Sigma rules: 09

title: Active Directory honeypot used for lateral movement
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker is using
requirements: ensure that those accounts are "attractive", documented, do not create any breach and cannot be used against your organization.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1087-Account%20discovery
- http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/10/deploy-deception.html
- https://jblog.javelin-networks.com/blog/the-honeypot-buster/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4624
      - 4625
      - 4768
      - 4769
      - 4770
      - 4771
      - 5140
      - 5145
    TargetUserName: '%honeypot_account_list%'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- pentest
level: high

title: Computer Discovery And Export Via Get-ADComputer Cmdlet
id: 435e10e4-992a-4281-96f3-38b11106adde
related:
    - id: db885529-903f-4c5d-9864-28fe199e6370
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-10
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ADComputer '
            - ' -Filter \*'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' > '
            - ' | Select '
            - 'Out-File'
            - 'Set-Content'
            - 'Add-Content'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often
level: medium

title: HAFNIUM Exchange Exploitation Activity
id: bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7
status: test
description: Detects activity observed by different researchers to be HAFNIUM group activity (or related) on Exchange servers
references:
    - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/03/07/exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-and-hafnium/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
    - https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3
    - https://twitter.com/GadixCRK/status/1369313704869834753?s=20
    - https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/1372218235949617161
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-09
modified: 2023-03-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.g0125
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_attrib:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'attrib'
            - ' +h '
            - ' +s '
            - ' +r '
            - '.aspx'
    selection_vsperfmon:
        - Image|contains: '\ProgramData\VSPerfMon\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'schtasks'
              - 'VSPerfMon'
    selection_opera_1:
        Image|endswith: 'Opera_browser.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
    selection_opera_2:
        Image|endswith: 'Users\Public\opera\Opera_browser.exe'
    selection_vssadmin:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'vssadmin list shadows'
            - 'Temp\__output'
    selection_makecab_1:
        Image|endswith: '\makecab.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '.dmp.zip'
    selection_makecab_2:
        Image|endswith: '\makecab.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
            - 'compressionmemory'
            - '.gif'
    selection_7zip:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t7z '
            - 'C:\Programdata\pst'
            - '\it.zip'
    selection_rundll32:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\comsvcs.dll'
            - 'Minidump'
            - 'full '
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot'
    selection_other:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Windows\Temp\xx.bat'
            - 'Windows\WwanSvcdcs'
            - 'Windows\Temp\cw.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: HTTP Logging Disabled On IIS Server
id: e8ebd53a-30c2-45bd-81bb-74befba07bdb
status: test
description: Detects changes to of the IIS server configuration in order to disable HTTP logging for successful requests.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/manage/provisioning-and-managing-iis/configure-logging-in-iis
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/configuration/system.webserver/httplogging
author: frack113
date: 2024-10-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1505.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: iis-configuration
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 29
        Configuration: '/system.webServer/httpLogging/@dontLog'
        NewValue: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Kubernetes Unauthorized or Unauthenticated Access
id: 0d933542-1f1f-420d-97d4-21b2c3c492d9
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a request to the Kubernetes API is rejected due to lack of authorization or due to an expired authentication token being used.
    This may indicate an attacker attempting to leverage credentials they have obtained.
references:
    - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/config-api/apiserver-audit.v1/
    - https://www.datadoghq.com/blog/monitor-kubernetes-audit-logs/#monitor-api-authentication-issues
author: kelnage
date: 2024-04-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: kubernetes
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        responseStatus.code:
            - 401 # Unauthorized
            - 403 # Forbidden
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A misconfigured RBAC policy, a mistake by a valid user, or a wider issue with authentication tokens can also generate these errors.
level: low

title: Modification or Deletion of an AWS RDS Cluster
id: 457cc9ac-d8e6-4d1d-8c0e-251d0f11a74c
status: experimental
description: Detects modifications to an RDS cluster or its deletion, which may indicate potential data exfiltration attempts, unauthorized access, or exposure of sensitive information.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_ModifyDBCluster.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDBCluster.html
    - https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-rds-privesc#rds-modifydbinstance
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2024-12-06
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1020
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
        eventName:
            - ModifyDBCluster
            - DeleteDBCluster
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Verify if the modification or deletion was performed by an authorized administrator.
    - Confirm if the modification or deletion was part of a planned change or maintenance activity.
level: high

