Sigma rules: 07

title: Admin User Remote Logon
id: 0f63e1ef-1eb9-4226-9d54-8927ca08520a
status: test
description: Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern).
references:
    - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-005
author: juju4
date: 2017-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.001
    - attack.t1078.002
    - attack.t1078.003
    - car.2016-04-005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character. ex: "Admin-*"), internal policy mandating use only as secondary account'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 10
        AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
        TargetUserName|startswith: 'Admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity.
level: low

title: ADS Zone.Identifier Deleted By Uncommon Application
id: 3109530e-ab47-4cc6-a953-cac5ebcc93ae
related:
    - id: 7eac0a16-5832-4e81-865f-0268a6d19e4b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the "Zone.Identifier" ADS by an uncommon process. Attackers can leverage this in order to bypass security restrictions that make use of the ADS such as Microsoft Office apps.
references:
    - https://securityliterate.com/how-malware-abuses-the-zone-identifier-to-circumvent-detection-and-analysis/
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-04
modified: 2025-07-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_delete
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':Zone.Identifier'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: in some envs this activity might be performed by other software. Apply additional filters as necessary
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
    filter_optional_browsers_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_browsers_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_browsers_msedge:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Other third party applications not listed.
level: medium

title: App Granted Privileged Delegated Or App Permissions
id: 5aecf3d5-f8a0-48e7-99be-3a759df7358f
related:
    - id: ba2a7c80-027b-460f-92e2-57d113897dbc
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects when administrator grants either application permissions (app roles) or highly privileged delegated permissions
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-28
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Add app role assignment to service principal
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app
level: high

title: CVE-2024-50623 Exploitation Attempt - Cleo
id: f007b877-02e3-45b7-8501-1b78c2864029
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects exploitation attempt of Cleo's CVE-2024-50623 by looking for a "cmd.exe" process spawning from the Celo software suite with suspicious Powershell commandline.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild
author: Tanner Filip, Austin Worline, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
date: 2024-12-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2024-50623
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\javaw.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'Harmony'
            - 'lexicom'
            - 'VersaLex'
            - 'VLTrader'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand'
            - '.Download'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Exports Critical Registry Keys To a File
id: 82880171-b475-4201-b811-e9c826cd5eaa
related:
    - id: f0e53e89-8d22-46ea-9db5-9d4796ee2f8a
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the export of a crital Registry key to a file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -E '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hklm'
            - 'hkey_local_machine'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '\system'
            - '\sam'
            - '\security'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation
level: high

title: HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager DLL Load
id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d
related:
    - id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be # Process Creation
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
author: Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description|contains: 'st2stager'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: JAMF MDM Potential Suspicious Child Process
id: 2316929c-01aa-438c-970f-099145ab1ee6
status: test
description: Detects potential suspicious child processes of "jamf". Could be a sign of potential abuse of Jamf as a C2 server as seen by Typhon MythicAgent.
references:
    - https://github.com/MythicAgents/typhon/
    - https://www.zoocoup.org/casper/jamf_cheatsheet.pdf
    - https://docs.jamf.com/10.30.0/jamf-pro/administrator-guide/Components_Installed_on_Managed_Computers.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/jamf'
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Add additional binaries/commands that are uncommon during your typical admin usage of Jamf
            - '/bash'
            - '/sh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate execution of custom scripts or commands by Jamf administrators. Apply additional filters accordingly
level: medium

