Sigma rules: 08

title: AWS GuardDuty Important Change
id: 6e61ee20-ce00-4f8d-8aee-bedd8216f7e3
status: test
description: Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/guardduty__whitelist_ip/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-11
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_source:
        eventSource: guardduty.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateIPSet
    condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
    - Valid change in the GuardDuty (e.g. to ignore internal scanners)
level: high

title: Bitbucket Secret Scanning Rule Deleted
id: ff91e3f0-ad15-459f-9a85-1556390c138d
status: test
description: Detects when secret scanning rule is deleted for the project or repository.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/secret-scanning-1157471613.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Basic" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category:
            - 'Projects'
            - 'Repositories'
        auditType.action:
            - 'Project secret scanning rule deleted'
            - 'Repository secret scanning rule deleted'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user activity.
level: low

title: Bypass UAC Using Event Viewer
id: 674202d0-b22a-4af4-ae5f-2eda1f3da1af
status: test
description: Bypasses User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-1---bypass-uac-using-event-viewer-cmd
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.010
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '_Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command\(Default)'
    filter:
        Details|startswith: '%SystemRoot%\system32\mmc.exe "%1" %'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_eventviewer/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)
      technique: T1548.002
      atomic_guid: 5073adf8-9a50-4bd9-b298-a9bd2ead8af9

title: CVE-2023-1389 Potential Exploitation Attempt - Unauthenticated Command Injection In TP-Link Archer AX21
id: 6c7defa9-69f8-4c34-b815-41fce3931754
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-1389 an Unauthenticated Command Injection in TP-Link Archer AX21.
references:
    - https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2023-11
    - https://github.com/Voyag3r-Security/CVE-2023-1389/blob/4ecada7335b17bf543c0e33b2c9fb6b6215c09ae/archer-rev-shell.py
    - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2023/4/21/tp-link-wan-side-vulnerability-cve-2023-1389-added-to-the-mirai-botnet-arsenal
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Rohit Jain
date: 2024-06-25
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2023-1389
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-method:
            - 'GET'
            - 'POST'
        cs-uri|contains|all:
            - '/cgi-bin/luci/;stok=/locale'
            - 'form=country'
    selection_keyword:
        - 'operation=write'
        - 'country=$('
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability Scanners
level: medium

title: CVE-2023-22518 Exploitation Attempt - Vulnerable Endpoint Connection (Proxy)
id: 27d2cdde-9778-490e-91ec-9bd0be6e8cc6
related:
    - id: a902d249-9b9c-4dc4-8fd0-fbe528ef965c
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-22518 (Confluence Data Center / Confluence Server), where an attacker can exploit vulnerable endpoints to e.g. create admin accounts and execute arbitrary commands.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22518-improper-authorization-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-server-1311473907.html
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/confluence-to-cerber-exploitation-of-cve-2023-22518-for-ransomware-deployment
    - https://github.com/ForceFledgling/CVE-2023-22518
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-11-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2023-22518
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_method:
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_uris:
        cs-uri|contains:
          # Exploitable endpoints
            - '/json/setup-restore-local.action'
            - '/json/setup-restore-progress.action'
            - '/json/setup-restore.action'
            - '/server-info.action'
            - '/setup/setupadministrator.action'
    selection_status:
        # Response code may be indicative of exploitation success, but is not always the case
        sc-status:
            - 200
            - 302
            - 405
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability scanners
level: medium

title: CVE-2024-49113 Exploitation Attempt - LDAP Nightmare
id: 3f2c93c7-7b2a-4d58-bb8d-6f39422d8148
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-49113 known as LDAP Nightmare, based on "Application Error" log where the faulting application is "lsass.exe" and the faulting module is "WLDAP32.dll".
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/travisbgreen/82b68bac499edbe0b17dcbfa0c5c71b7
    - https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7282295814792605698/
author: Samuel Monsempes
date: 2025-01-08
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499
    - cve.2024-49113
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        Data|contains|all:
            - 'lsass.exe'
            - 'WLDAP32.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Data Copied To Clipboard Via Clip.EXE
id: ddeff553-5233-4ae9-bbab-d64d2bd634be
status: test
description: Detects the execution of clip.exe in order to copy data to the clipboard. Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1115/T1115.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-27
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1115
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\clip.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: clip.exe
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_clip_execution/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from
      technique: T1115
      atomic_guid: 0cd14633-58d4-4422-9ede-daa2c9474ae7