title: OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security
id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5 # Registry
      type: similar
    - id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06 # ProcessCreation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_service:
        EventID: 4698
        TaskName:
            - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
            - 'UpdatMachine'
    condition: selection_service
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
id: 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
status: test
description: Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':\Windows\ADFS\bg\inetmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Persistence Via Sudoers.d Files
id: ddb26b76-4447-4807-871f-1b035b2bfa5d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation or modification of files within the "sudoers.d" directory on Linux systems.
    Such activity may indicate an attempt to establish or maintain privilege escalation by granting specific users elevated permissions.
    Unauthorized changes to sudoers files are a common technique used by attackers to persist administrative access.
references:
    - https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/1f1c3e0958af8ad9f6ebe10ab442e75de33e91de/apps/deployer.sh
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-05
modified: 2026-03-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1548.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: '/etc/sudoers.d/'
    filter_main_dpkg:
        Image|endswith: '/usr/bin/dpkg'
        TargetFilename: '/etc/sudoers.d/README.dpkg-new'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Creation of legitimate files in sudoers.d folder as part of administrator work
level: medium

title: Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image
id: 584bca0f-3608-4402-80fd-4075ff6072e3
related:
    - id: e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79
      type: similar
    - id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3 # RTLO
      type: similar
    - id: 2c0d2d7b-30d6-4d14-9751-7b9113042ab9
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential commandline obfuscation using unicode characters.
    Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
references:
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md#atomic-test-6---dlp-evasion-via-sensitive-data-in-vba-macro-over-http
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Josh Nickels
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'Cmd.EXE'
            - 'cscript.exe'
            - 'PowerShell.EXE'
            - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
            - 'pwsh.dll'
            - 'wscript.exe'
    selection_special_chars:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # spacing modifier letters that get auto-replaced
            - 'ˣ' # 0x02E3
            - '˪' # 0x02EA
            - 'ˢ' # 0x02E2
            # Forward slash alternatives
            - '∕' # 0x22FF
            - '⁄' # 0x206F
            # Hyphen alternatives
            - '―' # 0x2015
            - '—' # 0x2014
            # Whitespace that don't work as path separator
            - ' ' # 0x00A0
            # Other
            - '¯'
            - '®'
            - '¶'
            # Unicode whitespace characters
            - '⠀' # Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Disk Cleanup Handler - Registry
id: d4f4e0be-cf12-439f-9e25-4e2cdcf7df5a
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker modifies values of the Disk Cleanup Handler in the registry to achieve persistence.
    The disk cleanup manager is part of the operating system. It displays the dialog box […]
    The user has the option of enabling or disabling individual handlers by selecting or clearing their check box in the disk cleanup manager's UI.
    Although Windows comes with a number of disk cleanup handlers, they aren't designed to handle files produced by other applications.
    Instead, the disk cleanup manager is designed to be flexible and extensible by enabling any developer to implement and register their own disk cleanup handler.
    Any developer can extend the available disk cleanup services by implementing and registering a disk cleanup handler.
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/diskcleanuphandler.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/09/02/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-86/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-02-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_add
detection:
    selection:
        EventType: CreateKey
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\VolumeCaches\'
    filter_main_default_keys:
        # Default Keys
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Active Setup Temp Folders'
            - '\BranchCache'
            - '\Content Indexer Cleaner'
            - '\D3D Shader Cache'
            - '\Delivery Optimization Files'
            - '\Device Driver Packages'
            - '\Diagnostic Data Viewer database files'
            - '\Downloaded Program Files'
            - '\DownloadsFolder'
            - '\Feedback Hub Archive log files'
            - '\Internet Cache Files'
            - '\Language Pack'
            - '\Microsoft Office Temp Files'
            - '\Offline Pages Files'
            - '\Old ChkDsk Files'
            - '\Previous Installations'
            - '\Recycle Bin'
            - '\RetailDemo Offline Content'
            - '\Setup Log Files'
            - '\System error memory dump files'
            - '\System error minidump files'
            - '\Temporary Files'
            - '\Temporary Setup Files'
            - '\Temporary Sync Files'
            - '\Thumbnail Cache'
            - '\Update Cleanup'
            - '\Upgrade Discarded Files'
            - '\User file versions'
            - '\Windows Defender'
            - '\Windows Error Reporting Files'
            - '\Windows ESD installation files'
            - '\Windows Upgrade Log Files'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate new entry added by windows
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via New AMSI Providers - Registry
id: 33efc23c-6ea2-4503-8cfe-bdf82ce8f705
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker adds a new AMSI provider via the Windows Registry to bypass AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) protections.
    Attackers may add custom AMSI providers to persist on the system and evade detection by security software that relies on AMSI for scanning scripts and other content.
    This technique is often used in conjunction with fileless malware and script-based attacks to maintain persistence while avoiding detection.
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/amsi.html
    - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/8d767892f3b17eefa4d0668f5d2df78e844f01d8/FakeAMSI/FakeAMSI.c
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2025-10-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\'
            - '\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\x86\RegSvr.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\{FB904E4E-D2C7-4C8D-8492-B620BB9896B1}'
    filter_optional_avg:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\x86\RegSvr.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\{FB904E4E-D2C7-4C8D-8492-B620BB9896B1}'
    filter_optional_avira:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Avira\Endpoint Protection SDK\endpointprotection.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\{00000001-3DCC-4B48-A82E-E2071FE58E05}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate security products adding their own AMSI providers. Filter these according to your environment.
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_amsi_providers/info.yml

title: Potential Privilege Escalation Attempt Via .Exe.Local Technique
id: 07a99744-56ac-40d2-97b7-2095967b0e03
status: test
description: Detects potential privilege escalation attempt via the creation of the "*.Exe.Local" folder inside the "System32" directory in order to sideload "comctl32.dll"
references:
    - https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
    - https://github.com/sailay1996/awesome_windows_logical_bugs/blob/60cbb23a801f4c3195deac1cc46df27c225c3d07/dir_create2system.txt
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Subhash P (@pbssubhash)
date: 2022-12-16
modified: 2022-12-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\logonUI.exe.local'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\werFault.exe.local'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\consent.exe.local'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\narrator.exe.local'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wermgr.exe.local'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\comctl32.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Vcruntime140 DLL Sideloading
id: d7a63acb-1284-49bc-bfea-7771146c8b1c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential DLL sideloading of vcruntime140.dll, a common C++ runtime library.
    Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise of legitimate applications such as SqlWriter, SqlDumper etc.
    Notably, APT29 has been documented leveraging WinELOADER to sideload vcruntime140.dll for executing malicious code.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-wineloader-german-political-parties
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/european-diplomats-targeted-spikedwine-wineloader
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2023/09/15/detecting-janelarat-with-yara-and-thor/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-12
modified: 2026-05-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\vcruntime140.dll'
    filter_main_legitimate_path:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    filter_main_legitimate_signer:
        Signed: true
        SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
        Description|endswith: 'C Runtime Library'
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_vcruntime140/info.yml

title: Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
id: beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
related:
    - id: 9cd55b6c-430a-4fa9-96f4-7cadf5229e9f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
    This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/apt41-world-tour-2021/
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent?view=powershell-7.3
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1
    - http://www.solomonson.com/posts/2010-07-09-reading-eventviewer-command-line/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
    - https://ptsecurity.com/research/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/striking-panda-attacks-apt31-today
    - https://www.cybertriage.com/artifact/terminalservices_remoteconnectionmanager_log/
    - https://ponderthebits.com/2018/02/windows-rdp-related-event-logs-identification-tracking-and-investigation/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2025-12-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wmi:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Select'
            - 'Win32_NTLogEvent'
    selection_wevtutil_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wevtutil.exe'
    selection_wevtutil_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' qe '
            - ' query-events '
    selection_wmic_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_wmic_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' ntevent'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Get-WinEvent '
            - 'get-eventlog '
    selection_logs_name:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more event log channels that are interesting for attackers
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender'
            - 'PowerShellCore'
            - 'Security'
            - 'Windows PowerShell'
    selection_logs_eid:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: We use the "?" to account for both a single and a double quote
            # Note: Please add additional interesting event IDs
            # Note: As this only focuses on EIDs and we know EIDs are not unique across providers. Rare FPs might occur with legit queries to EIDs from different providers.
            # This covers EID 4624 and 4628 from Security Log
            - '-InstanceId 462?'
            - '.eventid -eq 462?'
            - '.ID -eq 462?'
            - 'EventCode=?462?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?462?'
            - 'System[EventID=462?]'
            # This covers EID 4778 from Security Log
            - '-InstanceId 4778'
            - '.eventid -eq 4778'
            - '.ID -eq 4778'
            - 'EventCode=?4778?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?4778?'
            - 'System[EventID=4778]'
            # This covers EID 25 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 25'
            - '.eventid -eq 25'
            - '.ID -eq 25'
            - 'EventCode=?25?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?25?'
            - 'System[EventID=25]'
            # This covers EID 1149 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 1149'
            - '.eventid -eq 1149'
            - '.ID -eq 1149'
            - 'EventCode=?1149?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?1149?'
            - 'System[EventID=1149]'
            # This covers EID 21 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 21'
            - '.eventid -eq 21'
            - '.ID -eq 21'
            - 'EventCode=?21?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?21?'
            - 'System[EventID=21]'
            # This covers EID 22 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 22'
            - '.eventid -eq 22'
            - '.ID -eq 22'
            - 'EventCode=?22?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?22?'
            - 'System[EventID=22]'
    condition: 1 of selection_logs_* and (selection_wmi or all of selection_wevtutil_* or all of selection_wmic_* or selection_cmdlet)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the utility by administrators to query the event log
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_eventlog_content_recon/info.yml

title: Powershell Create Scheduled Task
id: 363eccc0-279a-4ccf-a3ab-24c2e63b11fb
status: test
description: Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md#atomic-test-4---powershell-cmdlet-scheduled-task
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md#atomic-test-6---wmi-invoke-cimmethod-scheduled-task
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'New-ScheduledTaskAction'
            - 'New-ScheduledTaskTrigger'
            - 'New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal'
            - 'New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet'
            - 'New-ScheduledTask'
            - 'Register-ScheduledTask'
    selection_cimmethod:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Invoke-CimMethod'
            - '-ClassName'
            - 'PS_ScheduledTask'
            - '-NameSpace'
            - 'Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler'
    filter_main_legitimate_scripts:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Export-ModuleMember'
            - 'Microsoft.Management.Infrastructure.CimInstance'
            - '__cmdletization_methodParameter'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cmdlet_scheduled_task/info.yml

title: PowerShell Defender Threat Severity Default Action Set to 'Allow' or 'NoAction'
id: 1e8a9b4d-3c2a-4f9b-8d1e-7c6a5b4f3d2e
related:
    - id: 5a9e1b2c-8f7d-4a1e-9b3c-0f6d7e5a4b1f
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of PowerShell to execute the 'Set-MpPreference' cmdlet to configure Windows Defender's threat severity default action to 'Allow' (value '6') or 'NoAction' (value '9').
    This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level.
    An attacker might use this technique via the command line to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/security-malware-windows-defender-threatseveritydefaultaction
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/7215831c-8252-4ae3-8d43-db588e82f952
    - https://gist.github.com/Dump-GUY/8daef859f382b895ac6fd0cf094555d2
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-LowThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-ModerateThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-HighThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-SevereThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-ltdefac '
            - '-mtdefac '
            - '-htdefac '
            - '-stdefac '
    selection_value:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Allow'
            - '6'
            - 'NoAction'
            - '9'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high

title: PowerShell Profile Modification
id: b5b78988-486d-4a80-b991-930eff3ff8bf
status: test
description: Detects the creation or modification of a powershell profile which could indicate suspicious activity as the profile can be used as a mean of persistence
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/powershellprofile.html
author: HieuTT35, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-10-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.013
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1'
            - '\PowerShell\profile.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\profile.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\PowerShell\7\profile.ps1'
            - '\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\profile.ps1'
            - '\WindowsPowerShell\profile.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administrator creating Powershell profile manually
level: medium