title: Kerberos ticket without a trailing $ (CVE-2021-42278/42287)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to spoof the SAM account name of a a domain controller in order to impersonate it. Vulnerability comes from that computer accounts should have a trailing $ in their name (i.e. sAMAccountName attribute) but no validation process existed until the patch was released. During the offensive phase, attacker will create and rename the sAMAccountName of a computer account to look like the one of a domain controller.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1558-Steal%20or%20Forge%20Kerberos%20Tickets
- https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/samaccountname-spoofing
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008380-authentication-updates-cve-2021-42287-9dafac11-e0d0-4cb8-959a-143bd0201041
- https://github.com/WazeHell/sam-the-admin
- https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac
- https://github.com/ly4k/Pachine
- https://cloudbrothers.info/en/exploit-kerberos-samaccountname-spoofing/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1558 # forged ticket
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068 # exploitation for privilege escalation
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_tgt:
    EventID: 4768
    Status: 0x0 # Success
    ServiceSid|endswith: '-502' # Krbtgt account SID
    #TargetUserName.lower() == Computer.split(".")[0].lower() # normal behavior would be that TargetUsername and Computer are different (DC01$ and DC01.domain.lan). Having both matching is suspicious.

  selection_tgs:
    EventID: 4769
    Status: 0x0 # Success
    ServiceName|endswith: $
    #TargetUserName.split("@")[0].lower() == Computer.split(".")[0].lower() # normal behavior would be that TargetUsername and Computer are different (DC01$@domain.lan vs DC01.domain.lan). Having both matching is suspicious.

  selection_host:
    TargetUserName|contains: "$"

  condition: (selection_tgt or selection_tgs) and not selection_host
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Massive group membership changes detected
name: massive_group_changes
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker will add a compromised account into different domain groups in order to gain access to all the assets under the control of those concerned groups.
references:
  - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added
      - 4732 # local and domain local group member added
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Automatic scripts, provisionning accounts
level: medium

---
title: Massive group membership changes detected Count
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - massive_group_changes # Referenced here
  group-by:
    - SubjectUserSid
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 20
    field: TargetSid # Count how many different groups had a member added in a short period by the same user
level: high

title: Massive remote schedule task creation via named pipes (CrackMapExec with ATexec)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker remotely creates a scheduled task on multiple hosts over named pipes to execute commands or elevate privileges.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1053.005-Scheduled%20Task
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/atexec.py
- https://u0041.co/blog/post/1
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1053.005
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\IPC$'
    RelativeTargetName: atsvc
    AccessList|contains: '%%4417' # WriteData
  condition: selection | count(Computer) by IpAddress > 20
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity, backup solutions
level: medium

title: Mesh Agent Service Installation
id: e0d1ad53-c7eb-48ec-a87a-72393cc6cedc
status: test
description: Detects a Mesh Agent service installation. Mesh Agent is used to remotely manage computers
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-28
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_root:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service:
        - ImagePath|contains: 'MeshAgent.exe'
        - ServiceName|contains: 'Mesh Agent'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the tool
level: medium

title: Modify System Firewall
id: 323ff3f5-0013-4847-bbd4-250b5edb62cc
related:
    - id: 53059bc0-1472-438b-956a-7508a94a91f0
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the removal of system firewall rules. Adversaries may only delete or modify a specific system firewall rule to bypass controls limiting network usage or access.
    Detection rules that match only on the disabling of firewalls will miss this.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html
    - https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack
    - https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/getting-started-with-nftables_configuring-and-managing-networking
author: IAI
date: 2023-03-06
modified: 2025-10-12
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection1:
        type: 'EXECVE'
        a0: 'iptables'
        a1|contains: 'DROP'
    selection2:
        type: 'EXECVE'
        a0: 'firewall-cmd'
        a1|contains: 'remove'
    selection3:
        type: 'EXECVE'
        a0: 'ufw'
        a1|contains: 'delete'
    selection4:
        type: 'EXECVE'
        a0: 'nft'
        a1|contains:
            - 'delete'
            - 'flush'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin activity
level: medium