title: Data Export From MSSQL Table Via BCP.EXE
id: c615d676-f655-46b9-b913-78729021e5d7
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of the BCP utility in order to export data from the database.
    Attackers were seen saving their malware to a database column or table and then later extracting it via "bcp.exe" into a file.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/bcp-utility
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/61000/
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/78944/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/attacking-mssql-servers
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/attacking-mssql-servers-pt-ii
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/08/07/sophos-mdr-hunt-tracks-mimic-ransomware-campaign-against-organizations-in-india/
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe), MahirAli Khan (in/mahiralikhan), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-08-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bcp.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'BCP.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' out ' # Export data from a table
            - ' queryout ' # Export data based on a SQL query
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate data export operations.
level: medium

title: DNS Query To Put.io - DNS Client
id: 8b69fd42-9dad-4674-abef-7fdef43ef92a
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to "Put.io" sharing website.
references:
    - https://darkatlas.io/blog/medusa-ransomware-group-opsec-failure
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: dns-client
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events.'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3008
        QueryName|contains:
            - 'api.put.io'
            - 'upload.put.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Put.io
level: medium

title: Driver Load From A Temporary Directory
id: 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
status: test
description: Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains: '\Temp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
level: high

title: File Deletion
id: 30aed7b6-d2c1-4eaf-9382-b6bc43e50c57
status: stable
description: Detects file deletion using "rm", "shred" or "unlink" commands which are used often by adversaries to delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.md
author: Ömer Günal, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-07
modified: 2022-09-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rm'     # covers /rmdir as well
            - '/shred'
            - '/unlink'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: informational

title: Firewall Rule Deleted Via Netsh.EXE
id: 1a5fefe6-734f-452e-a07d-fc1c35bce4b2
status: test
description: Detects the removal of a port or application rule in the Windows Firewall configuration using netsh
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/8bbd5b4c-b82d-4e6d-a3ea-d454594a37cc/
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-14
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'firewall'
            - 'delete '
    filter_optional_dropbox:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Dropbox.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'name=Dropbox'
    filter_optional_avast:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\instup.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'advfirewall firewall delete rule name="Avast Antivirus Admin Client"'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
    - Software installations and removal
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_delete_rule/info.yml

title: HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution
id: f376c8a7-a2d0-4ddc-aa0c-16c17236d962
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools
references:
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.001
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Product|contains: 'SharpHound'
        - Description|contains: 'SharpHound'
        - Company|contains:
              - 'SpecterOps'
              - 'evil corp'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\Bloodhound.exe'
              - '\SharpHound.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -CollectionMethod All '
            - ' --CollectionMethods Session '
            - ' --Loop --Loopduration '
            - ' --PortScanTimeout '
            - '.exe -c All -d '
            - 'Invoke-Bloodhound'
            - 'Get-BloodHoundData'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -JsonFolder '
            - ' -ZipFileName '
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' DCOnly '
            - ' --NoSaveCache '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Other programs that use these command line option and accepts an 'All' parameter
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_bloodhound_sharphound/info.yml

title: Hiding User Account Via SpecialAccounts Registry Key - CommandLine
id: 9ec9fb1b-e059-4489-9642-f270c207923d
related:
    - id: f8aebc67-a56d-4ec9-9fbe-7b0e8b7b4efd
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide user account from being listed on the logon screen.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/01/29/buzzing-on-christmas-eve-trigona-ransomware-in-3-hours/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/04/01/from-onenote-to-ransomnote-an-ice-cold-intrusion/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/04/29/from-icedid-to-dagon-locker-ransomware-in-29-days/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
date: 2022-05-14
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList'
            - 'add'
            - '/v'
            - '/d 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administrator activities
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_registry_special_accounts_hide_user/info.yml