title: Previously Installed IIS Module Was Removed
id: 9e1a1fdf-ee58-40ce-8e15-b66ca5a80e1f
status: test
description: Detects the removal of a previously installed IIS module.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/manage/provisioning-and-managing-iis/configure-logging-in-iis
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2024-10-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1505.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: iis-configuration
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 29
        Configuration|contains: '/system.webServer/modules/remove'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator activity
# Note: Upgrade after an initial baseline
level: low

title: Remote PowerShell Session (PS Module)
id: 96b9f619-aa91-478f-bacb-c3e50f8df575
status: test
description: Detects remote PowerShell sessions
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-08-10
modified: 2023-01-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - ' = ServerRemoteHost ' #  HostName: 'ServerRemoteHost'  french : Nom d’hôte =
            - 'wsmprovhost.exe'      #  HostApplication|contains: 'wsmprovhost.exe' french  Application hôte =
    filter_pwsh_archive:
        ContextInfo|contains: '\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive.psm1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use remote PowerShell sessions
level: high

title: Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE
id: 92626ddd-662c-49e3-ac59-f6535f12d189
status: test
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-create
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - car.2013-08-001
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /create '
    filter_main_system_user:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    filter_optional_msoffice:
        #  schtasks.exe /Create /tn "Microsoft\Office\Office Performance Monitor" /XML "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\ClickToRun\{9AC08E99-230B-47e8-9721-4577B7F124EA}\Microsoft_Office_Office Performance Monitor.xml"
        ParentImage:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'Microsoft\Office\Office Performance Monitor'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - Software installation
level: low

title: Service permissions hijacked for privileges abuse (service)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the permissions of a service in order to abuse its privileges
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- http://woshub.com/set-permissions-on-windows-service/
- https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/view-edit-service-permissions-windows/
- https://decoder.cloud/2019/02/07/demystifying-windows-service-permissions-configuration/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.1
- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/abuse-service-registry-acls-windows-privesc-f88079140509
- https://github.com/rohnedwards/PowerShellAccessControl
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1574.010
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_sdset: # full command (native commmand): "sc sdset XblGameSave "D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)"
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: sdset

  selection_subinACL: # full command (3rd party tool): subinacl.exe /service Spooler /grant=contoso\tuser=PTO
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      #- subinacl # not considered as executable name can be changed
      - 'service'
      - 'grant='

  selection_setACL: # full command (3rd party tool): SetACL.exe -on "schedule" -ot srv -actn list
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      #- setacl # not considered as executable name can be changed
      - 'on'   # object name
      - 'srv'  # object type
      - 'actn' # action

  condition: selection_sdset OR selection_subinACL OR selection_setACL
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via AWK - Linux
id: 8c1a5675-cb85-452f-a298-b01b22a51856
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "awk" or it's sibling commands, to invoke a shell using the system() function.
    This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gawk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nawk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/mawk/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/awk'
            - '/gawk'
            - '/mawk'
            - '/nawk'
        CommandLine|contains: 'BEGIN {system'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious WindowsTerminal Child Processes
id: 8de89e52-f6e1-4b5b-afd1-41ecfa300d48
status: test
description: Detects suspicious children spawned via the Windows Terminal application which could be a sign of persistence via WindowsTerminal (see references section)
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/windowsterminalprofile.html
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-25
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WindowsTerminal.exe'
            - '\wt.exe'
    selection_susp:
        - Image|endswith:
              # Add more LOLBINS
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\csc.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              # Add more suspicious paths
              - 'C:\Users\Public\'
              - '\Downloads\'
              - '\Desktop\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\TEMP\'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # Add more suspicious commandline
              - ' iex '
              - ' icm'
              - 'Invoke-'
              - 'Import-Module '
              - 'ipmo '
              - 'DownloadString('
              - ' /c '
              - ' /k '
              - ' /r '
    filter_builtin_visual_studio_shell:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Import-Module'
            - 'Microsoft.VisualStudio.DevShell.dll'
            - 'Enter-VsDevShell'
    filter_open_settings:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_'
            - '\LocalState\settings.json'
    filter_vsdevcmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
            - '\Common7\Tools\VsDevCmd.bat'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate "Windows Terminal" profiles
level: medium