title: New AWS Lambda Function URL Configuration Created
id: ec541962-c05a-4420-b9ea-84de072d18f4
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects when a user creates a Lambda function URL configuration, which could be used to expose the function to the internet and potentially allow unauthorized access to the function's IAM role for AWS API calls.
    This could give an adversary access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/API_CreateFunctionUrlConfig.html
    - https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-lambda-privesc
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/how-to-set-secure-defaults-on-aws
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2024-12-19
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: lambda.amazonaws.com
        eventName: 'CreateFunctionUrlConfig'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Creating a Lambda function URL configuration may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Creating a Lambda function URL configuration from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: New Network Trace Capture Started Via Netsh.EXE
id: d3c3861d-c504-4c77-ba55-224ba82d0118
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture
references:
    - https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/canberrapfe/2012/03/30/capture-a-network-trace-without-installing-anything-capture-a-network-trace-of-a-reboot/
    - https://klausjochem.me/2016/02/03/netsh-the-cyber-attackers-tool-of-choice/
author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1040
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'trace'
            - 'start'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: medium

title: Non-DLL Extension File Renamed With DLL Extension
id: bbfd974c-248e-4435-8de6-1e938c79c5c1
status: test
description: |
    Detects rename operations of files with non-DLL extensions to files with a DLL extension. This is often performed by malware in order to avoid initial detections based on extensions.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1481672378639912960
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1036/T1036.md#atomic-test-1---system-file-copied-to-unusual-location
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-19
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.008
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_rename
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File Provider with at least the KERNEL_FILE_KEYWORD_RENAME_SETLINK_PATH keyword'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    filter_main_dll:
        # Note: To avoid file renames
        SourceFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    filter_main_installers:
        SourceFilename|endswith: '.tmp'
    filter_main_empty_source:
        SourceFilename: ''
    filter_main_null_source:
        SourceFilename: null
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|contains: ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_main_upgrade:
        - Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe'
        - TargetFilename|contains: ':\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
    filter_optional_squirrel:
        SourceFilename|contains: '\SquirrelTemp\temp'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely from installers and temporary locations
level: medium

title: NTFS hard link creation
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to create a hard link.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4664
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.009 # Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4664
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- admin activity on file server
level: medium

title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential CVE-2021-26084 Exploitation Attempt
id: 38825179-3c78-4fed-b222-2e2166b926b1
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2021-260841 a Confluence RCE using OGNL injection
references:
    - https://github.com/TesterCC/exp_poc_library/blob/be61622600ec79d8fba2fa5f816a870715f0cb3b/exp_poc/CVE-2021-26084_Confluence_OGNL_injection/CVE-2021-26084.md
    - https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/62d3751945289d088ccfdf4d0ffbf61598a2cd7d/Confluence-RCE.md
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html
    - https://mraddon.blog/2017/03/20/confluence-trick-to-create-pages-from-blueprint-templates/
author: Sittikorn S, Nuttakorn T
date: 2022-12-13
modified: 2023-03-24
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-26084
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
    definition: 'Requirements: The POST request body data must be collected in order to make use of certain parts of this detection'
detection:
    selection_main:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        sc-status: 200
        cs-username: 'anonymous' # This string is used to reduce possible FP you could remove it to get authenticated attempts
    selection_exploit_1:
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/pages/createpage-entervariables.action'
            - 'SpaceKey=x' # This URI assume that you can't have a space ID of "X"
    selection_exploit_2_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/doenterpagevariables.action'
    selection_exploit_2_keyword:
        - 'u0027' # This string should appear in the post body as a value of the parameter "queryString"
    condition: selection_main and (selection_exploit_1 or all of selection_exploit_2_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Data Exfiltration Activity Via CommandLine Tools
id: 7d1aaf3d-4304-425c-b7c3-162055e0b3ab
status: test
description: Detects the use of various CLI utilities exfiltrating data via web requests
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-02
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_iwr:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'curl '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'irm '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'wget '
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -ur' # Shortest possible version of the -uri flag
            - ' -me' # Shortest possible version of the -method flag
            - ' -b'
            - ' POST '
    selection_curl:
        Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--ur' # Shortest possible version of the --uri flag
    selection_curl_data:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -d ' # Shortest possible version of the --data flag
            - ' --data '
    selection_wget:
        Image|endswith: '\wget.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '--post-data'
            - '--post-file'
    payloads:
        - CommandLine|re:
              - 'net\s+view'
              - 'sc\s+query'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'Get-Content'
              - 'GetBytes'
              - 'hostname'
              - 'ifconfig'
              - 'ipconfig'
              - 'netstat'
              - 'nltest'
              - 'qprocess'
              - 'systeminfo'
              - 'tasklist'
              - 'ToBase64String'
              - 'whoami'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'type '
              - ' > '
              - ' C:\'
    condition: (selection_iwr or all of selection_curl* or selection_wget) and payloads
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_data_exfiltration_via_cli/info.yml