title: ISATAP Router Address Was Set
id: d22df9cd-2aee-4089-93c7-9dc4eae77f2c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the configuration of a new ISATAP router on a Windows host. While ISATAP is a legitimate Microsoft technology for IPv6 transition, unexpected or unauthorized ISATAP router configurations could indicate a potential IPv6 DNS Takeover attack using tools like mitm6.
    In such attacks, adversaries advertise themselves as DHCPv6 servers and set malicious ISATAP routers to intercept traffic.
    This detection should be correlated with network baselines and known legitimate ISATAP deployments in your environment.
references:
    - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/mitm6-strikes-again-the-dark-side-of-ipv6/
    - https://redfoxsec.com/blog/ipv6-dns-takeover/
    - https://www.securityhq.com/blog/malicious-isatap-tunneling-unearthed-on-windows-server/
    - https://medium.com/@ninnesoturan/detecting-ipv6-dns-takeover-a54a6a88be1f
author: hamid
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.t1565.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4100
        Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-Iphlpsvc'
    filter_main_localhost:
        IsatapRouter:
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - '::1'
    filter_optional_null:
        IsatapRouter: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ISATAP router configuration in enterprise environments
    - IPv6 transition projects and network infrastructure changes
    - Network administrators configuring dual-stack networking
    - Automatic ISATAP configuration in some Windows deployments
level: medium

title: Kapeka Backdoor Scheduled Task Creation
id: 6c130acd-0adb-4545-bcc4-2e85d0883c9a
related:
    - id: 64a871dd-83f6-4e5f-80fc-5a7ca3a8a819
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Kapeka backdoor scheduled task creation based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bd07fb1e9b4768e7202de6cc454c78c6891270af02085c51fce5539db1386c3f/behavior
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to trigger this detection.'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4698
    selection_paths:
        TaskContent|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
    selection_command:
        TaskContent|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.wll'
            - '#1'
    selection_taskname:
        TaskContent|contains:
            - 'OneDrive' # The scheduled task was called “OneDrive” instead of “Sens Api” in some cases
            - 'Sens Api'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASS
id: 4a1b6da0-d94f-4fc3-98fc-2d9cb9e5ee76
status: test
description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Roberto Rodriguez, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - car.2019-04-004
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_1:
        EventID: 4656 # A handle to an object was requested.
        ObjectName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessMask|contains:
            - '0x40'
            - '0x1400'
            # - '0x1000'  # minimum access requirements to query basic info from service
            - '0x100000'
            - '0x1410'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1010'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1438'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x143a'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1418'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1f0fff'
            - '0x1f1fff'
            - '0x1f2fff'
            - '0x1f3fff'
    selection_2:
        EventID: 4663 # An attempt was made to access an object
        ObjectName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessList|contains:
            - '4484'
            - '4416'
    filter_main_specific:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\GamingServices.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
            - '\minionhost.exe'  # Cyberreason
            - '\MRT.exe'         # MS Malware Removal Tool
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'     # Defender
            - '\perfmon.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskmgr.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'        # THOR
            - '\thor64.exe'      # THOR
            - '\vmtoolsd.exe'
            - '\VsTskMgr.exe'    # McAfee Enterprise
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - 'RtkAudUService64' # https://medium.com/falconforce/the-curious-case-of-realtek-and-lsass-33fc0c8482ff
        ProcessName|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - ':\Windows\SysNative\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWow64\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
    filter_main_generic:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Program Files'  # too many false positives with legitimate AV and EDR solutions
    filter_main_exact:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - ':\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe'
    filter_main_sysmon:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
            - ':\Windows\Sysmon64a.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_aurora:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent-sc\aurora\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\aurora-agent-64.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_scenarioengine:
        # Example: C:\a70de9569c3a5aa22184ef52a890177b\x64\SCENARIOENGINE.EXE
        ProcessName|endswith: '\x64\SCENARIOENGINE.EXE'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_avira1:
        ProcessName|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\is-'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\avira_system_speedup.tmp'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_avira2:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\avira_speedup_setup_update.tmp'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_snmp:
        ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\snmp.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_googleupdate:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\SystemTemp\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\GoogleUpdate.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_optional_procmon:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon64a.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; update the whitelist with it
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Cabinet File Expansion
id: 9f107a84-532c-41af-b005-8d12a607639f
status: test
description: Detects the expansion or decompression of cabinet files from potentially suspicious or uncommon locations, e.g. seen in Iranian MeteorExpress related attacks
references:
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/meteorexpress-mysterious-wiper-paralyzes-iranian-trains-with-epic-troll
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/
author: Bhabesh Raj, X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2024-11-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\expand.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-F:'
    selection_folders_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Admin$\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\C$\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    filter_optional_dell:
        # Launched by Dell ServiceShell.exe
        ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\ServiceShell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\ProgramData\Dell\UpdateService\Temp\'
    condition: selection_cmd and 1 of selection_folders_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - System administrator Usage
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService
id: 9e4b7d3a-6f2c-4e9a-8d1b-3c5e7a9f2b4d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process.
    The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features.
    While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2026-02-19
references:
    - https://kostas-ts.medium.com/detecting-abuse-of-openedrs-permissive-edr-trial-a-security-researcher-s-perspective-fc55bf53972c
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.t1219
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_process:
        Image|endswith: '\COMODO\Endpoint Manager\ITSMService.exe'
    selection_suspicious_extensions:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.7z'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.pif'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scr'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate OpenEDR file management operations
    - Authorized remote file uploads by IT administrators
    - Software deployment through OpenEDR console
level: medium

