Sigma rules: 06

title: A New Trust Was Created To A Domain
id: 0255a820-e564-4e40-af2b-6ac61160335c
status: stable
description: Addition of domains is seldom and should be verified for legitimacy.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4706
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-12-03
modified: 2024-01-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4706
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate extension of domain structure
level: medium

title: Abusable DLL Potential Sideloading From Suspicious Location
id: 799a5f48-0ac1-4e0f-9152-71d137d48c2a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/behind-the-scenes-unveiling-the-hidden-workings-of-earth-preta.html
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/beyond-the-horizon-traveling-the-world-on-camaro-dragons-usb-flash-drives/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_dll:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            # Note: Add more generic DLLs that cannot be pin-pointed to a single application
            - '\coreclr.dll'
            - '\facesdk.dll'
            - '\HPCustPartUI.dll'
            - '\libcef.dll'
            - '\ZIPDLL.dll'
    selection_folders_1:
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_folders_2:
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    condition: selection_dll and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
id: 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
related:
    - id: 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
      type: similar
    - id: c15a46a0-07d4-4c87-b4b6-89207835a83b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
    Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/source
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'source '
            - 'add '
            - 'http://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives might occur if the users are unaware of such control checks
level: high

title: DNS Query To Devtunnels Domain
id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
related:
    - id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 # Net Connection DevTunnels
      type: similar
    - id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 # Net Connection VsCode
      type: similar
    - id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1 # DNS VsCode
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects DNS query requests to Devtunnels domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
    - https://blueteamops.medium.com/detecting-dev-tunnels-16f0994dc3e2
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/dev-tunnels/security
    - https://cydefops.com/devtunnels-unleashed
author: citron_ninja
date: 2023-10-25
modified: 2023-11-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: dns_query
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|endswith: '.devtunnels.ms'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Devtunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium

title: Dump Ntds.dit To Suspicious Location
id: 94dc4390-6b7c-4784-8ffc-335334404650
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of ntdsutil to dump ntds.dit database to a suspicious location
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mgreen27/status/1558223256704122882
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/jj574207(v=ws.11)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-14
modified: 2023-10-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection_root:
        Provider_Name: 'ESENT'
        EventID: 325 # New Database Created
        Data|contains: 'ntds.dit'
    selection_paths:
        Data|contains:
            # Add more locations that you don't use in your env or that are just suspicious
            - ':\ntds.dit'
            - '\Appdata\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup operation/creating shadow copies
level: medium

title: Event log clear attempt (PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to clear the event logs.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1070.001-Clear%20Windows%20event%20logs
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1070.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection: # full command: "Clear-EventLog -LogName application, system"
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - Clear-EventLog
      - LogName

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - Clear-EventLog
      - LogName

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - Clear-EventLog
      - LogName

  condition: selection_powershell_native or selection_powershell_modern or selection_powershell_block
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine
id: 846b866e-2a57-46ee-8e16-85fa92759be7
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html
    - https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=exploitdb&qid=48224
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-03-25
modified: 2023-01-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.s0190
    - cve.2020-10189
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: 'DesktopCentral_Server\jre\bin\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File and Directory Discovery - Linux
id: d3feb4ee-ff1d-4d3d-bd10-5b28a238cc72
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of system utilities such as "find", "tree", "findmnt", etc, to discover files, directories and network shares.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1083/T1083.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, CheraghiMilad
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_file_with_asterisk:
        Image|endswith: '/file'
        CommandLine|re: '(.){200,}' # execution of the 'file */* *>> /tmp/output.txt' will produce huge commandline
    selection_recursive_ls:
        Image|endswith: '/ls'
        CommandLine|contains: '-R'
    selection_find_execution:
        Image|endswith: '/find'
    selection_tree_execution:
        Image|endswith: '/tree'
    selection_findmnt_execution:
        Image|endswith: '/findmnt'
    selection_locate_execution:
        Image|endswith: '/mlocate'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activities
level: informational

title: FortiGate - New Firewall Policy Added
id: f24ab7a8-f09a-4319-82c1-915586aa642b
status: experimental
description: Detects the addition of a new firewall policy on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.
references:
    - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/333889629/config-firewall-policy
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2025-11-01
modified: 2026-05-04
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.002
logsource:
    product: fortigate
    service: event
detection:
    selection:
        action: 'Add'
        cfgpath: 'firewall.policy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A firewall policy can be added for legitimate purposes.
level: medium