title: Potential Exploitation Attempt Of Undocumented WindowsServer RCE
id: 6d5b8176-d87d-4402-8af4-53aee9db7b5d
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation attempt of undocumented Windows Server Pre Auth Remote Code Execution (RCE)
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/3946
    - https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/1616455335203438592?s=20
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2023-01-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '-k DHCPServer'
        CommandLine|contains: '-k DHCPServer'
        User|contains: # Covers many language settings for Network Service. Please expand.
            - 'NETWORK SERVICE'
            - 'NETZWERKDIENST'
            - 'SERVIZIO DI RETE'
            - 'SERVICIO DE RED'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Sideloading
id: 844f8eb2-610b-42c8-89a4-47596e089663
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "ShellDispatch.dll"
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/06/07/this-lolbin-doesnt-exist/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\ShellDispatch.dll'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers may trigger some false positives
level: medium

title: PUA - System Informer Driver Load
id: 10cb6535-b31d-4512-9962-513dcbc42cc1
related:
    - id: 67add051-9ee7-4ad3-93ba-42935615ae8d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects driver load of the System Informer tool
references:
    - https://systeminformer.sourceforge.io/
    - https://github.com/winsiderss/systeminformer
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\SystemInformer.sys'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'SHA256=8B9AD98944AC9886EA4CB07700E71B78BE4A2740934BB7E46CA3B56A7C59AD24'
              - 'SHA256=A41348BEC147CA4D9EA2869817527EB5CEA2E20202AF599D2B30625433BCF454'
              - 'SHA256=38EE0A88AF8535A11EFE8D8DA9C6812AA07067B75A64D99705A742589BDD846D'
              - 'SHA256=A773891ACF203A7EB0C0D30942FB1347648F1CD918AE2BFD9A4857B4DCF5081B'
              - 'SHA256=4C3B81AC88A987BBDF7D41FA0AECC2CEDF5B9BD2F45E7A21F376D05345FC211D'
              - 'SHA256=3241BC14BEC51CE6A691B9A3562E5C1D52E9D057D27A3D67FD0B245C350B6D34'
              - 'SHA256=047C42E9BBA28366868847C7DAFC1E043FB038C796422D37220493517D68EE89'
              - 'SHA256=18931DC81E95D0020466FA091E16869DBE824E543A4C2C8FE644FA71A0F44FEB'
              - 'SHA256=B4C2EF76C204273132FDE38F0DED641C2C5EE767652E64E4C4071A4A973B6C1B'
              - 'SHA256=640954AFC268565F7DAA6E6F81A8EE05311E33E34332B501A3C3FE5B22ADEA97'
              - 'SHA256=251BE949F662C838718F8AA0A5F8211FB90346D02BD63FF91E6B224E0E01B656'
              - 'SHA256=E2606F272F7BA054DF16BE464FDA57211EF0D14A0D959F9C8DCB0575DF1186E4'
              - 'SHA256=3A9E1D17BEEB514F1B9B3BACAEE7420285DE5CBDCE89C5319A992C6CBD1DE138'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System Informer is regularly used legitimately by system administrators or developers. Apply additional filters accordingly
level: medium

title: Python SQL Exceptions
id: 19aefed0-ffd4-47dc-a7fc-f8b1425e84f9
status: stable
description: Generic rule for SQL exceptions in Python according to PEP 249
references:
    - https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0249/#exceptions
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-12
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: python
detection:
    keywords:
        - DataError
        - IntegrityError
        - ProgrammingError
        - OperationalError
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: RDP discovery performed on multiple hosts
name: rdp_discovery_multiple_host
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to discover active RDP services via tools like Hydra. Note that this event doesn't provide any information about login outcome (success or failure) as well as user information. For further correlation, ID 4624/4625 (logon type 3, 7 or 10) as well as ID 1149 should be used.
references:
  - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1046-Network%20Service%20Scanning
  - https://github.com/mehranexpert/Crazy-RDP
  - https://github.com/3gstudent/SharpRDPCheck
  - https://ponderthebits.com/2018/02/windows-rdp-related-event-logs-identification-tracking-and-investigation/
  - https://purerds.org/remote-desktop-security/auditing-remote-desktop-services-logon-failures-1/
  - http://woshub.com/rdp-connection-logs-forensics-windows/
  - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/mstsc.htm
  - https://github.com/AndrewRathbun/DFIRMindMaps/tree/main/OSArtifacts/Windows/RDP_Authentication_Artifacts
  - https://github.com/TonyPhipps/SIEM/blob/master/Notable-Event-IDs.md#microsoft-windows-remotedesktopservices-rdpcoretsoperational
  - https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2019/02/15/rdp-event-log-dfir/
  - https://nullsec.us/windows-event-id-1029-hashes/
  - https://www.13cubed.com/downloads/rdp_flowchart.pdf
  - https://nullsec.us/windows-rdp-related-event-logs-the-client-side-of-the-story/
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1046 # network service scanning
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1110 # brutforce
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.001 # remote services: RDP
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: rdp
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 131 # The server accepted a new TCP connection from client <ip>:<port>.
    Channel: Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational
  filter:
    IpAddress: # In ID 131, IP address is provided in "ClientIP.split(":")[0]
      - "%vulnerability_scanners%"
      - "%admin_jump_hosts%"
      - "127.0.0.1"
      - "::1"
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - VAS scanners, administrator jump host
level: high

---
title: RDP discovery performed on multiple hosts Count
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - rdp_discovery_multiple_host # Referenced here
  group-by:
    - IpAddress
  timespan: 5m
  condition:
    gte: 20
    field: Computer # Count of many computer are reporting connection attemps from a single source IP
level: high

title: RegAsm.EXE Initiating Network Connection To Public IP
id: 0531e43a-d77d-47c2-b89f-5fe50321c805
status: test
description: Detects "RegAsm.exe" initiating a network connection to public IP adresses
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/ec207948-4916-47eb-a0f4-4c6abb2e7668/
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
author: frack113
date: 2024-04-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.009
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\regasm.exe'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Unsigned Kernel Extension Load Attempt
id: 7e7a1a47-45dd-4f97-8205-1d6aea67f682
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to load unsigned kernel extensions which may indicate
  rootkit installation or malicious kernel-level access
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x4B.html
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/29
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1547.006
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
  category: kernel_extension
detection:
  selection:
    esf.event_type: 17
    event.action: kextload
  filter_signed:
    TeamID: '*'
  condition: selection and not filter_signed
falsepositives:
- Legitimate unsigned kexts in development environments
- Testing scenarios
level: critical
modified: 2025/01/15

title: Windows traffic capture abuse
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker use the native Windows sniffer in order to capture sensitive information or credentials.
references:
- https://bakerstreetforensics.com/2022/01/07/quickpcap-capturing-a-pcap-with-powershell/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1040 # Network Sniffing 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all: # full command : 'netsh trace start capture=yes IPv4.Address=192.168.1.167 '
      - netsh
      - start
      - capture
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator network troubleshooting
level: medium