_rundll32_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    suspicious_rundll32_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith: 'rundll32.exe'
    condition: spoolsv and ( suspicious_unrestricted or (suspicious_net and not suspicious_net_filter) or (suspicious_cmd and not suspicious_cmd_filter) or (suspicious_netsh and not suspicious_netsh_filter) or (suspicious_powershell and not suspicious_powershell_filter) or all of suspicious_rundll32_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high