title: Impossible Travel
id: b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a
status: test
description: Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#impossible-travel
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'impossibleTravel'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Connecting to a VPN, performing activity and then dropping and performing additional activity.
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher
id: 6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - PowerShell Module
id: c72aca44-8d52-45ad-8f81-f96c4d3c755e
related:
    - id: 86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$?\{?input).*&&.*"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: macOS Configuration Profile Installation
id: e429564d-e697-4ecc-8996-504474e414f4
status: experimental
description: 'Detects installation of configuration profiles which can be used for
  persistence,

  privilege escalation, or to modify system security settings. Malicious profiles

  can disable security features, install certificates, or configure system settings.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_event:
    esf.event_type:
    - 126  # ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_PROFILE_ADD
    - 127  # ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_PROFILE_REMOVE
  selection_root:
    UserId: 0
  condition: selection_event and not selection_root
falsepositives:
- MDM (Mobile Device Management) profile installations
- IT-managed configuration profiles
- Legitimate user-installed profiles
- VPN and network configuration profiles
fields:
- event_type
- event_name
- User
- profile_identifier
- profile_uuid
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547
- attack.t1556
level: medium

title: Microsoft 365 - Unusual Volume of File Deletion
id: 78a34b67-3c39-4886-8fb4-61c46dc18ecd
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a user has deleted a unusual a large volume of files.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: austinsonger
date: 2021-08-19
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Unusual volume of file deletion'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Okta Policy Rule Modified or Deleted
id: 0c97c1d3-4057-45c9-b148-1de94b631931
status: test
description: Detects when an Policy Rule is Modified or Deleted.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-12
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType:
            - policy.rule.update
            - policy.rule.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown

level: medium

title: Periodic Backup For System Registry Hives Enabled
id: 973ef012-8f1a-4c40-93b4-7e659a5cd17f
status: test
description: |
    Detects the enabling of the "EnablePeriodicBackup" registry value. Once enabled, The OS will backup System registry hives on restarts to the "C:\Windows\System32\config\RegBack" folder. Windows creates a "RegIdleBackup" task to manage subsequent backups.
    Registry backup was a default behavior on Windows and was disabled as of "Windows 10, version 1803".
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/installing-updates-features-roles/system-registry-no-backed-up-regback-folder
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-01
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1113
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Control\Session Manager\Configuration Manager\EnablePeriodicBackup'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate need for RegBack feature by administrators.
level: medium

title: Potential MOVEit Transfer CVE-2023-34362 Exploitation - Dynamic Compilation Via Csc.EXE
id: 39ac1fb0-07f1-474b-b97e-c5c0eace0d79
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "csc.exe" via "w3wp.exe" process. MOVEit affected hosts execute "csc.exe" via the "w3wp.exe" process to dynamically compile malicious DLL files.

    MOVEit is affected by a critical vulnerability. Exploited hosts show evidence of dynamically compiling a DLL and writing it under C:\\Windows\\Microsoft\.NET\\Framework64\\v4\.0\.30319\\Temporary ASP\.NET Files\\root\\([a-z0-9]{5,12})\\([a-z0-9]{5,12})\\App_Web_[a-z0-9]{5,12}\.dll.

    Hunting Opportunity

    Events from IIS dynamically compiling binaries via the csc.exe on behalf of the MOVEit application, especially since May 27th should be investigated.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/moveit-transfer-critical-vulnerability-rapid-response
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/critical-vulnerability-in-progress-moveit-transfer-technical-analysis-and-recommendations/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-06-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - cve.2023-34362
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'moveitdmz pool'
        Image|endswith: '\csc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Initial software installation and software updates.
level: medium

title: Potential Netcat Reverse Shell Execution
id: 7f734ed0-4f47-46c0-837f-6ee62505abd9
status: test
description: Detects execution of netcat with the "-e" flag followed by common shells. This could be a sign of a potential reverse shell setup.
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
    - https://www.hackingtutorials.org/networking/hacking-netcat-part-2-bind-reverse-shells/
    - https://www.infosecademy.com/netcat-reverse-shells/
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ncat.1.html
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_nc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/nc'
            - '/ncat'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' -e '
    selection_shell:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ash'
            - ' bash'
            - ' bsh'
            - ' csh'
            - ' ksh'
            - ' pdksh'
            - ' sh'
            - ' tcsh'
            - '/bin/ash'
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/bsh'
            - '/bin/csh'
            - '/bin/ksh'
            - '/bin/pdksh'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/tcsh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - '$IFSash'
            - '$IFSbash'
            - '$IFSbsh'
            - '$IFScsh'
            - '$IFSksh'
            - '$IFSpdksh'
            - '$IFSsh'
            - '$IFStcsh'
            - '$IFSzsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Process Injection Via Msra.EXE
id: 744a188b-0415-4792-896f-11ddb0588dbc
status: test
description: Detects potential process injection via Microsoft Remote Asssistance (Msra.exe) by looking at suspicious child processes spawned from the aforementioned process. It has been a target used by many threat actors and used for discovery and persistence tactics
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/09/a-closer-look-at-qakbots-latest-building-blocks-and-how-to-knock-them-down/
    - https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/analyst-reports/ar-qakbot.pdf
author: Alexander McDonald
date: 2022-06-24
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\msra.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|endswith: 'msra.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\arp.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\route.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Msra.exe
level: high

title: Potential Suspicious PowerShell Module File Created
id: e8a52bbd-bced-459f-bd93-64db45ce7657
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new PowerShell module in the first folder of the module directory structure "\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\malware\malware.psm1". This is somewhat an uncommon practice as legitimate modules often includes a version folder.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/developer/module/understanding-a-windows-powershell-module?view=powershell-7.3
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # Note: Don't include PowerShell 7 as it has default modules that don't follow this logic
            - '\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\*\.ps'
            - '\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\*\.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positive rate will vary depending on the environments. Additional filters might be required to make this logic usable in production.
level: medium

title: Potential Vivaldi_elf.DLL Sideloading
id: 2092cacb-d77b-4f98-ab0d-32b32f99a054
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "vivaldi_elf.dll"
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/beyond-the-horizon-traveling-the-world-on-camaro-dragons-usb-flash-drives/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-03
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\vivaldi_elf.dll'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        Image|endswith: '\Vivaldi\Application\vivaldi.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains: '\Vivaldi\Application\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe
id: ca5583e9-8f80-46ac-ab91-7f314d13b984
related:
    - id: d2451be2-b582-4e15-8701-4196ac180260
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of KeyScrambler.exe
references:
    - https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1712785421845790799
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-05-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\KeyScrambler.exe'
    selection_binaries:
        # Note: add additional binaries that the attacker might use
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PowerShell Downgrade Attack - PowerShell
id: 6331d09b-4785-4c13-980f-f96661356249
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
references:
    - http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/03/17/detecting-and-preventing-powershell-downgrade-attacks/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Lee Holmes (idea), Harish Segar (improvements)
date: 2017-03-22
modified: 2023-10-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_classic_start
detection:
    selection:
        Data|contains: 'EngineVersion=2.'
    filter_main:
        Data|contains: 'HostVersion=2.'
    condition: selection and not filter_main
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Powershell Keylogging
id: 34f90d3c-c297-49e9-b26d-911b05a4866c
status: test
description: Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2022-07-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1056.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_basic:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Keystrokes'
    selection_high: # want to run in background and keyboard
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetAsyncKeyState'
            - 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetForegroundWindow'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_keylogging/info.yml

title: RDP BlueeKeep connection closed (CVE-2019-0708)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to exploit the BlueKeep vulnerability.
references:
- https://github.com/sbousseaden/Slides/blob/master/Windows%20DFIR%20Events.pdf
- https://corelight.com/blog/2019/05/23/how-to-use-corelight-and-zeek-logs-to-mitigate-rds-rdp-vulnerabilities
- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/explain-like-i-m-5-remote-desktop-protocol-rdp
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.001 # remote services: RDP
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1021.001 # exploit for privilege escalation
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: rdp
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 148 # Channel X has been closed between the server and the client on transport tunnel: Y.
    Channel: Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational
    ChannelName: "ms_t120"
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- none
level: high

title: Renamed AutoIt Execution
id: f4264e47-f522-4c38-a420-04525d5b880f
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe.
    AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks, it can be misused in cyber attacks.
    Attackers can leverage AutoIt to create and distribute malware, including keyloggers, spyware, and botnets. A renamed AutoIt executable is particularly suspicious.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1665463817130725378?s=12&t=C0_T_re0wRP_NfKa27Xw9w
    - https://www.autoitscript.com/site/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /AutoIt3ExecuteScript'
            - ' /ErrorStdOut'
    selection_2:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=FDC554B3A8683918D731685855683DDF'  # AutoIt v2 - doesn't cover all binaries
            - 'IMPHASH=CD30A61B60B3D60CECDB034C8C83C290'  # AutoIt v2 - doesn't cover all binaries
            - 'IMPHASH=F8A00C72F2D667D2EDBB234D0C0AE000'  # AutoIt v3 - doesn't cover all binaries
    selection_3:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'AutoIt3.exe'
            - 'AutoIt2.exe'
            - 'AutoIt.exe'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AutoIt.exe'
            - '\AutoIt2.exe'
            - '\AutoIt3_x64.exe'
            - '\AutoIt3.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SharePoint ToolShell CVE-2025-53770 Exploitation - Web IIS
id: 48d053db-6a56-4866-b60d-0975647050ed
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects access to vulnerable SharePoint components potentially being exploited in CVE-2025-53770 through IIS web server logs.
    CVE-2025-53770 is a zero-day vulnerability in SharePoint that allows remote code execution.
references:
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_sharepoint-incidentresponse-windowssecurity-activity-7352653907363303425-bL2f
    - https://research.eye.security/sharepoint-under-siege/
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/07/customer-guidance-for-sharepoint-vulnerability-cve-2025-53770/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025-53770
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver # IIS web server logs
detection:
    selection_exploit_post:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem|contains: '/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'DisplayMode=Edit&a=/ToolPane.aspx'
    selection_exploit_get:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem|contains: '/_layouts/15/spinstall0.aspx'
    selection_referer:
        cs-referer|contains: '/_layouts/SignOut.aspx'
    condition: 1 of selection_exploit_* and selection_referer
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script
id: 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
related:
    - id: 7aa4e81a-a65c-4e10-9f81-b200eb229d7d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_bin_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'toolbox-cmd.exe'
    selection_bin_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' script '
            - ' set '
    selection_susp_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
id: ed965133-513f-41d9-a441-e38076a0798f
related:
    - id: 3d304fda-78aa-43ed-975c-d740798a49c1
      type: derived
    - id: bbb80e91-5746-4fbe-8898-122e2cafdbf4
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-12
modified: 2023-01-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_encoded:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -ec '
    selection_hidden:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -window hidden '
            - ' -windowstyle hidden '
            - ' -w 1 '
    selection_noninteractive:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -noni '
            - ' -noninteractive '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
id: cc08d590-8b90-413a-aff6-31d1a99678d7
status: test
description: Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
references:
    - https://windows-internals.com/printdemon-cve-2020-1048/
author: EagleEye Team, Florian Roth
date: 2020-05-13
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - cve.2020-1048
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Add-PrinterPort -Name'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.bat'
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Generic / Text Only'
    condition: (selection1 and selection2) or selection3
falsepositives:
    - New printer port install on host
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Access to LSASS with Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs
id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd
related:
    - id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious process access to LSASS.exe from processes located in uncommon locations with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace.
    These DLLs contain functions like MiniDumpWriteDump that can be abused for credential dumping purposes. While modern tools like Mimikatz have moved to using ntdll.dll,
    dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll are still used by basic credential dumping utilities and legacy tools for LSASS memory access and process suspension techniques.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpwritedump
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_lsass_calltrace:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'dbgcore.dll'
            - 'dbghelp.dll'
    # The following selection is commented out and not enabled by default because any access to LSASS with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace from uncommon locations is assumed to be suspicious,
    # but it may reduce false positives if the rule is too noisy. These GrantedAccess bits are commonly used for dumping LSASS memory.
    # Uncomment if you observe false positives with the default rule.
    # selection_granted_access:
    #     GrantedAccess|contains:
    #         - '0x1fffff'
    #         - '0x10'
    #         - '0x1010'
    #         - '0x1410'
    #         - '0x1438'
    selection_susp_location:
        SourceImage|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Documents\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Possibly during software installation or update processes
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml

title: Suspicious Splwow64 Without Params
id: 1f1a8509-2cbb-44f5-8751-8e1571518ce2
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1429401053229891590?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\splwow64.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'splwow64.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high