title: PUA - Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) Execution
id: e76ca062-4de0-4d79-8d90-160a0d335eca
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) tool.
    KDU can be used to bypass driver signature enforcement and load unsigned or malicious drivers into the Windows kernel.
    Potentially allowing for privilege escalation, persistence, or evasion of security controls.
references:
    - https://github.com/h4rmy/KDU
    - https://huntress.com/blog/esxi-vm-escape-exploit
author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress)
date: 2026-01-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\kdu.exe'
              - '\hamakaze.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'hamakaze.exe'
    selection_cli_suspicious:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-map ' # map driver to the kernel and execute it entry point
            - '-prv ' # optional, select vulnerability driver provider
            - '-dse ' # write user defined value to the system DSE state flags; dse=0(disable),dse=1(enable)
            - '-ps ' #  modify process object of given ProcessID;
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate driver development, testing, or administrative troubleshooting (e.g., enabling/disabling hardware)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_kdu_driver_tool/info.yml

title: Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel
id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9
related:
    - id: 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed.
    Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327
author: '@Kostastsale'
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Excel\Security'
            - 'PythonFunctionWarnings'
        CommandLine|contains: ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses
id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5
related:
    - id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 # PS Classic
      type: similar
    - id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 # PS Module
      type: similar
    - id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 # PS ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-13
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand'
            - 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisableme'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_remotefxvgpudisablement_abuse/info.yml

title: Renamed Sysinternals Sdelete Execution
id: c1d867fe-8d95-4487-aab4-e53f2d339f90
status: test
description: Detects the use of a renamed SysInternals Sdelete, which is something an administrator shouldn't do (the renaming)
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'sdelete.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\sdelete.exe'
            - '\sdelete64.exe'
            - '\sdelete64a.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - System administrator usage
level: high

title: Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory
id: 32b96012-7892-429e-b26c-ac2bf46066ff
status: test
description: Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/red-curl-2.html
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'Control_RunDLL'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%LocalAppData%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Steganography Hide Files with Steghide
id: ce446a9e-30b9-4483-8e38-d2c9ad0a2280
status: test
description: Detects embedding of files with usage of steghide binary, the adversaries may use this technique to prevent the detection of hidden information.
references:
    - https://vitux.com/how-to-hide-confidential-files-in-images-on-debian-using-steganography/
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-09-11
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: EXECVE
        a0: steghide
        a1: embed
        a2:
            - '-cf'
            - '-ef'
        a4:
            - '-cf'
            - '-ef'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Suspicious Unsigned Thor Scanner Execution
id: ea5c131b-380d-49f9-aeb3-920694da4d4b
status: stable
description: Detects loading and execution of an unsigned thor scanner binary.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-29
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    filter_main:
        Signed: 'true'
        SignatureStatus: 'valid'
        Signature: 'Nextron Systems GmbH'
    condition: selection and not filter_main
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate binaries named "thor.exe" that aren't published by Nextron Systems
level: high

title: Turla PNG Dropper Service
id: 1228f8e2-7e79-4dea-b0ad-c91f1d5016c1
status: test
description: This method detects malicious services mentioned in Turla PNG dropper report by NCC Group in November 2018
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/11/22/turla-png-dropper-is-back/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-11-23
modified: 2021-11-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.t1543.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'WerFaultSvc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical